Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 19STCV14194, Date: 2023-02-17 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

Case Number: 19STCV14194    Hearing Date: February 17, 2023    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Diana Herrera (“Ms. Herrera”) and Felix Herrera (“Mr. Herrera”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. 

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle (the “Vehicle”) manufactured by Moving Defendant.  On April 23, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) breach of express written warranty; and (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.

In relevant part, the Complaint alleges: Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle on or about May 26, 2012.  (Complaint ¶ 7.)  The Vehicle came with various warranties, and during the warranty period, the Vehicle contained or developed various defects.  (See Complaint ¶¶ 8-9.)  Although Moving Defendant’s authorized representatives were unable to repair the defects, Moving Defendant refused to repurchase the Vehicle or pay Plaintiffs restitution.  (Complaint ¶ 10.)

On December 2, 2022, Moving Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication (the “Motion”) on the ground that the undisputed facts demonstrate that all of Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations.  

DISCUSSION

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense.  (CCP § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)  Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)       

Song-Beverly Act Claims

            A plaintiff alleging breaches of express warranties under the Song-Beverly Act is required to plead and prove that: (1) the vehicle had a nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element).  (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 152.) 

Song-Beverly Act causes of action are subject to the four-year statute of limitations set forth in California Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) section 2725.  (Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 213-14; Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 133.)  UCC section 2725 provides: (1) an action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued; and (2) a cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach.  (Id. at 1306.)  A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.  (Id.)  Generally, statute of limitations issues raise questions of fact that must be tried; however, when the uncontradicted facts are susceptible of only one legitimate inference, summary judgment is proper.  (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1374.)

            Moving Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred in their entirety because they accrued in 2014 at the latest.  In support of the Motion, Moving Defendant provides evidence that on May 26, 2012, Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle.  (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) 1.)  The Vehicle—a pre-owned Kia Sorrento—came with the balance of the New Vehicle Limited Warranty.  (UMFs 1-2.) 

On September 6, 2012, Plaintiffs brought the Vehicle to an authorized repair facility due to a problem with the check engine light.  (UMF 4.)  During this first visit, the brake switch was replaced.  (Id.)  Plaintiffs brought the Vehicle to Moving Defendant’s authorized representative again on September 20, 2012 because the Vehicle did not start and the check engine light was on.  (UMF 5.)  During this visit, a transmission control upgrade was completed.  (Id.)  On February 27, 2013, Plaintiffs brought the Vehicle to Moving Defendant’s authorized representative due to a steering wheel issue and loose headrest.  (UMF 6.)  Plaintiffs brought the Vehicle to Moving Defendant’s authorized representative on April 8, 2013 with complaints of an oil leak and a noise made by the power steering when turning.  (UMF 7.)  On July 16, 2013, Plaintiffs brought the Vehicle in with complaints related to the battery.  (UMF 8.)  On January 24, 2014, Plaintiffs brought the Vehicle in for recalls and maintenance.  (UMF 9.)^[1] 

In their opposition (the “Opposition”), Plaintiffs present evidence that they were not aware that the Vehicle had warranty-related problems until they presented the Vehicle to Moving Defendant’s authorized repair facility during a series of visits between 2016 and 2019.  (See Additional Material Fact (“AMF”) 7.)  Plaintiffs present evidence that they brought the Vehicle to Moving Defendant’s authorized repair facility on or around June 22, 2016 due to the Vehicle having an active airbag light.  (AMF 8; Declaration of Diana Herrera (“Ms. Herrera Decl.”) ¶ 10, Exhibit 3.)  During this visit, Ms. Herrera was informed that the repair was not covered by warranty.  (See id.)  Plaintiffs also present evidence that Moving Defendant extended a warranty related to the Vehicle’s airbag in June 2016.  (See Declaration of Matthew Pardo (“Pardo Decl.”) ¶ 4, Exhibit 2.)  On around August 17, 2016, Ms. Herrera brought the Vehicle to an authorized repair facility with complaints about the Vehicle’s air conditioning system.  (AMF 12; Ms. Herrera Decl., Exhibit 4.)  On September 1, 2016, Ms. Herrera again brought the Vehicle to an authorized repair facility due to problems with the air conditioning.  (AMF 13; Ms. Herrera Decl. ¶ 12, Exhibit 5.)  Finally, on or around January 28, 2019, Ms. Herrera brought the Vehicle to an authorized repair facility with concerns including problems with the door handle, airbag light, and dash lights.  (UMF 14; Herrera Decl. ¶ 14, Exhibit 6.)  Before 2016, Plaintiffs believed that the Vehicle had been repaired by Moving Defendant’s authorized repair facility in 2012 through 2014 and relied on Moving Defendant’s representatives’ assurances that the Vehicle did not have longstanding problems that might indicate a defect.  (See AMF 6.)

First through Fourth Causes of Action

Express warranty claims accrue when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the breach of warranty.  (See, e.g., Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 642-43.)

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that there are triable issues of material fact regarding whether Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims are time-barred.  While Moving Defendant presents evidence that Plaintiffs made four visits to its representatives, only three of those visits relate to the alleged warranty breaches.  Furthermore, Plaintiffs present evidence that before 2016, they believed that Moving Defendant’s representatives repaired the issues exhibited by the Vehicle and did not suspect any long-term or unfixable defects.  The Court additionally notes that while neither the Motion nor Separate Statement mention the evidence of Plaintiffs’ visits to the repair facility that occurred after 2014, exhibits offered as evidentiary support for the Motion do include evidence of these visits.  (See, e.g., Declaration of Eric Tsai (“Tsai Decl.”), Exhibit D at 45:1-3.)  Moving Defendant’s reply (the “Reply”) argues that Plaintiffs’ visits to its repair facility between 2016 and 2019 concerned issues with the Vehicle that were not directly related to their visits between 2012 and 2014, and that Plaintiffs otherwise fail to present evidence that they did not suspect that their initial issues with the Vehicle issues were manifestations of u defects despite conducting a diligently investigation.  The Reply does not, however, dispute that these visits occurred, and there is no evidence that Plaintiffs experienced issues with the Vehicle during the nearly two and a half years between their January 2014 visit (which was related to a recall and not explicitly connected to a warranty) and June 2016 visits.  The Court finds that the Reply’s arguments are thus insufficient to demonstrate that there are no triable issues of fact regarding whether Plaintiffs should have been on inquiry notice of their claims after 2014.  The Court therefore DENIES the Motion as to the first through fourth causes of action.

Fifth Cause of Action

The duration of the implied warranty of merchantability and where present the implied warranty of fitness with respect to used consumer goods sold in this state, where the sale is accompanied by an express warranty, shall be coextensive in duration with an express warranty which accompanies the consumer goods, provided the duration of the express warranty is reasonable, but in no event shall such implied warranties have a duration of less than 30 days nor more than three months following the sale of used consumer goods to a retail buyer.  (Civ. Code § 1795.5, subd. (c).)  Claims for breach of implied warranty are also governed by the four-year statute of limitations.¿¿(Mexia¿v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc.¿(2009) 174¿Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306.)  In contrast to a breach of an express warranty, however, a breach of the implied warranty¿occurs only¿at the time of delivery.¿ (Id. at¿1304.)¿ In the case of a latent defect, a product is rendered unmerchantable, and the warranty of merchantability is breached,¿by the existence of the unseen defect, not by its subsequent discovery.  (Id.¿at 1305.)

Based on the foregoing, a breach of an implied warranty accrued when Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle.  It is undisputed that the Vehicle was purchased pre-owned in 2012.  Under Civil Code section 1795.5, subdivision (c), the Vehicle’s implied warranty expired three months after its purchase.  Plaintiffs did not file the Complaint more than four years after the Vehicle’s purchase; thus, their claim for breach of implied warranty is barred by the statute of limitations.  The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion to the fifth cause of action.[2]

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court strongly encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.  If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org stating your intention to appear in person.  The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.  This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

   Dated this 17th day of February 2023