Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 22SMCV01496, Date: 2023-02-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV01496 Hearing Date: February 1, 2023 Dept: 207
Background
Plaintiff Heather Yang (“Plaintiff”) brings this action
against Defendant Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. (“Defendant”) stemming from
alleged defects in a 2020 Lexus UX 250H manufactured by Defendant. Plaintiff’s
operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts causes of action against
Defendant for (1) breach of implied warranty under the Song-Beverly Act, (2)
breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act, (3) violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and (4) breach of express warranty under California
Commercial Code § 2-313. Defendant now brings this demurrer to Plaintiff’s
first and second causes of action for breach of implied and express warranty
under the Song-Beverly Act, arguing each fails to state a cause of action
against it and is uncertain pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e) and (f).
Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s demurrer.
Demurrer Standard
When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. (Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento
(1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-21.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must
be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the
pleading alone, and not on the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v.
Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such,
the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied
factual allegations. (Id.) However, it does not accept as true
deductions, contentions, or conclusions of law or fact. (Stonehouse Homes
LLC v. City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.)
A special demurrer for uncertainty under Section 430.10(f) is disfavored
and will only be sustained where the pleading is so unintelligible a defendant
cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be
admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury
v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even
if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern
discovery procedures.” (Id.)
Analysis
1. Meet and
Confer Requirement
The Court finds Defendant has
satisfied the meet and confer obligations imposed by Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41.
(Skanes Decl. at ¶8.)
2. Uncertainty
Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10 defines “uncertain”
as ambiguous and unintelligible. Case precedent shows that a demurrer to a complaint
for uncertainty should not be sustained where the allegations are sufficiently clear
to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet as such a motion is directed
at the uncertainty of the allegations actually made, not at the insufficiency of
the facts alleged. (People v. Lim (1941), 18 Cal.2d 872, 883 [citing Callahan
v. Broderick (1899), 124 Cal. 80, 83; Brea v. McGlashan (1934), 3 Cal.App.2d
454, 459; Smith v. Hollander (1927), 85 Cal.App. 535, 542; Butler v. Wyman
(1933), 128 Cal.App. 736, 740].)
Plaintiff’s causes of action for
breach of express and implied warranty under the Song-Beverly Act are not uncertain
as they are neither ambiguous nor unintelligible and plainly apprise Defendant
of the claims being made against it. Additionally, Defendant has not provided an
argument as to why these causes of action are uncertain under section 430.10(f).
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to the first and second causes of action on
the basis of uncertainty is OVERRULED.
3. Song-Beverly
Act Claims
Defendant argues Plaintiff’s first
and second causes of action for breach of implied and express warranty,
respectively, under the Song-Beverly Act are fatally flawed as the subject
vehicle is not a “new motor vehicle” as defined by the Act.
“The Song-Beverly Act is a
remedial statute designed to protect consumers who have purchased products
covered by an express warranty.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of
California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 798.) It regulates warranty
terms and imposes service and repair obligations on the parties who issue the
warranties. (Joyce v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486.)
The Act was subsequently amended to include provisions specifically applicable
to motor vehicles and this amendment became known as the Lemon Law. (Jensen
v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 123.) The motor
vehicle provision is codified at Civil Code § 1793.2, et seq. Like its consumer
goods counterpart, section 1793.2(d)(2) applies to sales of new vehicles only;
specifically, it applies to “a new motor vehicle, as that term is defined in
paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22.”
Plaintiff alleges Defendant
manufactured her vehicle, which she purchased used from one of Defendant’s
affiliated dealerships. Plaintiff further alleges at the time of her purchase
there was some portion of Defendant’s original new car warranty still remaining
and unexpired. Defendant argues such facts establish the subject vehicle is a
“new motor vehicle” under the Song-Beverly Act, relying primarily on the recent
Court of Appeal decision in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
209.
The Rodriguez Court analyzed
the statutory framework of the Song-Beverly Act and held as follows:
[A] hallmark
of the Act is that its consumer protections apply against the party who sold the
product to the buyer and issued the express warranty. With this framework in mind,
we turn to the refund-or-replace provision at issue and the definition of “new motor
vehicle”
(Rodriguez, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at 218.)
The current definition,
located in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) provides: “‘New motor vehicle’ means
a new motor vehicle that is bought or used primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes. ‘New motor vehicle’ also means a new motor vehicle with a gross vehicle
weight under 10,000 pounds that is bought or used primarily for business purposes
by a person … or any other legal entity, to which not more than five motor vehicles
are registered in this state. ‘New motor vehicle’ includes the chassis, chassis
cab, and that portion of a motor home devoted to its propulsion, … [and] a dealer-owned
vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's
new car warranty ….
(Id. at 219.)
Based on all
of these textual reasons, we conclude the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with
a manufacturer's new car warranty” unambiguously refers to cars that come with a
new or full express warranty. But even if this meaning weren't readily apparent
from the statute, the Act's legislative history would convince us the phrase refers
to vehicles sold with full warranties. The phrase was added to the Act's definition
of “new motor vehicle” in 1987 with the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 2057 (1987–1988
Reg. Sess.). The enrolled bill report explains that our lawmakers deemed it necessary
to add “dealer-owned vehicles and ‘demonstrator’ vehicles sold with a manufacturer's
new car warranty” to the definition of “new motor vehicles” because “[s]ome buyers
[were] being denied the remedies under the lemon law because their vehicle is a
‘demonstrator’ or ‘dealer-owned’ car, even though it was sold with a new car warranty.”
(Dept. Consumer Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2057 (1987–1988 Reg.
Sess.) Sept. 25, 1987, pp. 3, 5, italics added.) This discussion indicates the amendment
was intended to provide relief to a narrow class of consumers by targeting a specific
type of vehicle—the basically new car. Notably absent from the discussion is any
mention of used vehicles. Indeed, we found no reference to used vehicles in any
of the legislative materials regarding Assembly Bill No. 2057 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.).
One would assume that if the amendment proposed to expand manufacturers’ liability
under the Act to a large class of used vehicles, such a change to the status quo
would warrant mention if not discussion.
(Id. at 223.)
On this basis, the Rodriguez
Court held that a used car purchased from a retail seller unaffiliated with the
manufacturer did not qualify as a “new motor vehicle” simply because there is some
balance remaining on the manufacturer's original warranty. The decision in Rodriguez
is pending review by the California Supreme Court, and thus is persuasive—but
not binding—authority for the Court. (See Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC
(2022) 2022 Cal.LEXIS 3829, 2022 WL 2720861 at 1.)
Plaintiff argues Rodriguez
is distinguishable as it concerned the purchase of a vehicle from a retail
seller unaffiliated with the manufacturer, whereas Plaintiff here purchased the
subject vehicle from a dealership affiliated with Defendant, the manufacturer.
Plaintiff instead urges the Court to adopt the holding of Jensen v. BMW of North
America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112. In Jensen, the plaintiff
leased a used vehicle from a manufacturer-affiliated dealer, which issued a
full new car warranty in addition to the original manufacturer’s warranty. On
such facts, the Jensen Court found the leased vehicle satisfied the
definition of “new motor vehicle” under the Song-Beverly Act. (Id. at
123.)
The Rodriguez Court
distinguished Jensen on two bases: (1) plaintiff in Jensen leased
the vehicle from a manufacturer-affiliated dealership whereas the plaintiff in Rodriguez
purchased the vehicle from an unaffiliated retail seller, and (2) the
affiliated dealership in Jensen issued a full new car warranty in
addition to the original manufacturer’s warranty whereas Rodriguez
concerning only the original, unexpired manufacturer’s warranty :
Though we think
Jensen was correctly decided, we agree with Dagher that its statement
about “the Act's coverage for subsequent purchasers of vehicles with a balance remaining
on the express warranty, must be read in light of the facts then before the court,
and are limited in that respect.” (Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
905, 923.) Given that those facts included a car leased with a full manufacturer's
warranty issued by the manufacturer's representative, the court was not asked to
decide whether a used car with an unexpired warranty sold by a third party reseller
qualifies as a “new motor vehicle.”
(Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at 224.)
The instant facts, as presented in
the parties’ briefing, fall somewhere between Rodriguez and Jensen.
Like Jensen, plaintiff here claims she purchased the subject vehicle
from a manufacturer-affiliated dealership, but like Rodriguez, there was
no additional warranty issued by the seller and the only warranty at issue is
the original, unexpired, manufacturer’s warranty. Thus, even if Rodriguez
were binding on the Court, it is not clear that it would compel the sustaining
of Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action.
Given the unsettled nature of Rodriguez,
the Court declines to find Plaintiff cannot state causes of action under the
Song-Beverly Act for breach of express and implied warranty. If the California
Supreme Court affirms Rodriguez or provides further guidance as to the
interpretation of the Song-Beverly Act, Defendant has alternative means to seek
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under the Act such as by motion for judgment on
the pleadings or motion for summary judgment.
However, the Court notes
Plaintiff’s representation that she purchased the subject vehicle from
Defendant’s “authorized and affiliated
dealership, Lexus Santa Monica” (Opp. at 2) does not appear anywhere in the
FAC. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action under the
Song-Beverly Act but grants Plaintiff leave to amend to assert allegations
regarding her purchase of the subject vehicle from a dealership affiliated with
Defendant under Jensen.
Conclusion
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first and second causes
of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.