Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 21STCV13788, Date: 2022-08-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV13788    Hearing Date: August 19, 2022    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff

RESPONDING PARTIES: Defendants Huhtamaki, Inc., Benjamin Madrigal (“Madrigal”); and Gene Zarrillo (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)

            The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of an employment relationship.  On April 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging: (1) hostile work environment harassment (conduct directed at Plaintiff by an individual); (2) hostile work environment harassment (conduct directed at Plaintiff by an individual); (3) hostile work environment harassment (conduct directed at Plaintiff by employer; (4) gender discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (5) race discrimination in violation of FEHA; (6) failure to prevent harassment, discrimination or retaliation under FEHA; and (7) retaliation under FEHA.

 On April 13, 2022, Moving Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and/or adjudication (the “MSJ”) to the Complaint.  At the July 19, 2022 hearing on the MSJ, Plaintiff dismissed the first, fourth, and fifth causes of action.

            On July 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint (the “Motion”).  The proposed first amended complaint (the “FAC”) includes: (1) non-substantive clerical corrections and the removal of unnecessary sentences; (2) the removal of the causes of action that were dismissed by Plaintiff and/or the Court during the hearing on the MSJ; (3) the addition of two new legal claims to clarify an existing cause of action that was mistakenly filed as FEHA sex harassment; and (4) the addition of facts that were addressed in documents filed in Court as part of Defendants’ MSJ.  

DISCUSSION

California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 473 permits the trial court in its discretion to allow amendments to pleadings in the furtherance of justice.  CCP section 576 provides that any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.  (CCP § 576.)  There is a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the pleadings at any stage of the proceeding.  (Berman v. Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945.)  An application to amend a pleading is addressed to the trial judge’s sound discretion.  (Id.)  If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.  (Morgan v. Superior Court of Cal. In and For Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.)  Where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party, the liberal rule of allowance prevails.  (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564.)

 The court may, however, deny a motion for leave to amend where a plaintiff has been dilatory in seeking leave to amend and such delay has prejudiced defendant.  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.)  Prejudice exists where amendment would: (1) cause a delay of trial; (2) increase preparation costs; (3) change the focus of the complaint; or (4) increase discovery burdens.  (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-88.)  Further, the court may consider unwarranted delay in seeking leave to amend, and abuse of discretion is less likely to be found in situations where the proposed amendment is offered after a long unexplained delay or where there is a lack of diligence.  (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280.)  For example, when a plaintiff seeks leave to amend his or her complaint only after the defendant has mounted a summary judgment motion directed at the allegations of the unamended complaint, even though the plaintiff has been aware of the facts upon which the amendment is based, it would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat the summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a moving target unbounded by the pleadings.  (Id. (citing Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176.)

Under California Rules of Court (“CRC”) rule 3.1324, a motion for leave to amend a pleading must be accompanied by a declaration that sets forth: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made sooner.  (CRC, r. 3.1324(b).)

Plaintiff describes the allegations in the proposed FAC as having the effect of: (1) deleting the causes of actions which were dismissed at the hearing on the MSJ; (2) correcting the Complaint by adding two causes of action for stalking and sexual assault against Madrigal; (3) adding new facts that were discovered after the filing of the Complaint; and (4) removing unnecessary facts and correcting grammatical errors.  (See Declaration of Ann A. Hull (“Hull Decl.”) ¶ 3.) 

In support of the Motion, Plaintiff offers evidence of her efforts to obtain discovery from Defendants.  (See Hull Decl. ¶¶ 7-16.)  While preparing Plaintiff’s opposition to the MSJ, Plaintiff learned that her claims against Madrigal should have been alleged as stalking and sexual assault claims, rather than a FEHA claim.  (Hull Decl. ¶ 18.)  Plaintiff asked if Defendants would stipulate to allowing Plaintiff to amend the Complaint, but Defendants did not agree to the stipulation.  (Id.)

             The Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented adequate facts to explain the delay in seeking the amendments alleged in the proposed FAC.  While it details Plaintiff’s efforts throughout the discovery process, the Motion provides no facts regarding when and how Plaintiff discovered the previously unpleaded allegations.  Notably, the Motion does not specify that Plaintiff discovered the proper basis for the new causes of action against Madrigal and the new allegations concerning Moving Defendants as a whole from the discovery that Plaintiff received in 2022.[1]  In addition, many of the allegations concern Moving Defendants’ alleged misconduct that was directed at Plaintiff, occurred in Plaintiff’s presence, and/or occurred in response to Plaintiff’s communications and conduct directed at Moving Defendants.  The Motion does not indicate why these facts were not within Plaintiff’s knowledge at the time the Complaint was filed or at any other time in the proceedings prior to the filing of the Motion.  Plaintiff’s reply brief (the “Reply”) attempts to provide additional evidence to bolster the arguments made in the Motion.  The Court declines to consider new evidence offered in the Reply.  (See Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-38.)  Moreover, the Court notes that while Plaintiff provides that she learned that the FEHA claim asserted against Madrigal should have been asserted as stalking and sexual assault claims while preparing the opposition to the MSJ, she continued to pursue the FEHA claim against him until the July 19, 2022 hearing.[2]  The Court finds that these circumstances suggest unwarranted delay in seeking to file the FAC. 

In addition, Court finds that the Moving Defendants collectively would be prejudiced by the amendment because many of the new facts alleged in the proposed FAC concern their conduct during the same time frame as the allegations in the Complaint and Moving Defendants would likely have to conduct duplicative discovery.  Further, Madrigal would be prejudiced by Plaintiff’s filing of the FAC, as he would become a party to this action after successfully defending himself against Plaintiff’s allegations—which Plaintiff pursued until the hearing on the MSJ despite previously becoming aware that the claims against him were “mistakenly” filed pursuant to FEHA—and being dismissed from the litigation.[3] 

            The Court therefore DENIES the Motion.

Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court strongly encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative. If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org stating your intention to appear in person. The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date. This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

              Dated this 19th day of August 2022