Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV04386, Date: 2023-01-27 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

Case Number: 22STCV04386    Hearing Date: January 27, 2023    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Jamshid Barmaan (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff

The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.

BACKGROUND

This action was initiated on February 4, 2022, and arises out of a landlord/tenant relationship.  The currently operative first amended complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1) violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”); (2) violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”); and (3) conversion.

In relevant part, the FAC alleges: Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement (the “Lease Agreement”) with Moving Defendant to rent property (the “Property”) in around 2015.  (FAC ¶ 14.)  Pursuant to the Lease Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to make monthly rent payments.  (Id.)  Moving Defendant represented himself as a licensed realtor and told Plaintiff that he owned and managed the Property.  (FAC ¶ 15.)

 At around the end of 2017, Plaintiff was badly injured in a car accident.  (FAC ¶ 16.)  Plaintiff thereafter went to Iran to obtain medical treatment and heal from the injuries he sustained in the car accident.  (FAC ¶ 17.)  Moving Defendant informed Plaintiff that he would not need to pay rent while he was in Iran rehabilitating and until he fully recovered or reached a legal settlement relating to the accident.  (See FAC ¶ 18.) 

When Plaintiff returned to the Property in around April 2018, he learned that Moving Defendant had entered the Property and removed Plaintiff’s personal property, including cash in the amount of at least $10,000 and furniture.  (FAC ¶ 19.)  Also in around April 2018, Moving Defendant entered the Property, threatened Plaintiff with a knife, and forced Plaintiff to sign a document relinquishing his rights to the Property.  (FAC ¶ 21.) 

Moving Defendant filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the FAC on the grounds that it fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action with respect to all three claims.  Moving Defendant also filed a motion to strike (the “Motion”), which seeks to strike allegations concerning damages.

DEMURRER

Meet and Confer

The meet and confer requirement has been met for both the Demurrer and Motion.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.  (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)  The court accepts as true all material factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.  (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.)  With respect to a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.  (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)  A demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

Statute of Limitations

A defendant may demur to a complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations when it is clear from the face of the complaint that the action is time-barred.  (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 412.)  The statute of limitations for conversion claims is three years.  (CCP § 338, subd. (c)(1).)  The statute of limitations for CLRA claims is also three years.  (Civ. Code § 1783.) 

            The allegations of the FAC establish that Plaintiffs claims accrued in around April 2018.  Plaintiff did not file this action until February 2022.  Plaintiff’s conversion and CLRA claims are therefore time-barred.  Plaintiff does not present facts that suggest that this defect may be cured by amendment.  The Court therefore SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the second and third causes of action without leave to amend. 

Unfair Competition Law

The UCL prohibits unfair competition, including unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts.  (Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 997, 1008-09.)  To show a violation of the UCL, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury; and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.  (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322.)  A business act or practice only needs to meet one of the requirements to be considered unfair competition under the UCL.  (Daro v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1093.)  Whether a particular act is business-related is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each case.  (People ex rel. City of Santa Monica v. Gabriel (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 882, 888.)  The renting of residential housing may be a business act.  (Id.; see also Daro v. Superior Court, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at 1101, n. 11.)

The statute of limitations for an unfair competition cause of action is four years.  (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208.)  This four-year statute of limitations applies even if the borrowed law provides a shorter statute of limitations.  (See Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 178-79.)

The Court finds that the SAC sufficiently alleges an unlawful business practice.  As alleged, Moving Defendant’s allegedly wrongful acts occurred in the performance of his duties as a landlord.  Moreover, the SAC sufficiently alleges the elements of conversion.  The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.  (Hodges v. County of Placer (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 537, 551.)  Money cannot be the subject of a cause of action for conversion unless there is a specific, identifiable sum involved, such as where an agent accepts a sum of money to be paid to another and fails to make the payment.  (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1491.)  Here, the SAC alleges that Moving Defendant took personal belongings and an identifiable sum of money from Plaintiff.  The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the first cause of action.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Legal Standard

A motion to strike either: (1) strikes any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strikes any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court.  (CCP § 436.)

            The Motion seeks to strike allegations concerning compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief. 

The remedies for UCL claims brought by private individuals are limited to injunctive relief and restitution. (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb and Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1133.)  UCL claims cannot serve as the basis for punitive damages.  (Ghazarian v. Magellan Health, Inc. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 171, 195.)  Attorney’s fees are not recoverable under an unfair competition cause of action.  (See Benson v. Southern California Auto Sales, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1208.) 

The Court finds that there is no basis for compensatory damages, punitive damages, or attorney’s fees alleged in the FAC.  Nor is there a basis for injunctive relief because the FAC does not allege that Plaintiff remains in possession of the Property.  (See Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 928.)  The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court strongly encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.  If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org stating your intention to appear in person.  The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.  This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

       Dated this 27th day of January 2023