Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 20STCV48295, Date: 2025-06-04 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition has been filed. Any opposition was required to have been filed by May 21, 2025. (Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), § 1005, subd. (b) [opposition must be filed at least nine court days prior to the hearing].)

Plaintiff filed this defamation and related claims action on December 17, 2020. The operative first-amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges causes of action for: (1) defamation per se; (2) defamation per quod; (3) false light; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; (6) negligent interference with prospective economic relations; and (7) injunctive relief.

October 8, 2024, Defendant filed a renewed special motion to strike (the “Anti-SLAPP Motion”). On January 23, 2025, the Court granted the Anti-SLAPP Motion.

On March 3, 2025, Defendant filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees (the “Motion”). The Motion is unopposed.

Pursuant to CCP section 425.16 subdivision (c)(1), “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.” (See also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141-1142.) Parties may seek attorney fees and costs in connection with a special motion to strike (1) in the moving papers, (2) in a subsequently filed motion, or (3) as part of a cost memorandum. (Melbostad v. Fisher (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 987, 992.)¿The moving party has the burden of proof in a motion for attorney’s fees. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.) The successful party is also entitled to fees incurred in filing the motion for anti-SLAPP fees, also referred to as “fees on fees.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1141 [in anti-SLAPP, CCP § 425.16 context].)

Defendant moves for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $218,625.71, consisting of: (1) $197,117.50 in attorney’s fees incurred for work on the Anti-SLAPP Motion; (2) $7,023.00 for attorney’s fees incurred for work on the instant Motion; (3) $9,035.00 in anticipated fees for preparing a reply brief and preparing for and attending the hearing on this Motion; and (4) $5,450.21 in costs.

It is undisputed that Defendant is the prevailing party on the Anti-SLAPP Motion and is thus entitled to attorney fees.

In determining whether the attorneys’ fees requested under Section 425.16 are “reasonable,” the Court “may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, his learning, his age, and his experience in the particular type of work demanded . . . [,] the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed.” (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659, disapproved on other grounds [quotation marks and emphasis omitted.])

Defendant seeks to recover attorney’s fees for two attorneys who worked on this matter. Their hourly rates are as follows: (1) Corey Carter, Carter Law: $695/hour; and (2) Matthew Strugar, Law Office of Matthew Strugar: $950/hour.

Each attorney attests to their legal experience and the reasonableness of their rates. (Carter Decl., ¶¶ 2-6; Strugar Decl., ¶¶ 2-22.) The Court finds, based on the submitted declarations and the Court’s own experience, that the requested hourly rates are reasonable for attorneys with their experience and in this area of law.

Defendant’s fee recovery is based on 224 hours for which counsel has submitted billing records. (Carter Decl., Ex. B; Strugar Decl., Ex. A.)

Upon review of the time entries submitted with the Motion, the Court finds that the time spent was reasonable. The entries are limited to fees incurred related to the Anti-SLAPP Motion and the instant Motion. As no reply brief was filed, and the Court anticipates that the hearing on this matter will take no than longer 0.5 hours, a reduction of 12 hours, or $8,340.00, is appropriate. (See Mot., p. 9:11-13.)

Thus, Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED, in the reduced amount of $210, 285.71.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court