Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 21STCV38916, Date: 2022-10-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV38916    Hearing Date: October 4, 2022    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: County of Los Angeles Public Administrator as Administrator of the Estate of Carl Lawton (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff

The Court has considered the moving and opposition papers.  No reply papers were filed.  Any reply papers were required to have been filed and served at least five court days before the hearing pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1005, subdivision (b).

BACKGROUND

            This action arises out of a dispute concerning real property (the “Property”).  Plaintiff initiated this action on October 21, 2021, by filing a complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging: (1) declaratory relief to quiet title.  The currently operative second amended complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1) breach of contract; and (2) equitable estoppel/declaratory relief to quiet title.

The SAC alleges: the Property is part of the estate of Carl Lawton (“Decedent”), who died intestate on about October 9, 2020.  (SAC ¶¶ 1-2.)  On or about April 8, 2017, Plaintiff and Decedent entered into a written agreement (the “Agreement”) that allowed Plaintiff to use a portion of the Property.  (SAC ¶ 7, Exhibit 1.)  The Agreement also includes terms that granted Plaintiff an option to purchase the Property upon Decedent’s death for the sum of one dollar.  (SAC ¶ 11; see Exhibit 1 at ¶ 7.)  Pursuant to this provision, Plaintiff exercised the option on October 9, 2020.  (See SAC ¶ 11, Exhibit 3.)  On January 6, 2021, Moving Defendant’s representative Lina Khorani (“Khorani”) sent Plaintiff a text message instructing him to continue making payments until title to the Property was transferred to his name.  SFAC ¶ 13.)  On March 31, 2021, Khorani authorized Plaintiff to open the locks and enter the Property.  (SAC ¶ 14.)  On or about July 14, 2021, Moving Defendant’s representative Armando Figueroa (“Figueroa”)  emailed Plaintiff to confirm Moving Defendant’s awareness of the need to transfer title of the Property to Plaintiff and directed Plaintiff to prepare the deed.  (SAC ¶ 15.)  On July 26, 2021, Figueroa informed Plaintiff that he was waiting for a response from County Counsel to determine how to transfer title to the Property and who would be authorized to sign the deed.  (SAC ¶ 17, Exhibit 6.)  Although Deputy County Counsel Sanya Dennis (“Dennis”) may have informed Plaintiff in August 2021 that she would not be signing the deed, Dennis did not represent that the Agreement would not be honored.  (See SAC ¶ 19.)  In the afternoon on October 8, 2021, Plaintiff learned from Dennis that the Property was placed on the market for sale and that County Counsel would not honor the Agreement.  (SAC ¶ 20.) 

Moving Defendant filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the SAC on the grounds that the FSAC does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            Moving Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

Meet and Confer

The meet and confer requirement has been met.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.  (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)  The court accepts as true all material factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.  (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.)  With respect to a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.  (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)  A demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

Statute of Limitations/Equitable Estoppel

Under CCP section 366.2, subdivision (a), if a person against whom an action may be brought on a liability of the person, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether accrued or not accrued, dies before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and the limitations period that would have been applicable does not apply.  (CCP § 366.2, subd. (a).)  The plain and unambiguous language of section 366.2 indicates that the statute applies to bar any claims asserted over one year after the defendant’s death, regardless of whether such action has or has not accrued under the ordinary rules applicable to such claims, including that of delayed discovery.  (See CCP § 366.2, subd. (b); Bradley v. Breen (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 798, 804-05.)  Therefore, even when a defendant pursues an action of which the plaintiff is unaware, the defendant’s death triggers the limitations period of CCP section 366.2, subdivision (a), regardless of any accrual rule that otherwise governs the claim.  (See Bradley v. Breen, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at 804-05.)

While the statute of limitations may not be tolled or extended under CCP section 366.2, a plaintiff may allege facts to show equitable estoppel prevents its application.  (Battuello v. Battuello (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 842, 848.)  The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.  (Schafer v. City of Los Angeles) (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261.)  The detrimental reliance must be reasonable.  (Id.)  Equitable estoppel must be specifically pleaded with sufficient accuracy to disclose the facts relied upon.  (Sofranek v. Merced County (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1250.)  Whether equitable estoppel applies is normally a question of fact.  (Id. at 1251.)  Where the complaint pleads undisputed facts establishing that equitable estoppel does not apply, however, the issue may be resolved on demurrer.  (Id.)

Moving Defendant argues that the SAC is barred by CCP section 336.2 because the original Complaint and Plaintiff’s separately filed creditor’s claim were filed over one year after Decedent’s death.[1]  Moving Defendant argues that equitable estoppel does not apply because Plaintiff learned that Moving Defendant did not intend to honor the Agreement on October 8, 2021 at the latest, which predates the expiration of the statute of limitations by one day.

While the Court agrees that the original Complaint was filed after the applicable statute of limitations expired because Plaintiff initiated this action more than one year after Decedent’s death, the Court finds that the SAC adequately alleges facts to invoke equitable estoppel.  The SAC alleges several communications between Moving Defendant’s representatives and Plaintiff which indicate that he would receive title to the Property and alleges that these statements intended to induce Plaintiff’s reliance on these statements, that Moving Defendant reneged upon these earlier representations on the eve of the expiration of the statute of limitations.  (See Sofranek v. Merced County, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at 1250.)  These allegations are sufficient to raise a question of fact as to the application of equitable estoppel that is inappropriate for resolution on demurrer.

The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer.  Moving Defendant is ordered to file an answer within 20 days of this order.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.  Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. 

  Dated this 4th day of October 2022