Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 21STCP24228, Date: 2025-02-11 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.
Case Number: 21STCP24228 Hearing Date: February 11, 2025 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOTION
FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT
MOVING PARTY: Cross-Defendant/Cross-Complainant
Maiden Stone, Inc. (“MSI”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Cross-Complainant Stoneland (“Stoneland”) and Defendant/Cross-Complainant
Landry Design Group Incorporated (“Landry”)
The Court has considered the moving
and opposition papers. No reply has been filed.
Background
This action arises out of alleged construction
defects. On June 29, 2021, Plaintiff Ted Waitt Trustee of The Nightingale Trust
dated November 1, 2017 (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint (“Complaint”) against defendants
Tyler Development Corporation (“Tyler Development”); Landry Design Group
Incorporated; Planned Partners Limited; Mark L. Smith; James West Roofing &
Waterproofing; California Energy Designs, Inc.; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Negligence; (3) Professional Negligence;
(4) Strict Products Liability; (5) Breach of Express Warranty; (6) Breach of
Implied Warranty of Merchantability; (7) Breach of Implied Warranty Of Fitness
For Particular Purpose; and (8) Declaratory Relief.
On January 22, 2025, MSI filed a motion
for determination of good faith settlement (the “Motion”). On February 4, 2025,
Stoneland filed an opposition (the “Stoneland Opposition”). Also on February 4,
2025, Landry filed an opposition (the “Landry Opposition”).
Judicial Notice
Pursuant to
Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), the Court may take judicial notice
of “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the
United States or of any state of the United States”.
The court,
however, may not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the
documents. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) Documents are only judicially noticeable to show their
existence and what orders were made such that the truth of the facts and
findings within the documents are not judicially noticeable. (Lockley v. Law
Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
875, 885.)
Per MSI’s request, the Court takes
judicial notice of the following: (1) Plaintiff’s June 29, 2021 Complaint filed
in this action; (2) Tyler Development’s
July 9, 2021 Cross-Complaint filed in this action; (3) MSI’s November 5, 2021
Request for Dismissal; (4) Stoneland’s Cross-Complaint filed in this action on
December 21, 2023; (5) Request for Dismissal of MSI by Stoneland, filed in this
action on October 30, 2024; (6) Plaintiff’s Amendment to Complaint adding MSI
as DOE #63, filed and served in this action on or about June 5, 2024; and (7) MSI’s
Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Amendment to Complaint as to DOE #63,
filed in this action on October 7, 2024.
Discussion
California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”)
section 877.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides, in relevant part, that, on noticed
motion, “[a]ny party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more
parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a
contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith
of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff . . . and one or more alleged
tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . .” “A determination by the court that the
settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or
co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or
co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative
indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (CCP § 877.6,
subd. (c).) Although a determination that a settlement was in good faith does
not discharge any other party from liability, “it shall reduce the claims
against the others in the amount stipulated” by the settlement. (CCP § 877,
subd. (a).)
In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde
& Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 (Tech-Bilt, Inc.), the
California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts
are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section
877.6: “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor's
proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of
settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should
pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial.
Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance
policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion,
fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling
defendants.”
“The party asserting the lack of good
faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)), should
be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of
the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the
equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that
the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the
terms of section 877.6.” (Id. at pp. 499-500.)
MSI moves to have the Court
determine that the settlement agreement was entered into in good faith. Plaintiff
and MSI executed a settlement agreement on October 25, 2024. The key settlement
terms are as follows: “In exchange for a $75,000 payment to Plaintiff by MSI’s
insurer, Plaintiff will provide MSI with a general release and a waiver of CC §
1542. This settlement is contingent on this Court’s determination of good faith
precluding all actions against MSI for equitable comparative contribution, or
partial or comparative indemnity based on comparative negligence or comparative
fault. Further, upon satisfaction of the settlement terms, Plaintiff will
dismiss MSI from its Complaint with prejudice. No assignment of any rights is
part of the terms of settlement, nor is MSI assigning its cross-complaint.”
(Olsen Decl., ¶ 24.)
The Court finds that the factors set
forth in Tech-Bilt have been met for the current case MSI asserts that Plaintiff’s
total claimed cost of repair is over $32M, plus approximately $17M in living
expense and $590,000.00 in Stearman costs. (Mot. p. 10.) MSI argues that
Plaintiff has sued many different defendants under different theories but has
only sued MSI under a negligence theory. (Mot. pp. 10:21-22.) MSI has agreed to
settle for $75,000.00. (Mot. p. 11:16.) MSI argues that Plaintiff’s consultants
attribute most of the issues associated with the travertine stone to improper
installation and design considerations, as to which MSI, as the supplier and
not the installer or contractor, was not responsible. (Mot. pp. 11:20-12:6.) MSI also argues that, unlike other defendants
in this matter, MSI has no statutory or contractual obligations upon which
economic loss or attorney’s fees could be recovered. (Mot. p. 12:6-9.) Due to
MSI’s relatively limited involvement in the damage attributed to the travertine
stone, the settlement amount represents a reasonable proportion of its
liability.
Regarding the third Tech-Bilt factor,
the parties have allocated the $75,000.00 as follows: “$70,000 towards
Plaintiff’s claimed cost of repair; and $5,000 towards Plaintiff’s claimed Stearman
costs.” (Mot. p. 12:27-28.)
MSI argues that the fourth Tech-Bilt
factor, recognizing that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he
would if he were found liable after a trial, weighs in its favor as well
because the settlement “was
reached in order to avoid the significant fees and costs associated with
litigating this through trial.” (Mot. p. 13:15-16.)
Lastly, MSI argues that as to the
other Tech-Bilt factors, insurance policy limits and existence of fraud
or collusion, the settlement amount is being funded by MSI’s insurance carrier
and there has been no collusion, fraud or tortious conduct aimed at injuring
the non-settling parties. (Mot. pp. 13:20-14:12.)
In opposition, Stoneland and Landry both
argue that $75,000.00 is not within the ‘ballpark’ of MSI’s share of liability
for Plaintiff’s damages. (Stoneland Opp. pp. 13:18-16:16; Landry Opp. pp. 6:19-7:22.)
Stoneland and Landry both argue that the travertine was an important design
element of the home and that the stone procured by MSI failed to meet
Plaintiff’s expectations, leading Plaintiff to replace it. (Stoneland Opp., pp.
16:19-18:27; Landry Opp. pp. 5:4-10.) As MSI was not the manufacturer of the
stone but merely served as a broker between the manufacturer and Plaintiff’s
contractor, Tyler Development, the modest settlement amount is reasonable and
aligns with MSI’s proportionate share of liability for Plaintiff’s damages. Thus,
the Motion is GRANTED.
MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
MOVING PARTY:
Defendant/Cross-Defendant E.C.M Exotic Pools, Inc. (“ECM”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Landry Design Group, Inc. (“Landry”)
Background
On February 18, 2022, Landry filed a
cross-complaint (“Cross-Complaint”). On September 20, 2023, Landry amended the
Cross-Complaint adding ECM as MOE 2.
On November 22, 2024, ECM filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings (the “MJOP”). On January 29, 2025, Landry filed
an opposition (“MJOP Opposition”). On February 4, 2025, ECM filed a reply (“MJOP
Reply”).
On February
3, 2025, ECM filed a motion for good faith settlement which is currently set
for hearing on March 3, 2025. As the Court anticipates that the issues raised
in this MJOP may become moot or redundant depending on the resolution of ECM’s
motion for good faith settlement, it will, on its own motion, continue the MJOP
hearing to allow both motions to be considered together.
Maiden Stone’s Motion for Good Faith
Settlement Determination is GRANTED.
The hearing on E.C.M Exotic
Pools, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings is CONTINUED to March 3, 2025 at 8:30 am.
Moving
Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed
by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email
and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off
calendar.
Dated this 11th day of February 2025
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Hon. Holly J.
Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |