Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 21STCV38916, Date: 2024-02-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV38916 Hearing Date: February 9, 2024 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,
Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION Date:
February 9, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 Non-Jury Trial: May 20, 2024 |
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles Public Administrator (“Moving
Defendant”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff
The
Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This
action arises out of a dispute concerning real property (the “Property”). The currently operative second amended
complaint (the “SAC”) alleges: (1) breach of contract; and (2) equitable
estoppel/declaratory relief to quiet title.
In
relevant part, the SAC alleges: the Property is part of the estate of Carl
Lawton (“Decedent”), who died intestate on or about October 9, 2020. (SAC ¶¶ 1-2.) On or about April 8, 2017, Plaintiff and
Decedent entered into a written agreement (the “Agreement”) that allowed
Plaintiff to use a portion of the Property.
(SAC ¶ 7, Exhibit 1.) The
Agreement also includes terms that granted Plaintiff an option to purchase the
Property upon Decedent’s death for the sum of one dollar. (SAC ¶ 11; see Exhibit 1 at ¶ 7.) Pursuant to this provision, Plaintiff
exercised the option on October 9, 2020.
(See SAC ¶ 11, Exhibit 3.)
On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff learned that the Property was placed on
the market for sale and that County Counsel would not honor the Agreement. (SAC ¶ 20.)
On
July 6, 2023, Moving Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment/adjudication
(the “Motion”) on the grounds that there are no triable issues of material fact
and Moving Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s
claims.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE
The
Requests for Judicial Notice filed by Moving Defendant and Plaintiff are
GRANTED as to the existence of the documents and their legal effect, but not to
the truth of the matters stated therein.
(See Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
743, 752-54.)
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Moving
Defendant’s objections to the Declaration of James Khoshkhou (“Khoshkhou
Decl.”) numbers 3-4 are SUSTAINED.
Moving Defendant’s objections to the Khoshkhou Declaration numbers 1-2,
and 5-8 are OVERRULED.
DISCUSSION
The
function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a
determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support
for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the
need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) California Code of Civil Procedure
(“CCP”) section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary
judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible
from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
As
to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary
judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate
an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action
or a defense thereto. To establish a triable
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts liberally
construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and
resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
The Parties’ Evidence
In
support of the Motion, Moving Defendant provides evidence that the Property is
an asset of Decedent’s estate. (Separate
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) 2.) Decedent died on October 9, 2020, and Moving
Defendant is the court-appointed representative and administrator of Decedent’s
estate. (UMF 3, 4.) Plaintiff owns land
adjacent to the Property. (UMF 5.) On or about April 28, 2017, Plaintiff and
Decedent entered into the Agreement, which was entitled “Agreement to Allow
Construction Upon Real Property” (the “Agreement”). (UMF 6.)
The
Agreement provides:
“By the terms here
of [sic] Khoshkhou is granted permission to enter upon the property of Lawton
and to extend the northerly boundary line of the Khoshkhou property onto the
Lawton property by approximately 25 feet. Khoshkhou shall thereafter be
permitted to do all things necessary construct one or more structures upon the
property so extended.” (UMF 7;
Declaration of Lina Khorani (“Khorani Decl.”) ¶ 4, Exhibit B at ¶ 1.)
The
Agreement also contains a provision that states:
“EARLIER
TERMINATION. The parties, by mutual agreement may terminate this agreement in
writing on such terms as deemed appropriate.
The death of either party shall not act as a terminating event. However, any representative appointed to
distribute the assets of Khoshkhou may elect to either continue in the
agreement as an asset of the estate or to terminate it by giving 90 days notice
to Lawton. Upon the death of Lawton,
Khoshkhou may elect to purchase the entirety of the property the subject of
this agreement from Lawton's estate for the purchase price of $1.00. If such election is made, the entirety of the
costs involved in effecting a lot split or other redetermination of boundary
lines shall be borne by Khoshkhou.” (UMF
8; Khorani Decl., Exhibit B at ¶ 7.)
On
or about October 9, 2020, Plaintiff forwarded Moving Defendant a document
indicating his intention to purchase the Property pursuant to the
Agreement. (UMF 9.)
Plaintiff’s
opposition (the “Opposition”) presents evidence of Plaintiff’s friendship with
Decedent and Plaintiff’s understanding that Decedent was estranged from his
family. (See Additional Material
Facts (“AMF”) 24.) The Opposition also
provides evidence of a covenant to hold the Property as one parcel that was
signed by Decedent and recorded in 1984.
(See AMF 22.)
Breach of Contract
The elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1)
the contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3)
the defendant’s breach; and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom. (Wall
Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171,
1178.)
The
rules governing the role of the court in interpreting a written instrument are
well established. (Brown v. Goldstein
(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 418, 432.) The
interpretation of a contract is a judicial function. (Id.)
In engaging in this function, the trial court gives effect to the mutual
intention of the parties as it existed at the time the contract was
executed. (Id.) Ordinarily, the objective intent of the
contracting parties is a legal question determined solely by reference to the
contract's terms. (Id.) The court generally may not consider
extrinsic evidence of any prior agreement or contemporaneous oral agreement to
vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of a written, integrated
contract. (Id.) Extrinsic evidence is admissible, however, to
interpret an agreement when a material term is ambiguous. (Id.)
The
interpretation of a contract involves a two-step process: first, the court
provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence
concerning the parties’ intentions to determine “ambiguity,” i.e., whether the
language is “reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation urged by a party. (Id. at 432-33.) If, in light of the extrinsic evidence, the
court decides the language is “reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation
urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step –
interpreting the contract. (Id. at
433)
When
there is no material conflict in the extrinsic evidence, the trial court interprets
the Agreement as a matter of law. (Id.) This is true even when conflicting inferences
may be drawn from the undisputed extrinsic evidence or that extrinsic evidence
renders the contract terms susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation. (Id.) If, however, there is a conflict in the
extrinsic evidence, the factual conflict is to be resolved by the jury. (Id.)
Moving
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prevail on either of the causes of
action alleged in the SAC because the Agreement’s language provides for the
purchase of only the portion of the Property being leased from Decedent to
Plaintiff rather than for the purchase of the entirety of the Property.
Regardless
of the correct interpretation of the scope of the Agreement’s provision
containing Plaintiff’s option to purchase, the Court finds that the Motion
fails to meet its burden to establish that there are no triable issues of
material fact regarding the claims alleged in the SAC. The Motion provides no evidence of Moving
Defendant’s effort to perform its obligations under the Agreement consistent
with its interpretation of the Agreement’s terms when Plaintiff attempted to
exercise his purchase rights. Moving
Defendant has therefore not demonstrated that it did not breach the
Agreement. Since the quiet title action
turns on the interpretation and performance of the Agreement, Moving Defendant
has likewise not established that there are no triable issues of material fact
regarding the second cause of action.
The Court therefore DENIES the Motion.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at
SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org. If the
department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the
hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.
Dated this 9th day of February 2024
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Hon.
Holly J. Fujie Judge
of the Superior Court |