Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 21STCV24228, Date: 2023-05-10 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Cross-Defendant/Cross-Complainant Maiden Stone, Inc. (“Maiden”)

The Court has considered the moving papers, the opposition papers and the replies.

Plaintiff Ted Waitt, Trustee of the Nightingale Trust dated November 1, 2007 filed this construction defect action on June 29, 2021. Plaintiff alleges: (1) breach of contract; (2) negligence; (3) professional negligence; (4) strict products liability; (5) breach of express warranty; (6) breach of implied warranty (merchantability); (7) breach of implied warranty (fitness); and (8) declaratory relief.

Plaintiff entered into a construction contract with general contractor Defendant Tyler Development Corporation (“Tyler”) to build a 14,000 square foot, single family residence at 9280 Nightingale Drive, Los Angeles, CA (the “Project”). Defendant Stoneland, Inc. (“Stoneland”) entered into a construction contract directly with Tyler to install travertine stone tile flooring and exterior pavers at the Project. Tyler entered into an agreement with Maiden to supply quarried travertine stone for installation at the Project.

On July 9, 2021, Tyler filed a cross-complaint against Stoneland and other parties, including Maiden, for breach of contract, equitable indemnity, contribution, express indemnity and declaratory relief. On November 5, 2021, Tyler dismissed Maiden from its cross-complaint without prejudice.

On December 23, 2023, Stoneland filed a cross-complaint against Maiden, alleging implied equitable indemnity, comparative contribution, declaratory relief, negligence and implied contractual indemnity. On February 21, 2024, Maiden filed a cross-complaint against Stoneland for equitable indemnity, contribution, breach of implied warranty, negligence, implied contractual indemnity and declaratory relief.

On March 22, 2024, Maiden filed this Motion to Bifurcate (the “Motion”), seeking to bifurcate its cross-complaint against Stoneland and Stoneland’s cross-complaint against Maiden, and to try the two cross-complaints together after the trial of the remaining case. On April 12, 2024, Stoneland and Plaintiff each filed oppositions to Maiden’s request to bifurcate. On April 18, 2024, Maiden filed replies to Stoneland’s and Plaintiff’s oppositions.

Pursuant to CCP §1048(b), “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of the state or of the United States.”

CCP §598 provides in pertinent part as follows: “The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order . . . that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case, except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597 and 597.5.” (Emphasis added).

The terms “bifurcate” and “severance” are often used interchangeably. But they have somewhat different meanings. A motion to “sever” asks the court to order separate trials of issues, causes of action, or parties joined in a single action. (CCP §§ 1048(b), 598, 597, 597.5, 379.5; Bly-Magee v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 318, 323, fn. 5.) The purpose is to avoid prejudice, to promote convenience, or to permit greater expedience and economy. (CCP § 1048(b).)

A motion to “bifurcate” is a type of severance motion. It asks for a separate trial on the issue of liability before trial of damages. The objective is “to avoid wasting court time in cases where the plaintiff loses on the liability issue, to promote settlements where the plaintiff wins on the liability issue, and to afford a more logical presentation of the evidence, thus simplifying the issues for the jury.” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 888.)

Granting or denying of a motion for separate trials lies within the trial court’s sound discretion, and is subject to reversal on appeal only for clear abuse. (Grappo v Coventry Financial Corp. (1991) 235 Cal App 3d 496, 504.) “The major objective of bifurcated trials is to expedite and simplify the presentation of evidence.” (Foreman & Clark v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 888.) CCP §1048 also authorizes a court to separate trial of any issue for furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice or where separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy.

Maiden argues that bifurcation is necessary to prevent prejudicing its case. Maiden argues that this case action has been pending for more than three years, but it was only named in Stoneland’s cross-complaint on December 20, 2023. Maiden argues it will only have 45 days to conduct discovery and bring a dispositive motion and that it has only recently received a large volume of discovery. Maiden argues it would be prejudicial to force it to hasten its own preparation for trial, given that Plaintiff, Defendant, Cross-Defendants and Cross-Complainants have had longstanding claims.

Maiden also argues that Stoneland’s equitable claims are premature without completion of Plaintiff’s litigation. Maiden argues that most of the complexity in this litigation resides with Plaintiff’s claims and the associated cross-complaints and that the outcome of Plaintiff’s litigation could ultimately dispose of other cross-complaints.

In opposition, Stoneland contends that Maiden fails to establish that bifurcation would promote judicial economy and efficiency or prevent undue prejudice to any party, and that it would be prejudiced by bifurcation because two trials would be redundant and waste the parties’ resources and time.

The Court finds that all of Maiden’s concerns in the Motion would be addressed by the continuance of the trial. The Court finds that good cause exists for the continuance of the trial to allow the parties to complete discovery and to file dispositive motions. Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion, but on its own motion ADVANCES and VACATES the current Final Status Conference (“FSC”) and trial date and CONTINUES the FSC to February 19, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. and the trial date to March 3, 2025 at 9:30 a.m.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court