Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCP04321, Date: 2023-03-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCP04321 Hearing Date: March 28, 2023 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
This order concerns: (1) a petition to vacate/correct
arbitration award (the “VP”) filed by Petitioner County of Los Angeles
(“Petitioner” or the “County”); and (2) a petition to confirm arbitration award
(the “CP”) filed by Respondent Service Employees International Union
(“Respondent,” “SEIU,” or the “Union”).
MOVING PARTIES: (1) The County; (2) SEIU
RESPONDING PARTIES: (1) SEIU; (2) The
County
The Court has considered the moving
and opposition papers. No reply papers
were filed.[1]
BACKGROUND
Petitioner filed the VP to vacate the
arbitration award (the “Award”) issued on August 31, 2022 by arbitrator Robert
Bergeson (the “Arbitrator”) in an arbitration concerning a grievance filed by
County employee Victor Briceno (“Briceno”).
In the Award, the Arbitrator found that the County had waived the
defense that Briceno did not timely submit his initial grievance and that
Briceno and SEIU did not timely request an arbitration. The Arbitrator sustained Briceno’s grievance
and directed the Parties to determine the remedy. (See Declaration of Megan K. Atkinson
(“Atkinson Decl.”) ¶ 10, Exhibit 6.) The
VP seeks to have the Court vacate the Award while the CP seeks to have the
Court confirm the Award.
DISCUSSION
Under CCP section 1285, any party to an
arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm,
correct or vacate the award. (CCP § 1285.) Regardless of the
particular relief granted, any arbitrator’s award is enforceable only when
confirmed as a judgment of the superior court. (O’Hare v. Municipal
Resource Consultants (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 267, 278.) Once a
petition to confirm an award is filed, the superior court must select one of
only four courses of action: it may confirm the award, correct and confirm it,
vacate it, or dismiss the petition. (EHM
Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc. (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 1058, 1063.) Under CCP section 1286.2, the court may
vacate the award only under very limited circumstances. (Id.)
Neither the trial court, nor the appellate
court, may review the merits of the dispute, the sufficiency of the evidence,
or the arbitrator’s reasoning, nor may a reviewing court correct or review an
award because of an arbitrator’s legal or factual error, even if it appears on
the award’s face. (Id. at 1063-64.) It is the general rule that, with
narrow exceptions, an arbitrator's decision cannot be reviewed for errors of
fact or law. (Id. at 1063.)
Under CCP section 1286.2, a
court may vacate an arbitration award if it determines any of the following:
(1)
The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2)
There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
(3)
The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a
neutral arbitrator;
(4)
The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected
without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted;
(5)
The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of
the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown
therefore or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the
controversy or by conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this
title; or
(6)
An arbitrator making the award either: (A) failed to disclose within the
time required for disclosure a ground for disqualification of which the
arbitrator was then aware; or (B) was subject to disqualification upon grounds
specified in Section 1281.91 but failed upon receipt of timely demand to
disqualify himself or herself as required by that provision.
(CCP § 1286.2, subd.
(a)(1)-(6).)
Respondents argue that the
Court should vacate the arbitration award pursuant to CCP section 1286.2,
subdivision (a)(4).
Scope of the Arbitrator’s
Authority
Under
CCP section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), a court shall vacate an arbitration
award if it determines that the arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award
cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the
controversy submitted is one circumstance where a court has authority to vacate
an arbitration award. (CCP § 1286.2,
subd. (a)(4).) Arbitrators may exceed their powers
when they act in a manner that is not authorized by the arbitration
agreement. (O’Flaherty v. Belgum (2004)
115 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1055-56.) In
determining whether an arbitrator exceed his or her powers, courts look to the
parties’ arbitration agreement to see if and how it limited the arbitrator’s
authority because arbitrators have no powers beyond those conferred upon them
by the arbitration agreement; their powers derive from, and are limited by, the
agreement to arbitrate. (Greenspan v.
LADT LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1437.) An arbitrator that resolves issues the
parties did not agree to or awards a
remedy the parties did not authorize exceeds the scope of his or her
powers. (Harshad & Nasir
Corporation v. Global Sign Systems, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 523, 543.)
CCP section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4) is
construed narrowly. (Emerald Aero,
LLC v. Kaplan (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1138.) Arbitrators do not exceed their powers by
reaching erroneous factual or legal conclusions on the merits of the parties’
claims, even if the award causes substantial injustice to one of the
parties. (Id.) California law is clear that arbitrators do
not exceed their powers merely by rendering an erroneous decision on a legal or
factual issue, so long as the issue was within the scope of the controversy
submitted to the arbitrators. (Safari Associates v. Superior Court (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1403-04.) This
narrow standard of review applies even where an arbitration agreement requires
an arbitrator to rule on the basis of relevant law, rather than on principles
of equity and justice. (Richey v.
AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916.)
The County argues that the Arbitrator exceeded his
authority by deeming that it waived the defense that Briceno’s initial
grievance and his later request for arbitration were not timely. By failing to consider the timeliness of the
grievance and request for arbitration, the County argues that the Arbitrator
improperly failed to enforce the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding
(“MOU”), the contract from which the Arbitrator’s authority is derived. The County additionally argues that the
Arbitrator failed to enforce the MOU by failing to consider the County’s
evidence that the Los Angeles County Fire Department and the Chief Executive
Officer of the County of Los Angeles did not support Briceno’s request for an Additional
Responsibilities Bonus.
The MOU contains the following provisions:
“Within thirty
(30) business days from the receipt of the written decision of the Department
Head, or his/her designated representative, SEIU Local 721, may request that
the grievance be submitted to arbitration as provided for hereinafter. (Atkinson Decl., Exhibit 1 at 17);
Only those
grievances which directly concern or involve the interpretation or application
of the specific terms and provisions of this Memorandum of Understanding may be
submitted to arbitration hereunder. (Id.
at 17-18);
Arbitration of a
grievance hereunder shall be limited to the formal grievance as originally
filed by the employee to the extent that said grievance has not been
satisfactorily resolved. Arbitration hereunder shall be conducted in accordance
with applicable rules and procedures adopted or specified by County's Employee
Relations Commission, unless the parties hereto mutually agree to other rules
or procedures for the conduct of such arbitration. The fees and expenses of the
arbitrator shall be shared equally by the parties involved, it being understood
and agreed that all other expenses including, but not limited to, fees for
witnesses, transcripts, and similar costs incurred by the parties during such
arbitration, will be the responsibility of the individual party involved. (Id. at 20); and
Prior to a hearing
by an arbitrator, a representative of the County and the Union shall meet and
prepare a submission statement setting forth the issue(s) to be determined
which shall be submitted to the arbitrator. In the event the County and the
Union cannot jointly agree on a submission statement, then at the hearing, each
party shall present to the arbitrator, its own submission statement in which
case the arbitrator shall determine the issue(s) to be resolved.” (Id.)
The
Court finds that the County has not established that the Arbitrator exceeded
his authority when he crafted the Award. The Award provides that the Arbitrator relied
on the MOU in arriving at his decision. The
Award further explains the Arbitrator’s reasoning for finding that the County
waived its timeliness arguments: the County’s failure to raise the issue until
it submitted its closing brief and that the issue was not included in the
issues the Parties stipulated were properly before the Arbitrator. (See Atkinson Decl., Exhibit 6 at
5.) Whether the decision reached by the
Arbitrator was based on a proper consideration of the facts, law or
interpretation of the MOU is beyond the scope of judicial review of an
arbitration award, particularly since the record reflects that the issue of
timeliness was considered by the Arbitrator.
Moreover, the County cites to no applicable rules of arbitration that
prohibited the Arbitrator from ruling on a procedural issue or authority that
allows the Court to review whether the Arbitrator properly applied the
law.
The
Court therefore DENIES the VP and GRANTS the CP.
Petitioner
is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
In consideration of the current COVID-19
pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on
all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the
parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an
appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m.
on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then
inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held.
The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing
day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the
Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This
rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper
social distancing.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at
SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email
and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off
calendar.
Dated this 28th day of March 2023
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Hon.
Holly J. Fujie Judge
of the Superior Court |
[1] The County and SEIU (the
“Parties”) filed a stipulation providing that neither would file reply papers.