Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case 21STCV20810 2023-02-23 Tentative Ruling

The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. Plaintiff and Defendant (the “Parties”) each filed supplemental papers after Plaintiff filed his reply brief (the “Reply”). Neither Party received leave of Court to file supplemental papers. The Court has thus not considered these sur-replies.

On June 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging 14 causes of action arising out of an employment relationship.

On December 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Offer to Compromise and Acceptance under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 998 (the “998 Offer”). The 998 Offer provides that the Parties agreed that Plaintiff would dismiss all his claims with prejudice in exchange for a recovery of $25,001 plus reasonable attorney’s fees.[1]

On January 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees (the “Motion”). The Motion seeks attorney’s fees in the total amount of $267,262.50, which represents $178,175 plus a 1.5 multiplier.

Defendant’s objections to the Declaration of Britanie A. Crippen (“Crippen Decl.”) numbers 1 and 3 are SUSTAINED. Objections to the Crippen Declaration number 2 is OVERRULED.

Defendant’s objections to the Declaration of Johnathan D. Roven (“Roven Decl.”) are OVERRULED in their entirety.

Under CCP section 1033.5, reasonable attorney’s fees may be awarded where they are authorized by a contract, statute, or law. (CCP § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Attorney’s fees ordinarily include compensation for all hours reasonably spent, including those necessary to establish and defend the claims. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.) The party moving for attorney’s fees has the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) Where a case is premised on a contingent fee agreement, it is appropriate to award reasonable attorney’s fees for time reasonably expended by the attorney. (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 755.) If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended is not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount. (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

A court awards attorney’s fees based on the “lodestar” method which is “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (Id.) The loadstar figure may be adjusted, based on a consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Id.) Generally, the reasonable hourly rate used for the lodestar calculation is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616.) Nevertheless, where an attorney has been awarded attorney’s fees for comparable work at comparable hourly rates in other actions, the hourly rate will be deemed reasonable. (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473-74.) Where a defendant does not produce evidence contradicting the reasonableness of plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates, the Court will deem an attorney’s hourly rate reasonable. (Id. at 473.)

The amount of attorney’s fees requested in the Motion represents 109.6 hours logged by Roven at a rate of $850 per hour and 104.3 hours logged by Crippen at a rate of $500 per hour. Defendant argues that the hourly rates and hours billed by both attorneys are both excessive.

In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, his learning, his age and his experience in the particular type of work demanded. (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659.) An award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) The verified time statements of attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) Courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-37.)

In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases. (Id. at 437.)

Roven was admitted to the California State Bar in 2012 and has been practicing employment law for several years. (Roven Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4.) In 2021, Roven was awarded attorney’s fees with a $500 per hour rate by an arbitrator. (Roven Decl. ¶ 15.)

Crippen was admitted to the California State Bar in 2019. (Crippen Decl. ¶ 3.) Since 2020, she has taken or defended approximately two to three depositions a week and has assisted with at least five arbitrations and jury trials. (Crippen Decl. ¶ 6.) Crippen requests a rate that exceeds the average for third-year attorneys due to her experience. (See Crippen Decl. ¶ 8; Roven Decl. ¶ 3.)

This case was accepted on a contingency basis. (Roven Decl. ¶ 21.) The Motion argues that litigating this case was risky because counsel was unable to contact Plaintiff for months. (See Roven Decl. ¶ 22.) In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel was unable to accept at least five cases in during the pendency of this litigation. (Roven Decl. ¶ 23.)

The Court finds that hourly rates of $550 per hour for Roven and $370 per hour for Crippen are appropriate for the time they billed in this matter. (See 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-37.)

Where a party is challenging the reasonableness of attorney’s fees as excessive, that party must attack itemized billing with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate or obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-64.) A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101.) Attorney billing records are given a presumption of credibility. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) Purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a lawyer or paralegal’s usual rate, regardless of who performs them. (Missouri v. Jenkins (1989) 491 U.S. 274, 288, n. 10.) Calendaring, preparing proofs of service, internal filing, preparing binders for a hearing, and scanning are examples of tasks that have been found to be purely clerical and thus noncompensable or compensable at a reduced billing rate. (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1187; Ridgeway v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2017) 269 F.Supp.3d 975, 991.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s legal bill is padded by entries that represent duplicative or unnecessary work and work performed on secretarial tasks.

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s billing statements and finds it appropriate to reduce Roven’s billed time by 28.1 hours and Crippen’s billed time by 14.7 hours for time billed for secretarial or administrative tasks, internal communications and communications with journalists, and for time related to an unfiled motion to be relieved as counsel, unsuccessful efforts to communicate with the client and a procedurally improper motion to compel Plaintiff’s deposition.

The lodestar may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (2) the skill displayed in presenting them; (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. (Id.)

Plaintiff requests a lodestar multiplier of 1.5. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this case involved novel or difficult questions or required special skills and declines to apply a multiplier.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in the total amount of $77,977 and GRANTS the Motion in accordance with the terms set forth above.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

[1] The Court observes that although the Parties do not dispute that they settled this matter, no Notice of Settlement was filed and as of the date of this hearing, only Plaintiff’s Private Attorneys General Act claim has been dismissed.