Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 22SMCV02390, Date: 2023-06-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV02390 Hearing Date: June 29, 2023 Dept: 207
Background
Plaintiff Carmeletta Mobley (“Plaintiff”) bring this wrongful
termination action against Defendants Jones Lang Lasalle America, Inc. ("JLL") and Roth Staffing Companies, L.P., (“Roth Staffing”
or, collectively with JLL, “Defendants”) stemming from her prior employment
with Defendants. JLL and Roth Staffing now each bring a demurrer to Plaintiff’s
operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). JLL argues the FAC fails to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against it and is uncertain
under Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e) and (f). JLL’s demurrer is unopposed. Roth
Staffing demurs on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
under Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(a) since the matter is currently being litigated
in arbitration. Roth Staffing’s demurrer is also unopposed. As these demurrers
challenge the same pleading, the Court will discuss them together in one tentative
ruling.
Legal
Standard
When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. (Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento
(1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-721.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must
be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the
pleading alone, and not on the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v.
Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such,
the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied
factual allegations. (Id.) However, it does not accept as true
deductions, contentions, or conclusions of law or fact. (Stonehouse Homes
LLC v. City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.)
The general rule is that the
plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v.
City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a
plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that
his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable
precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the
nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)
A special demurrer
for uncertainty under Section 430.10(f) is disfavored and will only be
sustained where the pleading is so unintelligible that a defendant cannot
reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be
admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury
v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even
if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern
discovery procedures.” (Id.)
Analysis
– JLL Demurrer
The Court finds JLL has satisfied
the meet and confer requirement imposed by Code of Civil Proc. § 430.41. (Collins Decl., ¶ 9.) The Court also
grants JLL’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452(c).) However, the Court only takes judicial notice of
“the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified
documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters
asserted in those documents. (Dominguez v. Bonta
(2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)
JLL argues the FAC is uncertain
under Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(f). The Court agrees. The FAC does not clearly
identify what causes of action are being asserted in this action. At one point
the FAC states “This matter encompasses claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, The Americans with Disabilities Act, The Equal Pay Act, The
Fair Labor Standards Act, California Labor Code, The California Industrial
Welfare Commission Wage Orders, whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination,
discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and failure to
pay final wages upon termination.” (FAC, ¶ 5.) The FAC does not identify what
specific provisions of these statutes Plaintiff contends JLL has violated, or how,
or whether each of these potential bases for liability are being asserted
against every defendant named in the FAC. Such pleading directly violates
California Rules of Court, rule 2.112 which requires a plaintiff to separately
state each cause of action, giving each a separate number and describing both
the nature or basis for the claim and identifying the specific parties it is
being asserted against.
The FAC does attach a page from a
form complaint which purports to state a single cause of action for negligence
against both Defendants. This negligence cause of action claims in conclusory
fashion that Plaintiff was denied access to reasonable accommodations “as noted
by ADA laws” and claims she was not provided with final wages prior to her
termination and last day of work. (FAC, p. 7.) It is not clear to the Court
whether Plaintiff is asserting a single cause of action for negligence in this
action or is also raising causes of action under the various statutes
referenced throughout the body of the FAC.
Compounding the confusion, the FAC
does not contain a prayer for relief indicating what relief or damages she is
seeking or claiming in this action. The FAC thus violates Code Civ. Proc. §
425.10(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must contain a “demand for
judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled. If the
recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated.”
The only relief explicitly sought by the FAC is a request that the Court
overrule the demurrers Defendants filed to the original Complaint and a request
that the Court “assess the costs of this action against the Defendant.” (FAC, ¶
20.) In granting Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the initial complaint,
the Court noted the filing of the FAC would moot those prior demurrers and
shortly after the FAC was filed the Court entered an order taking those prior
demurrers off calendar. It is thus not clear what further relief Plaintiff is
seeking in this action.
The FAC is thus unclear and
ambiguous as it leaves the Court to guess as to what is being alleged and to
whom it is being alleged against. The Court thus SUSTAINS JLL’s demurrer. The
Court will allow Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend her Complaint to address
these issues.
JLL also argues several causes of
action or potential causes of action are likely barred by their respective
statutes of limitations. Such claims may be properly raised by demurrer if they
appear on the face of a pleadings. However, in this instance the operative
Complaint is too uncertain for the Court to be able to determine with any
reliability what claims are being raised by Plaintiff and thus cannot determine
whether such claims are barred by applicable statutes of limitation.
Analysis – Roth Staffing
Demurrer
The Court finds that Roth Staffing has
satisfied the meet and confer requirement imposed by Code of Civil Proc. § 430.41.
(Bennett Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. B.)
Roth Staffing contends that
the FAC is subject to demurrer on subject matter jurisdictional grounds under
Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(a) since the matter is currently pending in
arbitration between the parties. Roth
Staffing’s argument is based on numerous documents and correspondence relating
to this ongoing arbitration. Such matter is beyond the purview of the Court in
ruling on a demurrer. A demurrer will only lie as to defects which are apparent
on the face of the pleading or through proper judicial notice. Roth Staffing
has not filed a request for judicial notice under California Rules of Court,
rule 3.1113(l) indicating these documents and email correspondence may be
judicially noticed by the Court, and thus the Court cannot consider these
extraneous documents in ruling on Roth Staffing’s demurrer. Moreover, it is
unlikely such documents would be subject to judicial notice since they do not
appear to fall under any of the categories of permissible judicially noticeable
documents. (See Evid. Code § 452.)
That being said, the FAC does allege that Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement
concerning disputes arising out of her employment with Defendants and that she
submitted this matter to JAMS for arbitration on November 17, 2021. (FAC, ¶
19.) The FAC contains no allegations that this matter has been withdrawn from
arbitration. (See Id., generally.) The existence of an arbitration does
not, however, necessarily deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 32, 46 [trial court “erroneously concluded that a pending private arbitration
in Israel deprived California courts of subject matter jurisdiction and vested
the Israeli courts with exclusive authority to determine the matters at
issue.”]) If Roth Staffing believes
Plaintiffs’ claims in this action are subject to an arbitration agreement or
are currently improperly pending in two separate fora, it may bring a motion to
compel arbitration of these claims and/or a motion to stay or dismiss the case
on this basis, however this does not appear to be an issue which the Court can
resolve by demurrer in this instance. Indeed, the case to which Roth Staffing cites in
its demurrer, Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994)
29 Cal.App.4th 482, is inapposite because the context of that case involved a motion
to compel arbitration, not a demurrer under Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(a).
Accordingly, there being no other grounds upon which Roth
Staffing brought its demurrer, the Court thus OVERRULES Roth Staffing’s demurrer.
Conclusion
JLL’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, as to JLL, with 20-days’ leave
to amend.
Roth Staffing’s demurrer is OVERRULED. Roth Staffing must
file an Answer to the FAC within 20 days of the date of this order.