Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 20STCV22092, Date: 2023-08-04 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.


Case Number: 20STCV22092    Hearing Date: August 4, 2023    Dept: 56

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

MAYRA SANTANA OLVERA,

                        Plaintiff,

            vs.

 

5905 AHK, LLC, et al.,

            Defendants.

 

      CASE NO.: 20STCV22092

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

 

Date:  August 4, 2023

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept. 56

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”)

           

            The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. 

 

BACKGROUND

            This action arises out of the purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle that was manufactured by Defendant.  The operative second amended complaint (the “SAC”) alleges: (1) violations of the Song-Beverly Act; (2) violations of the Magnuson-Moss Act; (3) violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act; (4) violations of the unfair competition law; (5) violations of Vehicle Code sections 11713 and 11713.18; and (6) bond liability.[1]

 

On June 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees (the “Motion”) on the grounds that she and Defendant entered into a settlement agreement (the “Agreement”) that entitles her to attorney’s fees in the amount of $74,496.00 and costs in the amount of $7,799.80.

 

DISCUSSION

A prevailing party in an action under the Song-Beverly Act may be entitled to attorney’s fees.  (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d); see also CCP § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)  Attorney’s fees ordinarily include compensation for all hours reasonably spent, including those necessary to establish and defend the claims.  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.)  The party moving for attorney’s fees has the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.)  Where a case is premised on a contingent fee agreement it is appropriate to award reasonable attorney’s fees for time reasonably expended by the attorney.  (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 755.)  If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.  (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

 

In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, his learning, his age and his experience in the particular type of work demanded.  (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659.)  An award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.  (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.)  The verified time statements of attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) 

 

             A court awards attorney’s fees based on the “lodestar” method which is “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)  The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.  (Id.)  The loadstar figure may be adjusted, based on a consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Id.)  Generally, the reasonable hourly rate used for the lodestar calculation is that prevailing in the community for similar work.  (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616.)  Nevertheless, where an attorney has been awarded attorney’s fees for comparable work at comparable hourly rates in other actions, the hourly rate will be deemed reasonable.  (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473-74.)  Where a defendant does not produce evidence contradicting the reasonableness of plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates, the Court will deem an attorney’s hourly rate reasonable.  (Id. at 473.) 

 

            In support of the Motion, Plaintiff provides evidence of its billing records.  (See Declaration of Robert B. Mobasseri (“Mobasseri Decl.”), Exhibit A.)  The Court finds that the Motion has demonstrated that her Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hourly rates are reasonable based on their qualifications, skills and experience.  (See 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-37.) 

 

Reasonableness of Billing Entries

Where a party is challenging the reasonableness of attorney’s fees as excessive that party must attack itemized billing with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate or obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable.  (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-64.)  A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.  (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101.)  Attorney billing records are given a presumption of credibility.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

 

            Defendant argues that many of the hours reflected in Plaintiff’s billing records should not be compensable because the records reflect time billed on matters related to the litigation prior to Defendant being named as a party.  (See Declaration of Robert Hugh Ellis (“Ellis Decl.”) ¶ 7, Exhibit 6.) 

 

            While the Court agrees with Plaintiff’s general argument that she is not necessarily precluded from recovering fees and costs incurred in the investigation of the action before naming Defendant as a party, neither the Motion nor reply brief provide specific evidence of how the pre-April 2022 billing entries or costs specifically relate to Defendant’s being named as a party in the FAC.  (See Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 655-56.)  The Court therefore finds it appropriate to only allow Plaintiff to recover fees and costs incurred beginning on February 9, 2022, when Plaintiff initially named Defendant as a party.

 

            The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion in part in accordance with the above.

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. 

        Dated this 4th day of August 2023

 

 

 

 

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court

 



[1] Defendant was named as a party to the action in February 2022.