Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case 21TCV27875 2022-07-27 Tentative Ruling

The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition was filed. Any opposition papers were required to have been filed and served at least 14 days before the hearing under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 437c, subdivision (b)(2).

This case arises out of a commercial lease agreement. Plaintiff’s complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges: (1) breach of contract; and (2) breach of guaranty. The Complaint alleges: Plaintiff and Defendant Tiffany’s House of Bounce (“House of Bounce”) entered into a written lease agreement (the “Lease Agreement”) with House of Bounce on August 21, 2018. (Complaint ¶ 9, Exhibit 1.) Ian Blankenship (“Blankenship”) executed a written guaranty (the “Guaranty”) in connection to the Lease Agreement. (Complaint ¶ 26, Exhibit 1.) House of Bounce breached the Lease Agreement before the end of its term. (See Complaint ¶¶ 17-19.)

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment (the “Motion”) on the second cause of action against Blankenship on the grounds that there are no triable issues of material fact as to whether House of Bounce breached the Lease Agreement and Blankenship subsequently breached his obligations under the Guaranty.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication meets the burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if the plaintiff has proved each element of the cause of action entitling them to judgment on that cause of action. (CCP § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of the opposing party. (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) The opposition papers must include a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts that the moving party claims to be undisputed. (CCP § 437c, subd. (b)(3).) If the opposing party disputes a fact, then the opposing party must reference supporting evidence. (Id.) Without a statement of undisputed facts containing references to supporting evidence in the form of affidavits or declarations, it is impossible for the opposing party to demonstrate the existence of disputed facts. (Lyons v. Security Pacific Nat Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006-07.)

The elements of a breach of guaranty claim are: (1) a valid guaranty; (2) the borrower has defaulted; and (3) the guarantor failed to perform under the guaranty. (Gray CPB LLC v. Kolokotronis (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 480, 486.)

The Lease Agreement was entered into on August 21, 2018 for a term that expired on February 28, 2022. (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) 1-2; Declaration of Maral Matossian (“Matossian Decl.”) ¶¶ 4,-5 Exhibit 1.) Blankenship executed the Guaranty, which provides for Blankenship’s liability to Plaintiff in the event House of Bounce breached the Lease Agreement. (See UMF 4-5.) Plaintiff has performed its obligations under the Lease Agreement. (UMF 6.) Under the Lease Agreement, House of Bounce was required to timely pay rent, other charges, and continuously operate its business for the duration of the lease term. (UMF 7.) On June 26, 2021, House of Bounce vacated the premises before the natural expiration of the Lease Agreement. (UMF 8.) House of Bounce did not pay rent between March 2019 through the termination of the lease term. (See UMF 9.) Pursuant to the terms of the Lease Agreement, House of Bounce also owes Plaintiff tax payments, utility payments, late fees, and other charges and owes Plaintiff an outstanding amount of $473,142.80. (See UMF 9-20.) Blankenship did not pay Plaintiff the amounts owed by House of Bounce. (See UMF 23.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden to show that there are no triable issues of material fact as to whether House of Bounce breached the Lease Agreement and that Blankenship subsequently breached the Guaranty. As the Motion is unopposed, Blankenship has failed to meet its burden to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact with respect to the breach of contract claim or any affirmative defense to that claim. The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court strongly encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative. If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org stating your intention to appear in person. The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date. This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court