Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 19STCP00482, Date: 2025-01-29 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

MOVING PARTY: Real Party in Interest Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (“Regency”)

On February 14, 2019, Petitioners/Plaintiffs Citizens for Amending Proposition L, Vernon Price and J. Keith Stephens filed this action arising from disputes over the City’s regulation of Regency-operated billboards in violation of Proposition L.

On December 20, 2024, Regency filed the instant motion to bifurcate (the “Motion”). On January 15, 2025, City filed a limited opposition (the “Opposition”). On January 24, 2025, Regency filed a reply (the “Reply”).

“The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order, no later than the close of pretrial conference in cases in which such pretrial conference is to be held, or, in other cases, no later than 30 days before the trial date, that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case, except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597 and 597.5.” (Code Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 598.)

“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action … or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues ….” (CCP, § 1048, subd. (b).)

Additionally, Evidence Code section 320 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the court in its discretion shall regulate the order of proof.” “Under these provisions, trial courts have broad discretion to determine the order of proof in the interests of judicial economy.” (Grappo v. Coventry Financial Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 496, 504.) Further, “[t]he statutory provisions for severance and separate trials (CCP, §§ 598, 1048) are not limited to the separate trial of a ‘cause of action’ but also authorize a separate trial of any ‘issue.’” (American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 864, 872.)

Bifurcation serves to (1) promote judicial economy by avoiding introduction and consideration of unnecessary evidence; and (2) prevent the determination of liability from being tainted by the consideration of irrelevant, confusing, misleading, and prejudicial evidence related to the issue of damages. (Plaza Tulare v. Tradewell Stores, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 522, 524; see Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 888, fn. 8 [Bifurcating trial may be proper to achieve the purpose of affording a more logical presentation of the evidence and simplifying the issues for the jury].)

Regency moves to bifurcate the trial into two phases: (1) a bench trial regarding the validity of the penalty provision in Section IV.J of the Development Agreement and Regency’s equitable affirmative defenses and (2) a jury trial as to any remaining issues. Regency argues that the validity of the penalty provision is a matter determined by the Court, not the jury, and most of the damages City seeks are based on that penalty provision. (Mot. pp. 16:22-17:15.) Regency argues that bifurcating this issue will “reduce the evidence and testimony to be presented to the jury.” (Mot. p. 16:24.) Regency next argues that their equitable affirmative defenses are also issues to be decided by the Court, and that if any of these defenses are upheld, City’s remaining claims will be resolved or substantially reduced. (Mot. pp. 17:16- 18:11.)

In the Opposition, City states that it does not oppose the proposed bifurcation. (Opp. p. 2:13-20.) Rather, City opposes the language in Regency’s proposed order granting the Motion because it does not reference the parties’ previous agreement to extend the 5-year rule under CCP section 583.10. (Opp. p. 3:15-26.) Thus, because the Court finds that bifurcation would be conducive to judicial expedition and economy in this matter, and because City does not oppose bifurcation, the Motion is GRANTED. The Court further notes that the parties have stipulated to the extension of the Five-Year Rule in CCP section 583.0 to September 14, 2025.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court