Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 21TCV38916, Date: 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21TCV38916 Hearing Date: July 26, 2022 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
Plaintiff, vs. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER Date:
July 26, 2022 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 Judge: Holly J. Fujie |
MOVING PARTY: County of Los Angeles Public Administrator as
Administrator of the Estate of Carl Lawton (“Moving Defendant”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This
action arises out of a dispute concerning real property (the “Property”). Plaintiff initiated this action on October
21, 2021, by filing a complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging: (1) declaratory
relief to quiet title. The currently
operative first amended complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1) breach of contract;
and (2) equitable estoppel/declaratory relief to quiet title.
The FAC alleges:
the Property is part of the estate of Carl Lawton (“Decedent”), who died
intestate on about October 9, 2020. (FAC
¶¶ 1-2.) On or about April 8,
2017, Plaintiff and Decedent entered into a written agreement (the “Agreement”)
that allowed Plaintiff to use a portion of the Property. (FAC ¶ 7, Exhibit 1.) The Agreement also includes terms that granted
Plaintiff an option to purchase the Property upon Decedent’s death for the sum
of one dollar. (FAC ¶ 11; see Exhibit
1 at ¶ 7.) Pursuant to this provision, Plaintiff
exercised the option on October 9, 2020.
(See FAC ¶ 11, Exhibit 3.)
On January 6, 2021, Moving Defendant’s representative Lina Khorani
(“Khorani”) sent Plaintiff a text message instructing him to continue making
payments until title to the Property was transferred to his name. (FAC ¶ 13.)
On March 31, 2021, Khorani authorized Plaintiff to open the locks and
enter the Property. (FAC ¶ 14.) On or about July 14, 2021, Moving Defendant’s
representative Armando Figueroa (“Figueroa”) confirmed Moving Defendant’s
awareness of the need to transfer title of the Property to Plaintiff and
directed Plaintiff to prepare the deed.
(FAC ¶ 15.) On July 26, 2021, Figueroa informed Plaintiff
that he was waiting for a response from County Counsel to determine how to
transfer title to the Property and who would be authorized to sign the deed. (FAC ¶ 17, Exhibit 6.) Although Deputy County Counsel Sanya Dennis
(“Dennis”) may have informed Plaintiff in August 2021 that she would not be signing
the deed, Dennis did not represent that the Agreement would not be honored. (See FAC ¶ 19.) In the afternoon on October 8, 2021,
Plaintiff learned from Dennis that the Property was placed on the market for
sale and that County Counsel would not honor the Agreement. (FAC ¶ 20.)
Moving Defendant
filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the FAC on the grounds that the FAC does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Moving
Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.
DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
The meet and
confer requirement has been met.
Legal Standard
A demurrer tests
the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law. (Durell
v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) The court accepts as true all material
factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not
consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations
contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.
(Shea Homes Limited Partnership v.
County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) With respect to a demurrer, the complaint
must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts
pleaded. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) A demurrer will be sustained without leave to
amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Statute
of Limitations/Equitable Estoppel
Under California Code of Civil
Procedure (“CCP”) section 366.2, subdivision (a), if a person against whom
an action may be brought on a liability of the person, whether arising in
contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether accrued or not accrued, dies before
the expiration of the applicable limitations period, and the cause of action
survives, an action may be commenced within one year after the date of death,
and the limitations period that would have been applicable does not
apply. (CCP § 366.2, subd. (a).) The plain and unambiguous language
of section 366.2 indicates that the statute applies to bar any claims asserted
over one year after the defendant’s death, regardless of whether such action
has or has not accrued under the ordinary rules applicable to such claims, including
that of delayed discovery. (See CCP § 366.2, subd. (b); Bradley
v. Breen (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 798, 804-05.) Therefore, even when a defendant perpetrates
an action which the plaintiff is unaware, the defendant’s death triggers the
limitations period of CCP § 366.2, subdivision (a), regardless of any accrual
rule that otherwise governs the claim. (See Bradley v. Breen, supra,
73 Cal.App.4th at 804-05.)
While the statute of
limitations may not be tolled or extended under CCP section 366.2, a plaintiff
may allege facts to show equitable estoppel prevents its application. (Battuello
v. Battuello (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 842, 848.) The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1)
the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that
his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a
right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of
the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his
injury. (Schafer v. City of Los Angeles) (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th
1250, 1261.) The detrimental reliance must be reasonable. (Id.)
Equitable estoppel must be specifically pleaded with sufficient accuracy to
disclose the facts relied upon. (Sofranek v. Merced County (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1250.) Whether equitable estoppel
applies is normally a question of fact.
(Id. at 1251.) Where the
complaint pleads undisputed facts establishing that equitable estoppel does not
apply, however, the issue may be resolved on demurrer. (Id.)
Moving Defendant argues that the FAC
is barred by CCP section 336.2 because the original Complaint and Plaintiff’s
separately filed creditor’s claim were filed over one year after Decedent’s
death.[1] Moving Defendant argues that equitable
estoppel does not apply because Plaintiff learned that Moving Defendant did not
intend to honor the Agreement on October 8, 2021 at the latest, which predates
the expiration of the statute of limitations by one day.
The Court agrees that the FAC was
filed after the applicable statute of limitations expired because Plaintiff initiated
this action more than one year after Decedent’s death. The Court finds that the FAC fails to
adequately allege facts to invoke equitable estoppel. While the FAC alleges several communications
between Moving Defendant’s representatives and Plaintiff, it does not
specifically plead the element of intent.
(See Sofranek v. Merced County, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at 1250.) The Court therefore SUSTAINS the Demurrer with
20 days leave to amend.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this
ruling.
In consideration of
the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages
that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made
by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If
you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you
must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of
the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in
person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of
the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any
time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the
hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal
appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate
precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to
the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on
the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive
an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed
off calendar.
Dated this 26th day of July 2022
Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court |