Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 21STCV00971, Date: 2025-01-10 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Ford Motor Company and McCoy and Mills Ford (“Defendants”)

The Court has considered the moving and opposition papers. No reply has been filed.

Plaintiff filed the instant lemon-law action against Defendants on January 11, 2021. The first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges causes of action for: (1) violation of Subdivision (d) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (2) violation of Subdivision (b) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (3) violation of Subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (4) breach of express warranty; and (5) breach of implied warranty of merchantability; (6) fraud by omission; and (7) negligent repair.

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of 22 orders approving awards of attorneys’ fees in other,

unrelated lemon law cases in both California and federal court. These orders are not relevant to

this Court’s determination of whether the award of fees and costs sought in this case is proper. Accordingly, the requests for judicial notice are DENIED. (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 296, 301 [[J]udicial notice … is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.”].)

Attorneys’ fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute or law. (Code Civil Procedure (“CCP”), § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).)

In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. Civil Code section 1794 states: If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)

The attorney claiming fees bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (CCP, § 1033.5 subd. (c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Id.)

In determining a reasonable attorneys’ fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the

number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Id.) These facts include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Id.)

Plaintiff moves for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $181,564.81, consisting of: (1) $111,611.50 in attorney fees for Strategic Legal Practices, APC (“SLP”); (2) $7,564.00 in

attorney fees for Ecotech Law Group (ELG); (3) a 1.35 multiplier enhancement on the attorney

fees (or $41,711.43); (4) $15,677.88 in costs and expenses for SLP; and (5) $5,000.00 to review the opposition, draft a reply, and attend the hearing on this Motion.

Plaintiff contends that he is the prevailing party in this action because of a signed 998 offer in which Defendants ultimately agreed to settle this case. The Court agrees and Defendants do not dispute this. Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action entitled to a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees.

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [“The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [her] court.”].)

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees for 25 different attorneys and 2 law clerks from SLP and 1 attorney from ELG who worked on the case. Their hourly rates are as follows: (1) Tina Abdolhosseini: 2021 rate of $415/hr; (2) Mani Arabi: 2022 rate of $ 450/hr and 2023 rate of $495/hr; (3) Nadine Aslaadi: 2021 rate of $350/hr and 2022 rate of $375/hr; (4) Neal Butala: 2021 rate of $460/hr; (5) Tionna Carvalho: 2021 rate of $450/hr, 2022 rate of $550/hr, 2023 rate of $570/hr and 2024 rate of $595/hr; (6) Joy de Leon: 2023 rate of $575/hr; (7) Mark Gibson: 2021 rate of $475/hr and 2022 rate of $485/hr; (8) Ariel Harman-Holmes: 2022 rate of $400/hr; (9) Susanna Joseph: 2022 rate of $465/hr; (10) Jared Kaye: 2023 rate of $395/hr; (11) Timothy Kenney: 2023 rate of $410/hr; (12) Karin Kuemerle: 2022 rate of $595/hr; (13) Daniel Law: 2021 rate of $425/hr and 2022 rate of $440/hr; (14) Jami Littles: 2023 rate of $595/hr; (15) Regina Lotardo: 2021 rate of $435/hr; (16) Rebecca Neubauer: 2023 rate of $495/hr: (17) Matthew Pardo: 2022 rate of $410/hr; (18) Ezra Ryu: 2021 rate of $385/hr; (19) Nino Sanaia: 2021 rate of $385/hr, 2022 rate of $385/hr and 2023 rate of $425/hr; (20) Harjap Singh Malik: 2021 rate of $350/hr; (21) Udayan Singia: 2021 rate of $325/hr; (22) Tyson Smith: 2023 rate of $475/hr; (23) Yenok Tantanyan: 2024 rate of $325/hr; (24) Michael Tracy: 2023 rate of $475/hr; (25) Steven Whang: 2022 rate of $475/hr; (26) Greg Yu: 2022 rate of $595/hr; (27) Alexandra Zindel: 2022 rate of $400/hr; and (28) Dara Tabesh: $610/hr.

For each of the SLP attorneys and clerks, attorney Payam Shahian attests to their legal experience and the reasonableness of their rates. (Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 9a-aa.) Dara Tabesh of ELG attests to his legal experience and reasonableness of his rates as well. (Tabesh Decl. ¶¶ 3-8.) The Court finds, based on the submitted evidence in the Shahian and Tabesh declarations and the Court’s own experience, that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ requested hourly rates are reasonable for attorneys with their experience and in this area of the law. The range of rates charged in this matter by SLP is reasonable for attorneys of similar experience, in the same area, dealing with the same subject matter. (See Goglin v BMW of North America (2016) LLC 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473-74 [approving $575 per hour fee on lemon law action for attorneys in Los Angeles].)

Defendant argues that the use of 28 different timekeepers for a routine lemon law action is unreasonable and excessive. This Court agrees from its own experience in practice that 26 attorneys working on a case will necessarily result in unnecessary duplication in work, and that even the seven attorneys and one law clerk which Plaintiff states accounted for vast majority of the work appears to this Court to be excessive for this type of case. The Court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) The Court will consider this issue in determining whether the total number of hours was reasonable.

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on 250.20 hours spent by attorneys at SLP and 12.4 hours spent by ELG litigating this case through this motion for which Plaintiff has submitted billing records. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 19; Ex. 23; Tabesh Decl, Ex. 1.) At the rates identified above, Plaintiffs represent that they are seeking a lodestar of $119,175.00.

Defendants object to several of Plaintiff’s requested hours on the grounds that Plaintiff’s counsel billed time that was unreasonable and unnecessary.

First, Defendants object to fees incurred that relate to the causes of action not under the Song-Beverly Act. (Opp. pp. 12:14-13:14) Specifically, Defendants object to 27.6 hours ($10,751.50) billed on January 19 and 20, February 3 and 23, March 25, April 13 and 26, and May 2, 2022, on the ground that these tasks relate to the fraud cause of action only and thus Plaintiff is not entitled to recover fees for these tasks under the Song-Beverly Act. (Ford Decl., Ex. E)

Second, Defendants object to various tasks as billed at excessive amounts of time. (Opp. pp. 13:15-15:13) Specifically, Defendants object to the following:

· 6.0 hours ($2,550.00) for drafting and finalizing the opposition to the motion to compel

· 4.5 hours ($1,575.00) for drafting a meet and confer letter and scheduling an IDC

· 13.3 hours ($4,655.00) for drafting and finalizing the motion to compel further requests for production

· 27.9 hours ($14,770.00) for drafting and revising the reply to the motion to compel further requests for production

· 13.3 hours ($7,437.00) for work by both SLP and ELG on preparing the ex parte application

· 14.2 hours ($5,650.00) for work on drafting and finalizing amended discovery responses

· 2.5 hours ($987.00) for preparing for and attending the deposition preparation meeting

· 18.3 hours ($10,434.00) for work by both SLP and ELG on motions to compel further discovery responses

· 0.9 hours ($523.00) to review and finalize the settlement after the date on which Plaintiff accepted the settlement offer

Third, Defendants object to certain time-entries as block-billed or clerical in nature. (Opp. pp. 15:14-17:2) Specifically, Defendants object to 10.6 hours ($4,422.50) billed on April 2 and May 2, 2021, October 6, 14, 28 and December 6, 2022, January 17, March 1, 17 and 27, April 23 and 24, 2023 as clerical in nature and 4.1 hours ($2,330.00) billed on December 29, 2022, January 19, September 5 and 28, 2023 as block-billed.

The Court agrees in part. The Court agrees that under Civil Code section 1794 Plaintiff is only entitled to recover fees from causes of action brought pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act. The Court therefore reduces the fee by $10,751.50.

Next, the Court agrees that the 13.3 hours drafting the motion to compel further and 27.9 hours to draft the subsequent reply is excessive and not reasonable. The Court finds that 10 hours is a reasonable amount of time to spend drafting and revising the motion and 6 hours is a reasonable amount of time to spend on the reply. The Court therefore reduces the time spent to draft the motion by 3.3 hours or $1,155.00 and reduces the time spent on the reply by 21.9 hours or $11,860.00

Moreover, the Court finds that 13.3 hours for work on the ex parte application is not reasonable as the application was only 4 pages long. The Court will thus reduce this item by 7 hours or $3,594.00.

Further, the 2.3 hours billed to email opposing counsel regarding the discovery responses and schedule an IDC with the Court is excessive. A reasonable amount of time for this task would be 1.0 hours, thus the Court will reduce this item by 1.3 hours or $455.00.

Next, the Court agrees that it should not have taken 12.4 hours to draft this fee motion as this appears to be substantially a template motion regularly used by plaintiffs. While the billing and supporting evidence may have taken some time to gather, the Court finds that the reasonable amount of time would be 5 hours for a reduction of $2,405.00

Lastly, as no reply to the Opposition was filed and the hearing on this matter will not take more than 1 hour, the Court will reduce the $5,000 for anticipated time to review the opposition, draft a reply and attend the hearing on this Motion by $4,500.00.

Having analyzed the motions and pleadings filed, and having reviewed the billing statements provided, the Court determines that a reasonable lodestar in this case, to limit any duplicative and excessive fees, is $89,815.00

While the lodestar reflects the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community, it may be adjusted based on various factors, including “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee

award” and (4) the success achieved. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)

Nonetheless, the court must not consider extraordinary skill and the other Serrano factors to the extent these are already included with the lodestar. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1138-1139.) “[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been

provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the

lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be

Plaintiff requests a lodestar multiplier enhancement of 1.35 in the additional amount of

$41,711.43 on the grounds that the Plaintiff’s counsel obtained an excellent outcome, and because “SLP undertook representation of Plaintiff on a contingency basis—if the action failed and Plaintiff did not recover, neither would their counsel. (Shahian Decl. ¶ 14.)” (Mot. p. 14:7-8.) Plaintiff also argues that the delay in payment justifies a multiplier. (Mot. p. 14:14-22.)

The Court finds that under the circumstances of this case, a lodestar multiplier is not appropriate. This is a straightforward lemon law case. Nothing before the Court indicates that the case presented novel issues or that the quality of representation far exceeded the quality of

representation that would have been provided by attorneys of comparable skill and experience

billing at the same rates. While Plaintiff argues that counsel accepted the case only on a

contingency basis and there was a delay in payment the Court finds that such consideration and

risk is already included within the lodestar amount. That is because the substantial hourly rates

allowed for by the court are hourly rates for lemon law cases done on a contingency basis. Based on the foregoing, the Court declines to award a lodestar multiplier.

Allowable costs “shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (CCP, § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) Any items not specifically mentioned by statute “may be allowed or denied in the court's discretion.” (CCP, § 1033.5 subd. (c)(4).)

Song-Beverly allows a successful plaintiff to recover both “costs” and “expenses.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Courts have held that “it is clear the Legislature intended the word

‘expenses' to cover items not included in the detailed statutory definition of ‘costs.”’ (Jensen v.

BMW of North America, Inc. (“Jensen”) (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137.) The court in Jensen

held that “[t]he legislative history indicates the Legislature exercised its power to permit the

recovery of expert witness fees by prevailing buyers under the Act … ,” noting that the

legislature included “expenses” in the lemon law act because '“[t]he addition of awards of “costs

and expenses” by the court to the consumer to cover such out-of-pocket expenses as filing fees,

expert witness fees, marshall’s fees, etc., should open the litigation process to everyone.’

Plaintiff requests a total of $15,677.88 in costs and expenses. (Shahian Decl., Ex. 23) Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s costs should be denied because Plaintiff does not provide a memorandum of costs or any evidence to support the costs. (Opp. pp. 18:21-19:8.)

Plaintiff seeks recovery of $3,995.00 for expenses paid for “Legal Services/Case” and “Legal Services and Related Costs” incurred on September 28, 29 and 30, October 14, 2021 and September 28, 2022. Plaintiff also seeks $1,029.30 for “Expense paid for JOB#6294892 Case No. 21STCV00971” incurred on February 8, 2023. Plaintiff seeks recovery of $110.00 for “Expense paid for Logistics & Processing” incurred on May 2 and June 12, 2023. Further, Plaintiff requests $54.95 for “Addt’lChgs,” “PDF/Ship,” and “Base Chg” incurred on September 14, 2023. The Court is unable to determine what these expenses entail or if they are statutorily authorized. Without any further explanation or evidence, these expenses are uncertain and possibly excessive. Thus, the Court will reduce the costs by $5,189.25.

Moreover, Plaintiff accepted Defendants’ 998 offer to compromise on September 28, 2023 (Baker Decl., ¶ 117.) Plaintiff seeks to recover $899.70 for “Expenses paid for Cancellation of Services,” “Expenses paid for Delivery and Postage,” Addt’lChgs,” and “Base Chg” incurred between November 3, 2023 and April 25, 2024. There is no description or invoice for these items. The Court thus finds that these costs incurred after Plaintiff accepted the 998 offer are not reasonable or necessarily incurred. Accordingly, the Court will reduce the expenses sought by $899.70.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED in part. The court awards $89,815.00 in attorneys’ fees and $9,588.93 in costs.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court