Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case 21STCV42690 2023-01-17 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Fahiem Gaffoor (“Gaffoor”)[1] in his personal capacity and as Successor Trustee of the Gaffoor Family Trust (the “Trust”); Cameron Irons; Max Greenbriar Properties, LLC; Max Le Grande Properties, LLC, (MLGP”); Max Valley Properties LLC and SVN Vanguard (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)[2]

This action arises out of a dispute over the estate and affairs of Mahomed Gaffoor (“Decedent”). The currently operative first amended complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1) wrongful termination (constructive discharge in violation of public policy); (2) breach of the implied covenant of “good cause”; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) unfair business practices; (5) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (6) violation of Labor Code section 6310; (7) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (8) assault; (9) battery; (10) trespass to chattels; (11) harassment; (12) wrongful eviction; and (13) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In relevant part, the FAC alleges: Plaintiff began working for Decedent in around August 2009. (FAC ¶ 38.) Plaintiff’s job responsibilities included inspecting various properties that Decedent owned. (Id.) Plaintiff resided at one of Decedent’s properties (the “Mavis Property”) and used another of Decedent’s properties (the “Le Grande Property”) as a storage unit. (See FAC ¶ 34.) In around September 2014, Plaintiff made arrangements with Decedent and Decedent’s friend Edward Sotelo to purchase the Mavis Property. (See FAC ¶¶ 41-44.)

In August 2014, Decedent and his wife executed a trust (the “Trust”), which nominated Plaintiff as the first successor trustee. (FAC ¶¶ 60-61.) The first three amendments to the Trust all named Plaintiff as the first successor trustee and specified that Plaintiff would receive the Mavis Property as a gift. (See FAC ¶¶ 64, 68, 71.)

Gaffoor, who is Decedent’s son, was estranged from Decedent for periods of time and had a contentious relationship with Plaintiff. (See, e.g., FAC ¶ 49.) In January 2021, Decedent became sick and was hospitalized. (See FAC ¶¶ 77-78.) The Trust was amended a fourth time at Gaffoor’s direction on January 22, 2021 and Decedent died on January 23, 2021. (See FAC ¶¶ 13, 79, 81.) This Fourth Amendment to the Trust named Gaffoor as Trustee. (See FAC ¶ 13.) On March 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a petition with the Orange County Superior Court to invalidate the Fourth Amendment. (FAC ¶ 89.) After Decedent’s death, Plaintiff was discharged from his employment duties and Defendants began a campaign to evict Plaintiff from his residence at the Mavis Property and storage unit at the Le Grande Property. (See FAC ¶¶ 82-103.) On October 22, 2021, Moving Defendants posted a 30-day notice to terminate Plaintiff’s tenancies at the Mavis and Le Grande Properties. (See FAC ¶ 99.)

Moving Defendants filed two demurrers (collectively, the “Demurrers”) to the FAC: Gaffoor filed a demurrer in his individual capacity (the “Gaffoor Demurrer”) to the first through seventh, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action and the Entity Defendants filed a Demurrer (the “Entity Demurrer”) to the first through seventh and tenth through thirteenth causes of action.

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law. (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) The court accepts as true all material factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts. (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) With respect to a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (Id.) A demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (Id.) A demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendant's knowledge. (Id.) Demurrers for uncertainty are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond. (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

The first through seventh causes of action concern Plaintiff’s alleged employment. Moving Defendants argue that the FAC fails to allege facts that establish their employment relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that the FAC sufficiently alleges an employment relationship because it alleges that each Moving Defendant was his employer and that they are they each functioned as alter-egos of one another.

The Court agrees with Moving Defendants’ collective arguments that the employment allegations are not clear. The FAC alleges only that Decedent hired Plaintiff to work as his personal assistant. There are no factual allegations supporting the conclusory allegations that Moving Defendants employed Plaintiff. Nor are there allegations connecting Decedent to the Entity Defendants in a professional capacity such that Moving Defendants jointly employed Plaintiff while he worked for Decedent. The Court therefore SUSTAINS the Demurrers to the first and second causes of action with 20 days leave to amend.

The tenth through thirteenth causes of action concern the alleged efforts to interfere with Plaintiff’s possession of the Mavis and Le Grande

Trespass to chattels lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has proximately caused injury. (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1350-51 A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally dispossessing another of the chattel, or using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another. (Jamgotchian v. Slender (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1401.) Though not amounting to conversion, the defendant’s interference must, to be actionable, have caused some injury to the chattel or to the plaintiff’s rights in it. (Id.)

The FAC does not allege that any of Moving Defendant’s alleged trespasses onto the Mavis or Le Grande Properties resulted in damages to Plaintiff’s personal property. The Court therefore SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the tenth cause of action with 20 days leave to amend.

The Court observes that the eleventh cause of action for “harassment” is unclear, as the FAC does not specify a statutory or common law basis for the claim. The Court therefore SUSTAINS the Demurrers to the eleventh cause of action with 20 days leave to amend.

Civil Code section 1942.5, subdivision (d) provides: it is unlawful for a lessor to increase rent, decrease services, cause a lessee to quit involuntarily, bring an action to recover possession, or threaten to do any of those acts, for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because the lessee has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees' association or an organization advocating lessees' rights or has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law. (Civ. Code § 1942.5, subd. (d).)

The FAC alleges that after Decedent’s death and Gaffoor was appointed Trustee, Moving Defendants held themselves out as the landlords and property managers of the Mavis and Le Grande Properties. (See FAC ¶ 268.) The FAC further alleges that Moving Defendants attempted to evict Plaintiff to retaliate against him for challenging the validity of the Fourth Amendment to the Trust. (See FAC ¶ 262.) Moving Defendants argue that the FAC does not allege sufficient facts to hold them jointly liable on an alter-ego theory. The Court disagrees. The FAC alleges that Moving Defendants comingled funds, did not comply with corporate formalities, and controlled one another. (See FAC ¶¶ 29-32.) These allegations are sufficient to allege liability on an alter-ego theory at the pleading state. (See Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 235-36.)

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous behavior with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) Conduct is considered extreme and outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Id.) Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant: (1) abuses a position that gives him power over a plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through emotional distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably when the conduct is likely to result in mental distress and illness. (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946.) Whether conduct is extreme or outrageous is generally a question of fact. (See Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 356.)

The Court finds that conduct rising to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress has not been sufficiently alleged. The FAC alleges that Moving Defendants engaged in a campaign to dispossess him of the Mavis and Le Grande Properties, including by entering the Properties without Plaintiff’s permission, videotaping Plaintiff and making false statements about Plaintiff to other tenants. (See FAC ¶ 91-103.) The Court does not find such conduct sufficiently extreme or outrageous, particularly under the circumstances discussed above to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and therefore SUSTAINS the Entity Demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action with thirty days leave to amend.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

[1] The Court uses first names to distinguish persons with the same last name and intends no disrespect in so doing.

[2] The Court refers to Gaffoor in his individual capacity as “Gaffoor” and refers to the remainder of Moving Defendants collectively as the “Entity Defendants.”