Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 21STCV20244, Date: 2023-02-07 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

Case Number: 21STCV20244    Hearing Date: February 7, 2023    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Defendant”)

            The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.

BACKGROUND

            On May 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Act; (2) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act; and (3) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act. 

On November 2, 2022, judgment was entered in Plaintiff’s favor.  On December 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees (the “Motion”) pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d).  Plaintiff seeks: (1) attorney’s fees in the amount of $108,442.50; and (2) costs in the amount of $2,446.16.[1]

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

            Plaintiff’s objections to the Declaration of Julia Wood (“Wood Decl.”) are OVERRULED in their entirety.

DISCUSSION

A prevailing party in an action under the Song-Beverly Act may be entitled to attorney’s fees.  (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d); see also CCP § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)  Attorney’s fees ordinarily include compensation for all hours reasonably spent, including those necessary to establish and defend the claims.  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.)  The party moving for attorney’s fees has the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.)  Where a case is premised on a contingent fee agreement it is appropriate to award reasonable attorney’s fees for time reasonably expended by the attorney.  (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 755.)  If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.  (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, his learning, his age and his experience in the particular type of work demanded.  (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659.)  An award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.  (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.)  The verified time statements of attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) 

             A court awards attorney’s fees based on the “lodestar” method which is “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)  The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.  (Id.)  The loadstar figure may be adjusted, based on a consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Id.)  Generally, the reasonable hourly rate used for the lodestar calculation is that prevailing in the community for similar work.  (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616.)  Nevertheless, where an attorney has been awarded attorney’s fees for comparable work at comparable hourly rates in other actions, the hourly rate will be deemed reasonable.  (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473-74.)  Where a defendant does not produce evidence contradicting the reasonableness of plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates, the Court will deem an attorney’s hourly rate reasonable.  (Id. at 473.) 

            The Motion provides evidence that Plaintiff retained counsel to assist her with this matter sometime in March or April of 2021.  (See Declaration of Babak Hashemi (“Hashemi Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-7.)  Counsel accepted this case on a contingency basis.  (Hashemi Decl. ¶ 6.)  Hashemi billed $450 per hour for work performed in this matter, although he typically bills $600 per hour in cases accepted on a contingency basis.  (See Hashemi Decl. ¶ 23.)  Two additional attorneys, Caitlin J. Scott (“Scott”) and Benjamin Martin (“Martin”) also worked on this case at a rate of $350 per hour.  (Id.)  The Motion includes an itemized billing statement accounting for work performed and a Memorandum of Costs.  (See Hashemi Decl. ¶ 2, Exhibits A-B.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that her attorneys’ hourly rates are reasonable based on their qualifications, skills and experience.  (See 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-37.)  While Defendant argues that the rates are too high, it has not presented evidence contradicting Plaintiff’s evidence of the reasonableness of the quoted hourly rates.  (See Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at 473-74.) 

Lodestar Multiplier

In cases involving the Song-Beverly Act, the lodestar figure may be augmented or diminished.  (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 819.)  In determining whether or not a lodestar figure will be multiplied for purposes of attorney’s fees, the court takes various relevant factors into account, including: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.  (Id.)

Plaintiff requests a lodestar multiplier of 1.5.  The Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this case involved novel or difficult questions or required special skills that are not ordinarily required in Song-Beverly Act cases and declines to apply a multiplier the requested attorney’s fees.

Billing Entries

Where a party is challenging the reasonableness of attorney’s fees as excessive that party must attack itemized billing with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate or obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable.  (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-64.)  A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.  (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101.)  Attorney billing records are given a presumption of credibility.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s legal bill is padded by entries that represent duplicative and excessive work.  Defendant’s opposition (the “Opposition”) identifies particular entries that Defendant disputes were necessary or reasonable.  (See Opposition 3:12-6:15.) 

            The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s billing statement and finds that the total amount of requested attorney’s fees is somewhat inflated as a result of duplicative billing and excessive time spent on certain tasks that was unreasonable given the complexity of the issues raised by the Complaint and the attorneys’ experience litigating Song-Beverly Act cases.  The Court therefore finds it appropriate to reduce Plaintiff’s recoverable attorney’s fees to $66,745, which represents a reduction of seven hours of billable work performed at a rate of $450 and seven hours of billable work performed at a rate of $350 per hour. 

            Defendant has not raised arguments contesting the validity of the costs claimed in Plaintiff’s MOC, and the Court therefore finds that Plaintiff is entitled to the full amount of requested costs.  In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Motion in accordance with the terms set forth above.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. 

        Dated this 7th day of February 2023