Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 21STCV02105, Date: 2022-10-03 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

Case Number: 21STCV02105    Hearing Date: October 3, 2022    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Defendants TRG Real Estate Services (“TRG”); 406 Rampart REI, LLC (“Rampart”); Concord Ventures, LLC (“Concord”); My Management Co., Inc. (“MMC”); MZL Properties, Inc. (“MZL”); and Afton Properties, Inc. (“Afton”) (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs

The Court has considered the moving and opposition papers.  No reply papers were filed.  Any reply papers were required to have been filed and served at least five court days before the hearing pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1005, subdivision (b).

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a landlord/tenant relationship.  The currently operative second amended complaint (the “SAC”) alleges: (1) negligence; (2) negligent failure to provide habitable premises; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (6) premises liability; (7) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; (8) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (9) nuisance; (10) collection of rent for untenable dwelling; and (11) constructive eviction and willful interruption of services. 

In relevant part, the SAC alleges: Rampart has had an ownership interest in the Property and has managed the Property from approximately March 2016 through the present.  (SAC ¶ 66.)  Concord has managed the Property from approximately August 2019 through the present.  (SAC ¶ 68.)  MMC managed the Property between approximately 2017 through 2019.  (SAC ¶ 69.)  Afton managed the Property between approximately January 2016 and January 2017.  (SAC ¶ 70.)  MZL managed the Property between approximately July 2013 through December 2016.  (SAC ¶ 71.)  TRG managed the Property between approximately 2012 through 2016.  (SAC ¶ 72.)  At all relevant times Moving Defendants were each others’ agents and alter egos.  (See SAC ¶ 75.)

Plaintiffs have resided at the Property pursuant to valid lease agreements during the period of wrongdoing described in the SAC.  (See SAC ¶¶ 7-64.)^[1]

The Property has not been properly maintained since at least 2012.  (SAC ¶ 80.)  Moving Defendants’ failure to maintain the Property has resulted in hazardous conditions, including interruption of utility services, pervasive water leaks, clogged pipes, damaged ceilings and walls, frequent electrical outages, managers entering units without permission or notice, the presence of non-tenant trespassers on the Property, and severe insect and rodent infestations.  (SAC ¶ 1.)  From 2012 through 2020, Moving Defendants were cited multiple times by the Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department (“HCIDLA”) and Los Angeles County Department of Health (“DPH”) for housing code and other violations.  (See SAC ¶¶ 3, 81-96.)  Despite having knowledge of the habitability problems at the Property, Moving Defendants refused to make repairs and continued to collect rent from Plaintiffs.  (SAC ¶ 99.)  The conditions at the Property have caused Plaintiffs to suffer physical injuries and health problems as well as emotional and mental health problems.  (See SAC ¶¶ 103-104.)

Moving Defendants filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to each cause of action in the SAC on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action with respect to each claim; (2) the allegations comprising each cause of action are vague, ambiguous and uncertain; and (3) each cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  Moving Defendants also filed a motion to strike (the “Motion”) portions of the SAC related to punitive damages.

DEMURRER

Meet and Confer

The meet and confer requirement has been met with respect to both the Demurrer and Motion.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.  (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)  The court accepts as true all material factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.  (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.)  With respect to a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.  (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)  A demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored.  (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.)  A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.  (Id.)  A demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendant's knowledge.  (Id.)  Demurrers for uncertainty are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.  (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.) 

As an initial matter, the Court finds that the allegations in the SAC are not incomprehensible to an extent that prevents Moving Defendants from being able to respond.  The SAC identifies the specific Plaintiffs and Defendants who are named in each cause of action.

Statute of Limitations

A party may demur to a complaint, alleging that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action when the claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.  (Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1482.)  When a ground for objection to a complaint, such as the statute of limitations, appears on its face or from matters of which the court may or must take judicial notice, a demurrer on that ground is proper.  (Duggal v. G.E. Capital Communications Services, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 81, 86.)  A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred.  (Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 321.)  In order for the bar to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.  (Id.)

The Court finds that the SAC is not facially time-barred because although the allegations include events that may fall outside the applicable statutes of limitations, the SAC alleges misconduct that has occurred through the present day.  Furthermore, the SAC alleges that Moving Defendants are the agents and alter egos of one another.  Since a demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained, the Court OVERRULES the Demurrer on this basis.  (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

First, Second, and Sixth Causes of Action

To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages.  (Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 680, 687.)  Premises liability is a form of negligence.  (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Mgmt. Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.)  The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence.  (Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1207.)

            Moving Defendants argue that the allegations supporting these causes of action are insufficiently specific to state a claim.  The Court disagrees.  The allegations are sufficient to put Moving Defendants on notice of Plaintiffs’ claims and Moving Defendants may seek additional information during discovery.  The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the first, second and sixth causes of action.

Third Cause of Action: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Negligent infliction of emotional distress is a form of the tort of negligence, to which the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.  (Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 124, 129.)  Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort; it is merely convenient terminology describing the context in which the negligence occurred.  (Long v. PKS, Inc. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1297.)  Rather, negligent infliction of emotional distress allows individuals to recover damages for emotional distress on a negligence cause of action where they were not otherwise injured or harmed.  (See CACI § 1621; Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916,925-31.)  In ordinary negligence actions for physical injury, recovery for emotional distress caused by that injury is available as an item of parasitic damages.  (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 981.) 

            Moving Defendants argue that the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is duplicative since Plaintiffs have separately alleged negligence.  The Court agrees, as the SAC alleges that Plaintiffs have suffered physical and emotional damages as a result of Moving Defendants’ negligence, and Plaintiffs may recover emotional distress damages thereunder.  The Court therefore SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the third cause of action without leave to amend. 

Fourth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous behavior with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress.  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)  Conduct is considered extreme and outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.  (Id.)  Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant: (1) abuses a position that gives him power over a plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through emotional distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably when the conduct is likely to result in mental distress and illness.  (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946.)  Whether conduct is extreme or outrageous is generally a question of fact.  (See Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 356.)

Moving Defendants argue that the SAC does not sufficiently allege extreme and outrageous conduct, while Plaintiffs argue that the SAC sufficiently describes a pattern of willful behavior to support the cause of action in the context of a land/lord tenant lawsuit.

Accepting all facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court finds that the SAC alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903 (“Stoiber”).  In Stoiber, the plaintiff-tenant alleged that her landlords knew of and failed to repair multiple defective conditions in the plaintiff’s apartment, including a cockroach infestation, poor plumbing, leaks and deteriorated flooring.  (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 912.)  The trial court sustained the various defendants’ demurrers and granted motions for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability was the exclusive remedy available to the plaintiff.  (Id. at 911.)  The court of appeal overruled the trial court, holding that a tenant may seek legal redress for breach of implied warranty of habitability and intentional infliction of emotional distress if the landlord’s acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress.  (Id. at 922.)  The court of appeal further found that, based on the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint, the issue of whether the landlords’ conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous was a factual issue that could not be determined on a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings.  (Id.)

As the allegations in the SAC are analogous to those in Stoiber, the Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the fourth cause of action.

Fifth Cause of Action: Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability

To state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a material defective condition affecting the habitability of the premise; (2) notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant discovers the condition; (3) the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency; and (4) resulting damages.  (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)

            Moving Defendants’ sole argument challenging the fifth cause of action is that the claim is time-barred.  As stated above, the SAC is not facially barred by the statute of limitations.  The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the fifth cause of action.

Seventh Cause of Action: Unfair Business Practices

The Unfair Competition Law (the “UCL”), Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. prohibits unfair competition, including unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business act.  (Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 997, 1008-09.)  A business act or practice only needs to meet one of the requirements to be considered unfair competition under the UCL.  (Daro v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1093.)  Whether a particular act is business-related is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each case.  (People ex rel. City of Santa Monica v. Gabriel (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 882, 888.)  The renting of residential housing may be a business act.  (Id.; see also Daro v. Superior Court, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at 1101, n. 11.)

The SAC adequately alleges a UCL claim since it identifies statutes that Moving Defendants violated.  The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the seventh cause of action.

Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Causes of Action

            Moving Defendants’ sole argument challenging the constructive eviction, collection of rent for untenable dwelling; and constructive eviction and willful interruption of services claims is that the causes of action are insufficiently specific.  For the reasons previously stated with respect to other causes of action and the allegations of the SAC generally, the Court finds this argument unpersuasive.  The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the eighth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action.

Ninth Cause of Action: Nuisance

Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.  (Civ. Code § 3479.)  To state a claim for private nuisance, the plaintiff must allege: (1) interference with his land or property; and (2) substantial actual damage which is unreasonable as to its nature, duration or amount.  (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 937-38.)

Moving Defendants argue that the nuisance claim is insufficiently alleged because it does not identify which Defendants are parties to the claim.  The Court notes that the SAC specifies that the ninth cause of action is alleged against “all Defendants.”  (See SAC at 45:2.)  The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the ninth cause of action. 

MOTION TO STRIKE

Legal Standard

A motion to strike either: (1) strikes any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strikes any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court.  (CCP § 436.)

Punitive Damages        

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages in an action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)  Malice is conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)  Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.  (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.)  Oppression is defined as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.  (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)  Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)  Absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, malice requires more than a “willful and conscious” disregard of the plaintiff’s interests; the additional component of “despicable conduct” must be found.  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

The Court finds that the SAC sufficiently alleges conduct to warrant an award of punitive damages, including the pervasive substandard conditions at the Property of which Moving Defendants were aware and repeatedly failed to address, while continuing to collect rent from low-income tenants who Moving Defendants knew had limited alternative housing options.  (See See Stoiber v. Honeychuck, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 920; SAC ¶ 136.) 

            The Court therefore DENIES the Motion.  Moving Defendant is ordered to answer the SAC within twenty days of the date of this ruling.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. 

  Dated this 3rd day of October 2022