Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 21STCV06259, Date: 2023-04-26 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.


Case Number: 21STCV06259    Hearing Date: April 26, 2023    Dept: 56

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

JULIO C. VIZCARRA, et al.,

                        Plaintiffs,

            vs.

 

KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., et al.,

                                                                             

                        Defendants.                              

 

      CASE NO.: 21STCV06259

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

Date:  April 26, 2023

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept. 56

Jury Trial: June 19, 2023

 

 

 

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. (“Moving Defendant”)

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs

 

The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. 

 

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle (the “Vehicle”) manufactured by Moving Defendant.  Plaintiffs’ complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges five causes of action for violations of the Song-Beverly Act and a sixth cause of action for fraud by omission.  In relevant part, the Complaint alleges that Moving Defendant knew but failed to inform Plaintiffs that the Vehicle was equipped with a defective engine.  (See Complaint ¶¶ 109-112.)

 

Moving Defendant filed a motion for summary adjudication (the “Motion”) to the sixth cause of action for fraud by omission and Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages.

 

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiffs’ objection to the Declaration of Sandra Beshai (“Beshai Decl.”) number 1 is OVERRULED.  Plaintiffs’ objection to the Beshai Declaration number 2 is SUSTAINED.

 

Moving Defendant’s objections to the Declaration of Matthew Pardo (“Pardo Decl.”) are SUSTAINED in their entirety.  Moving Defendant’s objections to the Declaration of Erika L. Lopez (“Lopez Decl.”) numbers 1-6 and 9 are OVERRULED.  Objections to the Lopez Declaration numbers 7-8 are SUSTAINED.  Moving Defendant’s objections to the Declaration of Julio C. Vizcarra (“Vizcarra Decl.”) numbers 1-6 and 9 are OVERRULED.  Objections to the Lopez Declaration numbers 7-8 are SUSTAINED. 

 

DISCUSSION

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense.  (CCP § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)  Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)       

 

Fraud by Omission

The elements of fraud by omission are: (1) misrepresentation by nondisclosure; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)  To plead fraud by omission, the plaintiff must also plead that the defendant was under a duty to disclose the allegedly omitted fact.  (Lopez v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 72, 596.)  There are four circumstances that impose a duty on the defendant such that nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.  (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 310-11.) 

 

A transaction giving rise to a duty to disclose, as would support a claim for intentional concealment, must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.  (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312).  As a matter of common sense, such a relationship can only come into being as a result of some sort of transaction between the parties.  (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337.)  Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.  (Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com. v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 831.)  A vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold.  (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 851.)

 

One defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property is entitled to recover the difference between the actual value of that with which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he received.  (Civ. Code § 3343, subd. (a).)

 

In support of the Motion, Moving Defendant provides evidence that on August 14, 2015, Plaintiffs leased the Vehicle, which is a 2016 Kia Sorrento, from Kia of Downtown Los Angeles.  (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) 1-2.)  On November 17, 2017, Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle. The Vehicle is equipped with a “Theta II” engine.  (UMF 2.)  Aside from expenses related to the Vehicle, Plaintiffs do not claim personal injury damages or that they were exposed to liability for personal injury damages as a result of alleged warranty defects.  (See UMF 10, 33.)

 

As a preliminary matter, Moving Defendant cites to Plaintiffs’ allegedly factually devoid discovery responses as evidence that Plaintiffs are unable to establish Moving Defendant’s knowledge and intentional concealment of an engine defect.  (See, e.g., UMF 5-6.)  Plaintiffs’ responses contain objections and cite to certain documents, and Plaintiffs have received relief from their waiver of objections to Moving Defendant’s discovery responses.  Moving Defendant’s evidence is therefore insufficient to meet its burden to establish that Plaintiffs are unable to establish their claim.  (See Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 726, 732-35.)

 

Moving Defendant’s evidence is sufficient, however, to meet its burden with respect to the element of damages.  Plaintiffs’ opposition (the “Opposition”) does not provide evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding fraud damages.  The only evidence Plaintiffs provide is their belief that the value of the Vehicle was reduced as a result of the alleged engine defect and that the purchase price was therefore unfair.  (See Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) 23-24.)  Plaintiffs’ subjective belief, however, is not sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact on this issue.  (See Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 476, 482.) 

 

The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion to the sixth cause of action.

 

Punitive Damages

            Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages is linked to their fraud by omission claim.  Because there are no triable issues of material fact regarding fraud-based damages, there are no triable issues of fact regarding their entitlement to punitive damages.  The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion to Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages. 

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

 

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court strongly encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.  If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org stating your intention to appear in person.  The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.  This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

 

   Dated this 26th day of April 2023

 

 

 

 

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court