Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV04386, Date: 2024-03-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV04386 Hearing Date: March 27, 2024 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL
DISTRICT
|
Plaintiff, vs. JAMSHID
BARMAAN, et al.,
Defendants. |
|
[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: March 27, 2023 Time:
8:30 a.m. Dept.
56 |
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Jamshid Barmaan
(“Moving Defendant”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
The Court has considered the moving,
opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This action was initiated on February 4, 2022,
and arises out of a landlord/tenant relationship. The currently operative first amended
complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1) violation of the California Unfair
Competition Law (“UCL”); (2) violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies
Act (“CLRA”); and (3) conversion.
In relevant part, the FAC alleges: Plaintiff
entered into a lease agreement (the “Lease Agreement”) with Moving Defendant to
rent property (the “Property”) in around 2015.
(FAC ¶ 14.) Pursuant to the Lease
Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to make monthly rent payments. (Id.) Moving Defendant represented himself as a
licensed realtor and told Plaintiff that he owned and managed the
Property. (FAC ¶ 15.)
At
around the end of 2017, Plaintiff was badly injured in a car accident. (FAC ¶ 16.) Plaintiff thereafter went to Iran to obtain
medical treatment and heal from the injuries he sustained in the car
accident. (FAC ¶ 17.) Moving Defendant informed Plaintiff that he
would not need to pay rent while he was in Iran rehabilitating and until he
fully recovered or reached a legal settlement relating to the accident. (See FAC ¶ 18.)
When Plaintiff returned to the Property in
around April 2018, he learned that Moving Defendant had entered the Property
and removed Plaintiff’s personal property, including cash in the amount of at
least $10,000 and furniture. (FAC
¶ 19.) Also in around April 2018,
Moving Defendant entered the Property, threatened Plaintiff with a knife, and
forced Plaintiff to sign a document relinquishing his rights to the
Property. (FAC ¶ 21.)
Moving Defendant filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment (the “MSJ”) to the FAC on the grounds that there are no triable issues
of material fact as to the remaining cause of action for violation of Business
and Professions Code section 17200.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE
Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED with
respect to Exhibits 1-9 as to the existence of the documents but not to the
truth of the matters stated therein. (See
Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400; Big Valley Band of
Pomo Indians v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1191-92.)
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
The Court OVERRULES
Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections in full.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Legal Standard
The function of a motion for summary judgment
or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party
cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order
of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP section 437c, subdivision (c) requires
the judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted and all
inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other
inferences or evidence show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler
v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
A plaintiff moving for summary judgment or
summary adjudication meets the burden of showing that there is no defense to a
cause of action if the plaintiff has proved each element of the cause of action
entitling them to judgment on that cause of action. (CCP § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Courts liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of the opposing party.
(Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Once the moving party has met its burden, the
burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material
fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive
evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) The opposition papers must include a separate
statement that responds to each of the material facts that the moving party
claims to be undisputed. (CCP § 437c,
subd. (b)(3).) If the opposing party
disputes a fact, then the opposing party must reference supporting
evidence. (Id.)
Unfair Competition Law
The UCL prohibits unfair competition,
including unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts. (Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston,
LLC (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 997, 1008-09.)
To show a violation of the UCL, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a loss
or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact,
i.e., economic injury; and (2) show that that economic injury was the
result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising
that is the gravamen of the claim. (Kwikset
Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322.) A business act or practice only needs to meet
one of the requirements to be considered unfair competition under the UCL. (Daro v. Superior Court (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 1079, 1093.) Whether a particular act
is business-related is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of
each case. (People ex rel. City of
Santa Monica v. Gabriel (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 882, 888.) The renting of residential housing may be a
business act. (Id.; see also
Daro v. Superior Court, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at 1101, n. 11.)
Defendant argues for summary judgment on the UCL claim on
the grounds that there are no triable issues of fact as to conversion. Specifically, Defendant asserts that
Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendant took $44,000 in cash and $6,000 in coins
from Plaintiff’s apartment or that such taking was a substantial factor in
causing harm. Defendant asserts the
evidence fails to show that Defendant stole personal property from Plaintiff’s
apartment. Defendant argues as follows: Plaintiff
asserts that before leaving for Iran in January 2018, he changed the lock on
his apartment door and did not provide a key to Defendant, suggesting that the
apartment remained secured during his absence.
(Defendant’s Undisputed Material Facts “UMF” nos. 11-14.) Plaintiff alleges having stored $44,000 in
cash and $6,000 in coins in a rice bag hidden within the box spring of his
mattress, a location purportedly known only to him. (UMF nos. 16, 17, 19.) However, Plaintiff later indicated uncertainty
about the exact location of the cash. (UMF 18.) Thus, according to these assertions, Defendant
points out that he had neither a key to the apartment nor knowledge of the
hiding place. (UMF nos. 12, 19.) Plaintiff conceded in his deposition that Defendant
never entered the apartment to steal his belongings, including the cash and
coins in question. (UMF 21.) This admission was supported by his
acknowledgment of the absence of witnesses to corroborate his theft claim. (UMF 22.) In Plaintiff’s deposition, he explicitly denies
any direct theft by Defendant. (UMF 21.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff
provided no concrete facts in response to special interrogatories about the
theft, but rather reiterated the broad allegations from his First Amended
Complaint about Defendant’s supposed agreement regarding rent and the vague
claim of theft upon his return from Iran, without specifying the alleged
$44,000 and $6,000 amounts. (UMF 25.) When asked to identify potential witnesses, Plaintiff
mentioned neighbors but admitted to not knowing their identities or contact
information. (UMF 26.) Defendant asserts that this narrative raises
significant questions about the substantiation of Plaintiff’s claims regarding
the theft.
Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot
establish that Defendant directed others to steal personal property from his
apartment. Defendant provides as follows: Plaintiff recounted an agreement with
Defendant that exempted him from paying rent while he sought medical treatment
in Iran due to injuries from a car accident.
Upon his return, he discovered the alleged theft of his property,
including cash and other items, but did not specifically allege that the
defendant directed others to commit this theft.
(UMF 25.) During his deposition, Plaintiff
admitted lacking evidence to support his claim that the defendant had
orchestrated the entry into his apartment to steal cash and coins. (UMF 24.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s testimony
reveals a belief in Dfendant’s guilt but acknowledges an absence of evidence to
substantiate this belief. (UMF 24.) Given this admission, Defendant argues that Plaintiff
fails to establish the necessary elements for a claim of
conversion—specifically, that Defendant substantially interfered with Plaintiff’s
property in a manner that was knowing or intentional.
The Court finds that Defendant has satisfied his prima
facie burden in showing that there are no triable issues of fact to support
Plaintiff’s UCL claim. The burden shifts
to Plaintiff.
In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has
failed to shift the burden by making an affirmative showing that negates any
element of Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff contends
that simply demonstrating an absence of evidence on his part is not sufficient
for summary judgment. He states that if
any of the 26 material facts identified by Defendant in his motion are
disputed, it should be sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff further argues that Defendant has
not successfully negated any cause of action under the UCL. He
asserts violations of several laws, including trespass, which he claims Defendant
has not refuted. Moreover, Plaintiff
asserts that his UCL claim is not limited to a theory of conversion, but that
there are other unlawful acts, such as trespass to chattels and burglary, that also
support his claim under the UCL.
In reply, Defendant argues that the facts presented in
his moving papers are sufficient to shift the burden of proof to
Plaintiff. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 851 [moving party must make a prima
facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact].) Defendant criticizes Plaintiff’s opposition
for failing to produce competent material evidence to support a claim of
conversion, pointing out that Plaintiff’s “disputed facts” are speculative and
unsupported by evidence. These disputed
facts include assertions that someone must have known about the hidden cash and
coins, that Defendant ordered the theft, and that there are witnesses to
support Plaintiff’s allegations, all of which Defendant contests as baseless.
Additionally, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s claims of trespass and burglary, were never previously
pled and are unsupported by evidence.
Defendant further points out Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Code of
Civil Procedure Section 437c(b)3, which requires a separate statement
responding to the moving party’s material facts and sets forth any disputed
facts with references to supporting evidence. Defendant emphasizes the absence of any
admissible evidence from Plaintiff to support his claims and highlights Plaintiff's
lack of diligence in pursuing discovery to substantiate his allegations. Given these deficiencies, Defendant concludes
that the Court should grant summary judgment in his favor.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s
assertions, the Court finds that Defendant has provided sufficient arguments
and evidence to show that there are no triable issues of fact. Plaintiff, on the other hand, fails to rebut
that showing by failing to provide any admissible evidence to show that there
are sufficient facts to establish the elements of conversion, the underlying
unlawful act for his UCL claim. Further,
as Defendant points out, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he may rely on
trespass and burglary to support his UCL claim.
Finally, Plaintiff fails to raise any admissible evidence to support his
claims.
Thus, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Moving party is ordered
to give notice of this ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed
by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email
and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off
calendar.
Dated this
27th day of January 2023
|
|
|
|
|
Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court |