Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 22AHCV01175, Date: 2025-01-08 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs William Demarest, Shari Giuliany, Helen Ortega, George Calderon and Maria Ybarra (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

This is a habitability action. On November 28, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint (“Complaint”) against defendants Hwang, Guochang International, Inc. and Does 1 through 10 (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging causes of action for: (1) recission; (2) negligence – premises liability; (3) breach of implied warranty of habitability/tenantability; (4) breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; (5) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (6) violation of Civil Code § 1942.4; (7) unfair business practices § 17200; and (8) Rosenthal Act Violation – Civil Code § 1788 et seq.

On October 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for summary adjudication (the “Motion”). On December 23, 2024, Hwang opposed the Motion (the “Opposition”). On December 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a reply (the “Reply”).

Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (d) and (h), the Court may take judicial notice of “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States” and “facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy” (Evid. Code, § 452 subds (d), (h).)

The court, however, may not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the documents. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) Documents are only judicially noticeable to show their existence and what orders were made such that the truth of the facts and findings within the documents are not judicially noticeable. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 885.)

Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the Court takes judicial notice of the following: (1) Plaintiffs’ Complaint; (2) Defendant Dolly Hwang’s Answer; (3) Defendant Guochang International, Inc.’s Answer; (4) Hwang v. Demarest: Unlawful Detainer Complaint (2022) –

Case No. 22PDUD01899; (5) Hwang v. Guiliani: Unlawful Detainer Complaint (2022) –

Case No. 22PDUD01829; (6) Hwang v. Ortega: Unlawful Detainer Complaint (2022) – Case

Case No. 24PDUD00430; (8) Hwang v. Giuliany: Unlawful Detainer Complaint (2024) –

Case No. 24PDUD00435; (9) Hwang v. Ortega: Unlawful Detainer Complaint (2024) – Case

(2024) – Case No. 24PDUD00447; (11) City of Arcadia Zoning Map; (12) City of Arcadia Municipal Code; and (13) Los Angeles County Assessor Property Information.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 437c subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿¿¿

Once the moving party has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿¿¿

Plaintiffs move for summary adjudication of their third cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, sixth cause of action for violation of section 1942.4 of the Civil Code, and eighth cause of action for violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”).

As an initial matter, the Court emphasizes that CCP section 437c does not permit piecemeal adjudication of facts. CCP § 437c(f)(1) provides, in pertinent part, “[a] motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” “The purpose of the enactment of¿Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)¿was to stop the practice of piecemeal adjudication of facts that did not completely dispose of a substantive area.” (Catalano v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 91, 97.) Summary adjudication of an issue may be appropriate when a defendant is the moving party because a defendant need only disprove one element of a cause of action. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) By contrast, when the moving party is the plaintiff, the plaintiff must prove each element. (CCP § 437c(p)(1).)

“[T]here is a warranty of habitability implied in residential leases in California.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296.) The elements of a claim for breach of the warranty of habitability are “the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a¿reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Id. at p. 1297.)

Plaintiffs argue that they have established their cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability because multiple defective conditions existed at the property. (Motion, pp. 11-15) Plaintiffs attach evidence of various substandard living conditions found at the subject property (Separate Statement, Nos. 7-28) Plaintiffs do not otherwise substantively address the other elements of a habitability cause of action, i.e. whether notice was given within a reasonable time after the tenants discovered the issues, whether the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiencies, or the amount of damages. Plaintiffs merely conclusorily state that “City of Arcadia housing officials repeatedly notified Defendants of the same illegal and uninhabitable conditions which persisted unaddressed over the course of years.” (Mot. p. 7:20-22.) To obtain a judgment, the Plaintiffs must establish each element necessary to prove a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. (CCP § 437c(p)(1).) Plaintiffs have not established a prima facie showing that no triable issue of material fact exists because Plaintiffs do not prove each element of a breach of the implied warranty of habitability cause of action.

The Court further notes that, even if Plaintiffs had met their burden to establish a prima facie case, Hwang presents sufficient evidence of triable issues of material fact. Hwang argues in opposition that whether there has been a breach of warranty of habitability and the amount of alleged damages are questions of fact. (Opp. p. 6:10-16.) In her declaration, Hwang also presents evidence showing that upon receiving the various notices of violations, the cited conditions were corrected, except for those issues where Plaintiffs denied access to the property for repairs (Hwang Decl. ¶¶ 6-12, 16, Exs. B-C) Hwang also asserts that mold remediation was completed and contends that the other habitability issues addressed by Plaintiffs were caused by Plaintiffs’ own actions or negligence. (Hwang Decl. ¶¶ 13-14, 18, Exs. C-D)

Thus, because triable issues of material fact exist as to the breach of warranty of habitability cause of action, the Motion is DENIED as to the third cause of action.

Civil Code section 1942.4 forbids a landlord to collect rent if all the following conditions exist: first, the landlord has failed to maintain the property in a habitable state; second, a public officer has notified the landlord of the need to correct the uninhabitable conditions; third, the conditions persist at least thirty-five (35) days after the notice was served; and fourth, the conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant. (Civ. Code § 1942.4, subd. (a).)

Plaintiffs present evidence that Defendants attempted to or did collect rent amidst the ongoing habitability concerns (Sep. Statement, Nos. 29-43.) In opposition, Hwang asserts Plaintiffs did not pay rent for two and a half years while occupying the premises. (Hwang Decl., ¶ 18.) In addition, as discussed above, there are triable issues of material fact regarding whether the property was maintained in a habitable state, whether the proper notification and time to repair processes were followed, and whether the conditions were caused by acts or omissions of the tenants.

Thus, the Motion is DENIED as to the sixth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4.

The purpose of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”) is to “prohibit debt collectors from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the collection of consumer debts and to require debtors to act fairly in entering into and honoring such debts, as specified in this title.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.1.) A “debt collector” under the Rosenthal Act is “any person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on behalf of himself or herself or others, engages in debt collection.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2 subd. (c).) A “debt collection” is “any act or practice in connection with the collection of consumer debts.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2 subd. (b).) A “consumer debt” is “money, property or their equivalent, due or owing or alleged to be due or owing from a natural person by reason of a consumer credit transaction.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2 subd. (f).) A “consumer credit transaction” is a “transaction between a natural person and another person in which property, services or money is acquired on credit by that natural person from such other person primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2(e).)

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated the Rosenthal Act because they collected or attempted to collect rent in violation of Civil Code section 1942.4 and alternatively because the subject property qualifies as an illegal boarding house and thus the leases are void and unenforceable. Plaintiff presents evidence that the subject property is zoned single family residential (Separate Statement No. 6; RJN Exs. 1K, 1M) but that there are at least four separate rental agreements for the premises (Separate Statement No. 6; RJN Exs. 1G-J). Thus, Plaintiffs have provided evidence that Defendants violated the Rosenthal Act by collecting rent on illegal and unenforceable leases. The burden thus shifts to Defendants to show that triable issues of material fact exist.

In opposition, Hwang asserts that the property is not an illegal boarding house. In her sworn declaration, Hwang states that the “property contains four separate, legally permitted dwelling units as confirmed by the City of Arcadia’s official records, including: One unit on the ground floor of the primary building; Two units upstairs in the primary building, one of which is the Premises; One detached unit in the rear of the property. The upstairs unit in question is legally permitted and has been leased as a standalone unit since its approval.” (Hwang Decl., ¶ 5; Response to Separate Statement No. 6.) The Court notes that Hwang does not otherwise present the referenced city records or other evidence that the property is zoned for separate units. Because the Court is required to “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389), the Court tenuously accepts, for purposes of this Motion, that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the property is legally zoned for its current use.

Thus, the Motion is DENIED as to the eighth cause of action for violation of the Rosenthal Act.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court