Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 20STCV49295, Date: 2025-01-23 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

Plaintiff filed this defamation and related claims action on December 17, 2020. The operative first-amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges causes of action for: (1) defamation per se; (2) defamation per quod; (3) false light; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; (6) negligent interference with prospective economic relations; and (7) injunctive relief.

On February 16, 2021, Defendant filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 425.16. The trial court denied the motion and Defendant filed an appeal. On August 29, 2024, the Court of Appeal issued a remittitur reversing the trial court’s conclusion and remanding the matter to determine Plaintiff’s probability of prevailing on the claim.

On October 8, 2024, Defendant filed the instant renewed special motion to strike (the “Anti-SLAPP Motion” or the “Motion”). On January 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition (the “Opposition”). Plaintiff filed additional documents in support of his Opposition on January 9, 10, and 14, 2025. On January 15, 2025, Defendant filed a Reply.

Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), the Court may take judicial notice of “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States”.

The court, however, may not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the documents. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) Documents are only judicially noticeable to show their existence and what orders were made such that the truth of the facts and findings within the documents are not judicially noticeable. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 885.)

Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the Court takes judicial notice of Defendant's original Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike under the Anti-SLAPP statute.

Pursuant to Defendant’s request, the Court takes judicial notice of: (1) the complaint in Nelson v. Bridgers, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 21STCV35635, filed 12/29/2021; (2) the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, Division One, in Nelson v. Bridgers, Case No. B325454, filed October 30, 2024 ; (3) the request for judicial notice filed in support of the special motion to strike filed in this case on 12/17/2020; and (4) the notice of ruling filed in this case on 1/31/22.

Anti-SLAPP analysis under CCP section 425.16 proceeds in two familiar steps. In the first step, the defendant or moving party must make “a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one ‘arising from’ protected activity.” (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 321 [quotations omitted] (Barry).) In this context, the term “protected activity” refers to speech or petitioning activities. (Id.) A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim; otherwise stated, “the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action [must] itself [be] … an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 [quotations omitted] (Park).) “[T]he focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’” (Id.) In teasing out whether protected conduct exists, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability. (Id.)

If the court finds the defendant or moving party succeeds at the first step, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to “demonstrate[] a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Id. [quotations omitted].) At the second step, courts “evaluate the defendants’ evidence only to determine if it defeats that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law. [I]n order to establish the requisite probability of prevailing, the plaintiff need only have stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim. Put another way, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited … That burden [is] not particularly high.” (Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 602 [quotations and citations omitted] (Area 51 Productions, Inc.).) “Claims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94 (Navallier).) If the cause of action satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute, then it is subject to being struck. (Barry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 321.)

As stated by our State’s highest Court: “This is a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.’” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192 (Varian).)

The findings of the Court of Appeal as stated in the remittitur issued on August 29, 2024 are the law of the case and as such this Court adopts them. (8/29/2024 Remittitur.) In that decision, the Court of Appeal held that Defendant’s “Instagram post qualifies as ‘protected activity’ under the anti-SLAPP law.” (8/29/2024 Remittitur, p. 6.) The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.

Once a defendant demonstrates that protected conduct is at issue, the plaintiff must show that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.¿ (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89.) “The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Accordingly, as explained in Baral, the second step of the analysis under section 425.16 requires a plaintiff to separately establish a probability of prevailing on each distinct claim for relief: “[T]he plaintiff must make the requisite showing as to each challenged claim that is based on allegations of protected activity.” (Id. at p. 392.)

The elements of any defamation claim are: (1) intentional publication by defendant of a statement of fact (2) that is false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damages. (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) When the defamed plaintiff is a public figure, to succeed against a special motion to strike they must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the challenged statement “was made with actual malice —that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1259 [quotations omitted]; see also Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 71, 84 (Christian).)

The Court of Appeal determined that Plaintiff is a figure in the public eye. (8/29/2024 Remittitur, pp. 7-8.) Therefore, in order to prevail on the Motion, he must show that Defendant acted with actual malice. Defendant asserts that she did not act with malice in making statements about Plaintiff's past acts of violence because these statements were based on Plaintiff's own accounts of these incidents, which he shared with her and others in her presence. (Mot. pp. 10:25-11:28; Bannon Depo. pp. 30-35, 43, 46, 56-58.) Defendant testified that “[Plaintiff] told me that he killed the Latino man with a baseball bat.” (Bannon Depo. p. 43:4-8.) Additionally, she verified with multiple individuals that Plaintiff had recounted the same stories to them as he had told her. (Kunkle Decl. ¶ 3; Besel Decl. ¶ 3; Clancy Decl. ¶ 7; Strugar Decl., Ex. D [Bridgers Depo.].)

Regarding the statements about Plaintiff defrauding his neighbor, Defendant asserts that she spoke with the neighbor, who verified the stories to her. (Mot., p. 12:4-20; Bannon Depo. pp. 102-105; Supp. Bannon Decl., Ex. A.) Defendant testified that the neighbor told her that “Mr. Nelson had forged his [the neighbor’s] signature [and] defrauded him out of a ridiculous amount of money.” (Bannon Depo. p. 103:24-25.) As to the statements about Plaintiff’s instrument business, Defendant again asserts that Plaintiff was the one who told her that he possessed stolen musical equipment and had manufactured fake vintage guitars. (Mot. pp. 12:27-13:10; Bannon Depo., 52-55, 112-120.) Defendant also presents testimony from other persons who state, “He told me to my face that he stole $30,000 worth of gear”. (Strugar Decl., Ex. D [Bridgers Depo., p. 59:5-6.].)

Lastly, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot show that she acted with malice when she posted “I am also one of multiple women Chris has dated who has suspected that he was hacking them” because she expressed her suspicion as an opinion, a cybersecurity expert verified that her suspicion was credible before she made the statement on Instagram, and she stated that she had no “irrefutable proof” and that Plaintiff denied that he had hacked her. (Mot., pp. 13:17-14:21; Bannon Decl., Ex. A at p. 16; Sweet Decl., ¶¶ 2-14.)

In the Opposition, Plaintiff argues that there is circumstantial evidence that Plaintiff acted with malice because Plaintiff and her other sources of information were unreliable and biased against him and did not further investigate their claims. (Opp. pp. 9:23-10:2.) Plaintiff relies on Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, for the proposition that “failure to investigate, anger and hostility toward the plaintiff, reliance upon sources known to be unreliable, or known to be biased against the plaintiff – such factors may, in an appropriate case, indicate that the publisher himself had serious doubts regarding the truth of his publication.” (Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 258 [citations omitted].) Such evidence, however, “is relevant only to the extent that it reflects on the subjective attitude of the publisher.” (Id.)

In opposing the Motion, Plaintiff relies on his declaration and on Defendant’s testimony. He states that he has not killed anyone or committed any of the other violent acts Defendant made statements about. (Opp., pp. 10:4-16; Nelson Decl., ¶¶ 43-54.) Plaintiff highlights Defendant’s deposition in which she stated, “A part of me wasn't even certain that it was true because it seemed, I just found his lack of remorse to be almost unbelievable to the point where I just had doubts about his veracity.” (Bannon Decl. p. 48:19-25.) Plaintiff argues that he did not defraud his neighbor and provides evidence that the two are still cordial. (Opp. p., 11:19-20; Martel Decl. p. 1:27; Nelson Decl., ¶¶ 21-24) Plaintiff also asserts that he has never manufactured or sold fake instruments or hacked any person. (Nelson Decl., ¶¶ 25-33, 40-42.) Ultimately, viewing the evidence before the Court as a whole, these contentions are insufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden to show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.

The requirement to prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence “presents a heavy burden, far in excess of the preponderance sufficient for most civil litigation. The burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a finding of high probability. The evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.” (Christian, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 84 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) While Plaintiff maintains that the statements Defendant made on Instagram are false, and that she was biased against him, he fails to present clear and convincing evidence that Defendant believed the statements were false. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits of his defamation causes of action.

Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action for false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with prospective economic relations and injunctive relief are based upon the same facts and alleged defamatory statements. Thus, the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to show a probability of prevailing on his defamation causes of action requires the remaining causes of action to be stricken as well.

Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike Under the Anti-SLAPP statute is GRANTED. The First-Amended Complaint is STRICKEN.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court