Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 19STCV08965, Date: 2023-01-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV08965    Hearing Date: January 18, 2023    Dept: 56

 

 

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

ERIK KITTER, et al.,

 

                        Plaintiffs,

            vs.

 

KEUM NAM CHANG, et al.,

 

                        Defendants.

 

      CASE NO.: 19STCV08965

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER

 

Date: January 18, 2023

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept. 56

Judge: Holly J. Fujie

 

AND CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Gregory Yu (“Moving Defendant”)

 

RESPONDING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Mark Stokes (“Stokes”) and Craig Calman (“Calman”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

 

The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. 

 

BACKGROUND

            This consolidated action consists of five actions arising out of a landlord/tenant relationship at a residential property (the “Property”) owned and managed by Defendants.  On March 8, 2021, Calman filed a complaint (the “Calman Complaint”) in the case styled as Craig Calman v. Keum Nam Chang, et al., LASC Case No. 21STCV08940 alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (4) tortious breach of implied warranty of habitability; (5) negligence; (6) private nuisance; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) violation of Municipal Code Section 151.04; (9) violation of California Civil Code section 1942.4; (10) violation of California Civil Code section 1942.5; and (11) violation of unfair business practices. 

 

            On March 8, 2021, Stokes filed a complaint (the “Stokes Complaint”) in the case styled as Mark Stokes v. Keum Nam Chang, et al., LASC Case No. 21STCV08972.  The Stokes Complaint alleges the same causes of action as the Calman Complaint.[1]

 

In relevant part, Plaintiffs allege: Stokes resided at the Property between 2014 and 2018.  (Stokes Complaint ¶ 31.)  Calman has resided at the Property since 2014.  (Calman Complaint ¶¶ 3, 31.)  There were many unaddressed habitability issues at the Property throughout Plaintiffs’ tenancies.  (See Stokes Complaint ¶¶ 31-44; Calman Complaint ¶¶ 31-49.) 

 

On January 12, 2022, Calman and Stokes both filed amendments to their respective Complaints naming Moving Defendant as the fictitiously named “Doe 1.”  On December 1, 2022, Moving Defendant filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the Stokes and Calman Complaints on the grounds that both Complaints fail to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and both Complaints are uncertain. 

 

 

DISCUSSION

Meet and Confer

The meet and confer requirement has been met.

 

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.  (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)  The court accepts as true all material factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.  (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.)  With respect to a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.  (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)  A demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

 

Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored.  (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.)  A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.  (Id.)  A demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendant's knowledge.  (Id.)  Demurrers for uncertainty are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.  (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.) 

 

            Moving Defendant primarily argues that he was improperly named as a Doe Defendant under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 474 because Moving Defendant is a named Defendant in the lead action and all Plaintiffs in the consolidated actions are represented by the same counsel.  Moving Defendant further argues that because Plaintiffs did not comply with CCP section 474, their claims against him are barred by the four-year statute of limitations for habitability claims because his ownership interest in the Property ended on January 11, 2018.

 

Doe Amendments

CCP section 474 allows a plaintiff who is ignorant of a defendant's identity to commence suit—before the statute of limitations runs—by using a fictitious name for that defendant and then amending her complaint when the defendant's true name is discovered.  (Hahn v. New York Air Brake LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 895, 897-98.)  If the statute's requirements are satisfied, the amendment relates back and the substituted defendant is considered to have been a party from the action's start.  (Id. at 898.)  The test is whether, at the time the complaint was filed, the plaintiff was ignorant of the facts giving rise to a cause of action against the person.  (Id. at 899.)  The focus is on the facts that the plaintiff knew, not on whether the plaintiff subjectively knew she had a cause of action based on those facts.  (Id.)

 

A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred.  (Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 321.)  In order for the bar to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.  (Id.)

The Demurrer cites to the allegations in the pleadings in the lead action as support for Moving Defendant’s position that Stokes and Calman had knowledge of his potential liability and therefore should have named him as a party to their Complaints earlier in the proceedings.  The Court declines to impute the allegations of the pleadings in the lead action to Plaintiffs’ knowledge of Moving Defendant’s potential liability toward them at the time they filed their Complaints.  The Demurrer provides no further evidence of Plaintiffs’ knowledge of facts establishing Moving Defendant’s potential liability for the damages alleged in their Complaints.  The Court observes that a demurrer was not the ideal procedural device to introduce arguments and evidence regarding Plaintiffs’ knowledge since review on demurrer is limited to the pleadings and judicially noticeable matters; a motion to quash service of summons or a motion for summary judgment would have been more appropriate if Moving Defendant intended to properly present evidence of Plaintiffs’ knowledge of his liability when they filed their Complaints.  (See Cal. Judges Benchbook Civ. Proc. Before Trial § 10.96 (citing cases).) 

 

Moving Defendant’s arguments about the statute of limitations were also improperly raised in the Demurrer as neither the Stokes nor Calman Complaint alleges facts which indisputably establish the expiration of the statute of limitations.[2]  Furthermore, both Complaints allege sufficient facts to put Moving Defendant on notice of their claims against him; any ambiguities regarding the timeline of his potential liability may be clarified in discovery.  (See Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) 

 

The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer in its entirety.  Moving Defendant is ordered to answer to the Complaints within 20 days of this order.

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

 

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

 


 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. 

 

 

Dated this 18th day of January 2023

 

  

Hon. Holly J. Fujie 

Judge of the Superior Court 

 

 

 



[1] The Court refers to the Calman Complaint and the Stokes Complaint collectively as the “Complaints.”

[2] Even if Moving Defendant had filed a motion to quash or motion for summary judgment, he has not presented admissible evidence of the date he sold the Property.  In law and motion practice, factual evidence is supplied to the court by way of declarations.  (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.)