Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV07450, Date: 2022-10-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV07450 Hearing Date: October 26, 2022 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER AND
MOTION TO STRIKE Date:
October 26, 2022 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 Judge: Holly J. Fujie |
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC (“Moving Defendant”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff
The Court has considered the moving,
opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of the
purchase of a vehicle (the “Vehicle”) manufactured and distributed by Moving
Defendant. Plaintiff initiated this
action by filing a complaint (the “Complaint”) on March 1, 2022. The currently operative first amended
complaint (the “FAC”) alleges four causes of action for warranty breaches under
the Song-Beverly Act and a fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement by
concealment.
In relevant part, the FAC
alleges: Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle on or about July 23, 2016. (FAC ¶ 6.)
The Vehicle came with several warranties. (FAC ¶ 7, Exhibit A.)
Before
purchasing the Vehicle, Plaintiff interacted with Moving Defendant’s authorized
dealership’s sales representatives, considered Moving Defendant’s
advertisements and other marketing materials related to the Vehicle, and
researched the features of the Vehicle on Moving Defendant’s website. (FAC ¶¶ 8, 31.)
During
the terms of the Vehicle’s warranties and within one year of its purchase, the
Vehicle exhibited symptoms of various defects, including a defect to the
cooling system. (See FAC ¶¶ 12,
72.) The cooling system defect can,
among other things, cause mechanical problems such as fluid leakage into the
engine and reduced engine power. (See
FAC ¶¶ 24, 26.) Beginning in 2017,
Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to Moving Defendant’s authorized repair
facilities multiple times with concerns related to the Vehicle’s engine and/or
cooling system. (See FAC ¶¶ 26,
39-42.)
Moving
Defendant knew since at least 2010 that the Vehicle contained defects to its
engine cooling systems from sources not available to the general public, pre-
and post-production testing data, early consumer complaints, and its internal
data aggregated from its network of dealers.
(See FAC ¶¶ 22, 29.)
Moving Defendant did not disclose the defect to Plaintiff either before
or after he purchased the Vehicle. (FAC
¶¶ 30, 80.) Plaintiff discovered Moving
Defendant’s wrongful conduct shortly before filing the original Complaint due
to the Vehicle continuing to exhibit symptoms of its defects after repair
attempts. (FAC ¶ 45.)
Moving
Defendant filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the fifth cause of action on the
grounds that the FAC fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action because: (1) the claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of
limitations; (2) the allegations are not sufficiently specific to allege fraud;
and (3) the claim is barred by the economic loss rule. Moving Defendant also filed a motion to
strike (the “Motion”) portions of the FAC related to punitive damages.
DEMURRER
Meet
and Confer
The meet and
confer requirement has been met for the Demurrer and Motion.
Legal Standard
A
demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law. (Durell
v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) The court accepts as true all material
factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not
consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations
contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.
(Shea Homes Limited Partnership v.
County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) With respect to a demurrer, the complaint
must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts
pleaded. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) A demurrer will be sustained without leave to
amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Statute
of Limitations
A complaint disclosing
on its face that the limitations period has expired in connection with one or
more counts is subject to demurrer. (Alexander
v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250.) Under California Code of Civil Procedure
(“CCP”) section 338, subdivision (d), fraud claims have a three-year statute of
limitations. (CCP § 338, subd. (d).)
The cause of action is not deemed to
have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake. (Id.) The statute begins to run only after one has
knowledge of facts sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of
fraud, thus putting him on inquiry. (Vega
v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 282, 298.) When a
plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for purposes of the accrual
of a case of action or application of the delayed discovery rule is generally a
question of fact, properly decided as a matter of law only if the evidence (or
the allegations in the complaint and facts properly subject to judicial notice)
can support only one reasonable conclusion.
(Broberg v. The Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 912, 921.)
The
Court finds that the allegations in the FAC do not conclusively establish that
the fraudulent concealment claim is barred as a matter of law. While Plaintiff was on notice of various
issues with the Vehicle outside the limitations period proscribed by CCP
section 338, subdivision (d), the FAC does not include allegations to
demonstrate as a matter of law that the problems Plaintiff experienced with the
Vehicle placed him on notice that Moving Defendant knew of a cooling system
defect and intentionally failed to disclose the defect to Plaintiff.
Fraud by Omission
The
elements of fraud by omission are: (1) misrepresentation by nondisclosure; (2)
knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4)
justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.
(Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) To plead fraud by omission, the plaintiff
must also plead that the defendant was under a duty to disclose the allegedly
omitted fact. (Lopez v. Nissan North
America, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 72, 596.) There are four circumstances that impose a
duty on the defendant such that nondisclosure or concealment may constitute
actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with
the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts
not known to plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material
fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial
representations but also suppresses some material facts. (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 276, 310-11.) The heightened
pleading for standard for fraud claims is relaxed if it appears from the nature
of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full
information, or if the facts lie more in the knowledge of opposing
parties. (Alfaro v. Community Housing
Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356,
1384-85 (“Alfaro”).) The
plaintiff need not plead specific information that should be within the
knowledge of the defendant. (West v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.)
A
transaction giving rise to a duty to disclose, as would support a claim for
intentional concealment, must necessarily arise from direct dealings between
the plaintiff and defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the
public at large. (Bigler-Engler
v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312). As a matter of common sense, such a
relationship can only come into being as a result of some sort
of transaction between the parties.
(LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337.) Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the
relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee,
doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual
agreement. (Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Com. v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 831.) A vendor has a duty to disclose material
facts not only to immediate purchasers, but to subsequent purchasers when the vendor
has reason to expect that the item will be resold. (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v.
CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 851 (“OCM”).)
The FAC adequately alleges a transactional relationship
between Plaintiff and Moving Defendant to support a duty to disclose. Moving Defendant manufactured and distributed
the Vehicle. In addition, Moving
Defendant was the source of the warranties which form the basis for Plaintiff’s
Song-Beverly claims. By manufacturing
and distributing cars, including the Vehicle, it was reasonable for Moving
Defendant to expect that the Vehicle would subsequently be sold. (See OCM, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at 851.) In addition, the FAC alleges that the facts
underlying the fraudulent omission claim lie more within the knowledge of
Moving Defendant, a knew of the transmission defect through a variety of
sources that are not readily available to the general public, including early
consumer complaints and its internal data.
The FAC is thus sufficiently alleged to put Moving Defendant on notice
of the nature of Plaintiff’s claim. (See
Alfaro, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at 1384.)
The Court therefore finds that the FAC alleges sufficient facts to
constitute fraud by omission.
Economic Loss Rule
Where a purchaser’s expectations in a sale are frustrated because
the product he bought is not working properly, his remedy is in contract alone,
for he has suffered only economic losses. (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana
Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988 (“Robinson”).) The economic loss rule hinges on a
distinction drawn between transactions involving the sale of goods for
commercial purposes where economic expectations are protected by commercial and
contract law, and those involving the sale of defective products to individual
consumers who are injured in a manner which has traditionally been remedied by
resort to the law of torts. (Id.) The economic loss rule prevents the law of
contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other. (Id.)
The restrictions on contract remedies serve purposes not found in
tort law—they protect the parties’ freedom to bargain over special risks and
they promote contract formation by limiting liability to the value of the
promise. (Harris v. Atlantic
Richfield (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 70, 77.)
This encourages efficient breaches, resulting in increased production of
goods and services at a lower cost to society. (Id.)
Because of these overriding policy considerations, the California
Supreme Court has proceeded with caution in carving out exceptions to the
traditional contract remedy restrictions. (Id.) The most widely recognized exception to the economic loss rule is
when a defendant’s conduct constitutes a tort as well as a breach of contract. (Id.
at 78.) The party alleging fraud or
deceit in connection with a contract must establish tortious conduct
independent of a breach of the contract itself, that is, violation of some
independent duty arising from tort law.
(Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1130 (“Food Safety Net Services”).) Such conduct may arise in several situations,
including in the fraudulent inducement of the pertinent contract. (See id.)
The Court is not persuaded by Moving Defendant’s argument that the
economic loss rule bars the sixth cause of action because the exception to the economic
loss rule established by Robinson is limited to cases alleging
affirmative misrepresentations. In Robinson,
the California Supreme Court held that that the economic loss rule does
not bar tort recovery for claims for intentional misrepresentation or fraud in
the performance of a contract. (See
Robinson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 979 at 984.)
Robinson therefore does not expressly bar recovery for
claims arising out of allegations that a contract was induced by a defendant’s
fraudulent concealment of facts. (See
Food Safety Net Services, supra,
209 Cal.App.4th at 1130.) Because the FAC sufficiently alleges fraud by omission and alleges that
Plaintiff would not have leased the Vehicle if he knew of the transmission
defect, Plaintiff is not precluded from seeking damages that
are separate from those arising from a breach of contract.
The
Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer. Moving
Defendant is to file an answer within 20 days of this order.
MOTION TO STRIKE
Legal Standard
A motion to strike either: (1) strikes any
irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strikes
any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of
this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.)
The Motion seeks to strike the prayer for punitive
damages from the FAC. As the fraud by
omission claim forms the basis for the prayer for punitive damages, based on
the Court’s ruling on the Demurrer, the Court DENIES the Motion.
Moving party
is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
In consideration of the current COVID-19
pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on
all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the
parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an
appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m.
on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then
inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held.
The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing
day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the
Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This
rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper
social distancing.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at
SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email
and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off
calendar.
Dated
this 26th day of October 2022
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Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court |