Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case 22STCV09312 2022-09-28 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action on March 16, 2022. They filed the currently operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) on May 16 and served defendants shortly thereafter.

Plaintiffs allege defendant Terence Stevens, a convicted child molester, sexually assaulted each of them at various points between 1982 and 1991. (Compl. ¶¶ 2-3.) They further allege that during this period, the County of Santa Barbara, through the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department, received numerous reports regarding Stevens’s suspected misconduct, even at one point arresting Stevens for lewd conduct, but failed to act on the reports according with their legal responsibilities.

Stevens served as an administrator, referee, and coach for the American Youth Soccer Organization (“AYSO”), the moving party here, for at least part of the period during which the alleged assaults occurred. Plaintiffs allege AYSO “long suspected [Stevens] was sexually molesting children,” but failed in their duty to protect and care for the youth enrolled in their program.

Plaintiffs allege five causes of action against defendants Terence Stevens, the County of Santa Barbara, the Santa Barbara Sheriff’s Department, and AYSO, for: (1) negligence per se against the County and the Sheriff’s Department; (2) child sexual assault against Stevens and, vicariously, AYSO; (3) negligence against AYSO; (4) failure to warn, train, or educate against AYSO; and (5) civil rights violations against the County and Sheriff’s Department.

Defendant AYSO, for itself only, demurs to plaintiffs’ second, third, and fourth causes of action. These are the only causes of action brought against AYSO. They are brought only by plaintiffs JOHN LWS, JOHN LSS, and JOHN LHS DOE, to whom the term “plaintiffs” refers collectively throughout this ruling.

“[A] demurring party shall file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating … the means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to the demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a)(3)(A).)

Counsel for AYSO has filed a declaration establishing that AYSO satisfied the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41.

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.) The grounds for the demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

The court “may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those arising by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220, citing Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638; Montclair Parkowners’ Association v. City of Monclair (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 784, 790.) For the purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged in the complaint as true. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (Picton) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.)

When considering demurrers, courts “are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton, supra, at p. 733, citing Rogoff v. Grabowski (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 624, 628.) As long as a party shows there is “a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment,” the trial court should grant leave to amend the pleadings when sustaining a demurrer. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) The rule of liberal construal notwithstanding, “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint can be amended. (Ross v. Creel Printing & Publishing Company (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 736, 748.)

“A complaint need only contain ‘a statement of the facts constituting a cause of action, in ordinary and concise language’ [Citation], and will be upheld ‘so long as [it] gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 869 fn. 3.) “The essence of the matter is fairness in pleading to give the defendant such notice by the complaint that he may prepare his case.” (Leet v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (1944) 25 Cal.2d 605, 619.) “The question is whether the pleading as a whole apprises the adversary of the factual basis of the claim … [a]nd particularity of facts depends on the extent to which the defendant needs detailed information.” (4 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 6th Pleading § 392(a) (2022), citations omitted.)

Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action: Vicarious Liability for Child Sexual Assault

In their second cause of action, plaintiffs allege Terrence Stevens sexually molested them within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1(d). (Compl. ¶ 38.) They argue AYSO is vicariously liable because it authorized and ratified Stevens’s conduct. (Id. ¶ 39.)

AYSO first argues that Stevens did not commit the alleged assaults within the scope of his employment. AYSO claims, specifically, that “California courts uniformly hold sexual misconduct is outside of the course and scope of employment as a matter of law.” (Dem. 9:13-14.) This claim overstates the rule, but not drastically. “Sexual assaults are not per se beyond the scope of employment. [Citation.] But courts have rarely held an employee's sexual assault or sexual harassment of a third party falls within the scope of employment. [Citations.] (Daza v. Los Angeles Community College District, (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 260, 268 [collecting numerous cases where sexual assault fell outside scope of employment, even when it occurred at the workplace itself].) The Court agrees that plaintiffs’ allegations fall outside the immediate scope of Stevens’s employment, and plaintiffs have not attempted to rebut this point in their opposition.

Thus, if plaintiffs seek to hold AYSO vicariously liable for Stevens’s actions, it must be on a theory of authorization and/or ratification, not respondeat superior. In this respect, plaintiffs allege “AYSO ratified and/or approved of [Stevens’s] sexual misconduct by failing to adequately investigate, discharge, discipline or supervise” Stevens, who was “known … to have sexually assaulted … or to have been accused of sexually assaulting children”, and that AYSO “conceal[ed] evidence of prior sexual assaults by” Stevens and “other agents of AYSO. (Compl. ¶ 40.) Plaintiffs allege no other specific facts.

The parties’ arguments hinge, respectively, on their contradictory interpretations of C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094 (C.R. v. Tenet) and Ratcliff v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 982 (Ratcliff). The facts of those two cases substantially mirror the facts here. In both cases, plaintiffs sought relief from employers for sexual misconduct by their employees. C.R. v. Tenet arose in the context of a sexual assault of one co-worker by another; Ratcliff dealt with the molestation of young boys by a Catholic priest.

Defendants argue “the allegations in both those cases were far different than anything Plaintiffs have alleged against AYSO in the present case.” (Dem. 12:8-9). Plaintiffs cite to Ratcliff for the general rule that a principal can ratify the sexual torts of its agents (Opp. 2:19-21) and argue specifically that “[t]here is nothing that meaningfully distinguishes the facts pled here and those [pled] in C.R. v. Tenet…” (Opp. 3:11-12.) The parties thus implicitly agree that comparison to C.R. v. Tenet and Ratcliff should control their argument over the question of ratification. The question is not whether ratification is generally applicable in these circumstances, but whether plaintiff has stated allegations with specificity comparable to either of these two precedents. In both cases, the appeals courts found plaintiffs’ complaints stated sufficient facts to constitute causes of action based partly on ratification.

The Court agrees with defendants that the facts as currently pled do not meet the standard of those in C.R. v. Tenet or Ratcliff. The issue is one of specificity. The plaintiffs in C.R. v. Tenet alleged that specific employees (managers and supervisors) covered up a perpetrator’s misconduct during a specific period of time and “hid” information regarding a specific incident of sexual assault, and that the defendant “destroyed documents” to conceal them from the plaintiff herself. (C.R. v. Tenet, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112.) In Ratcliff, the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the perpetrator had taken a leave of absence because of his misconduct and “openly violated … written policies”, and that the employer was aware of specific witnesses to the misconduct but never questioned them. (Ratcliff, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 1004.) The plaintiffs in both cases alleged more specific facts than those appearing in the FAC here.

Plaintiffs’ complaint fails, however, only for want of specifics. The allegations in the FAC could be clarified to state a claim if plaintiffs allege facts on which their more conclusory statements are based. The specificity of the allegations elsewhere in the complaint suggest plaintiffs may possess sufficient information to state a claim upon amendment, and plaintiffs have requested leave to amend in their opposition.

The Court GRANTS defendant’s motion as to plaintiffs’ second cause of action WITH twenty days leave to amend.

Both parties recognize that defendant’s liability for negligence rests on the existence of a “special relationship” between defendant and plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶ 43; Dem. 13:16-17.) “[U]nder the common law, as a general rule, one person owe[s] no duty to control the conduct of another [Citations]… .” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435.) Nevertheless, a “defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third parties if [the defendant] has a special relationship with the other person. [Citation.]” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235, quotations omitted.) Specifically, “a person may have an affirmative duty to protect the victim of another’s harm if that person is in …a special relationship with either the victim or the person who created the harm.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 215 (Brown II).) It is well-established that, at least under certain circumstances, a youth athletic league may owe such a duty to the children who participate in its activities. (See e.g. Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Association, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118 (“U.S. Youth Soccer”); Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1077 (Brown I), affirmed on appeal in Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 (Brown II).)

The Brown I case clearly articulates standards establishing a “special relationship”: “[a] special relationship between the defendant and the victim is one that ‘gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from the defendant, whereas a special relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that ‘entails an ability to control [the third party’s] conduct.” (Brown I, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 216, quoting Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619 (Regents).) Put differently, “[a] typical setting for the recognition of a special relationship is where the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, has some control over the plaintiff’s welfare.” (Giraldo v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 231, 245-246, citations omitted.) Special relationships have “defined boundaries” such that “[t]hey create a duty of care owed to a limited community, not the public at large.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 621.)

Much like the parties rely on conflicting interpretations of C.R. v. Tenet and Ratcliff in their arguments regarding ratification, they rely on conflicting interpretations of U.S. Youth Soccer, supra, and Brown (I and II), supra, in their arguments regarding an alleged special relationship between plaintiffs and AYSO. In both those cases, youth athletes sued sports leagues for injuries arising from coaches’ sexual misconduct. Both plaintiffs alleged, in part, that the leagues breached a duty owed to the athletes based on a “special relationship” as described above.

In U.S. Youth Soccer, the perpetrator of the sexual misconduct in question coached a youth soccer league. The plaintiff alleged that the perpetrator engaged in “grooming behavior”, “became friendly with … plaintiff’s parents” and earned their trust through his association with the defendant soccer league. (U.S. Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1125.) The plaintiff’s allegations in U.S. Youth Soccer, however, were considerably lengthier and more detailed than those stated in the FAC here. Importantly, the plaintiff in U.S. Youth Soccer alleged grooming behavior took place at practices, games, and tournaments, while the plaintiff was directly engaged in activities administered by the defendant. (Id. at pp. 1124-1125.) Similarly, in Brown, the perpetrator repeatedly assaulted the defendant in hotel rooms at athletic events after luring her there under the pretext of coaching activities and “continued to sexually molest [her] at events sanctioned by [the defendant sports leagues].” (Brown, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th 1077 at pp. 1085-1086.)

Other cases cited by the plaintiff arose in similar circumstances where plaintiffs had a particular expectation of protection and defendants exercised special control over the environment that they did not exercise elsewhere. In John HG Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, for example, the misconduct in question occurred at a church facility during a catechism class. In Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, the misconduct occurred during officially sanctioned Boy Scout events.

Plaintiffs have not alleged that any misconduct here took place at sanctioned events, or while plaintiffs’ activities were under the direct administration of AYSO. They allege generally that Stevens’s “unique authority and position” allowed him to “identify vulnerable victims and their families” and “manipulate”, “induce”, and “coerce them” such that he could successfully continue perpetrating his crimes. (Compl. ¶ 44.) They also allege Stevens had “access and authority with minors [that] was known to AYSO and encouraged by them.” (Ibid.) However, plaintiffs offer no specifics as to whether plaintiffs were, in fact, in a specially vulnerable position when Stevens victimized them, or whether AYSO had control over Stevens’s actions at that time. The association of the perpetrator with the soccer league is not by itself sufficient to show a special relationship; otherwise the league would effectively be held liable for all misconduct perpetrated against athletes by staff, no matter how circumstantially disconnected the misconduct is from league activities.

Defendant dwells at length in its demurrer on the factors articulated in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland) and whether they apply to AYSO’s situation here. Rowland does not articulate a balancing test to be conducted in the facts of every given case. Rather, courts employ the Rowland factors to determine whether, where a special relationship already exists, if special public policy concerns justify relieving a tortfeasor of its duty of care, notwithstanding the special relationship. (Brown II, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209.)

As illustrated throughout the moving papers and this ruling, numerous courts have affirmed that the Rowland factors do not justify relieving youth sports leagues from liability wholesale at the pleading stage under circumstances nearly identical to those allege in this case. (See e.g. ibid. [Rowland barred liability only for the larger, umbrella sports organization defendant]; U.S. Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th 1118 [Rowland precluded only duty to warn, not duty generally].) The Court is not persuaded that the Rowland test justifies immunizing AYSO from liability, should plaintiffs plead facts sufficient to establish a special relationship between either Stevens or the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs have offered to “plead additional facts buttressing that AYSO determined who could supervise children, who could be coaches, AYSO’s control over its regions, … and other facts to demonstrate that while Plaintiffs were entrusted to the care of AYSO agents, those agents acted as quasi-parents for the Plaintiffs, capable of directing and controlling Plaintiffs.” (Opp. 8:9-13.) Particularly when coupled with the specificity of its allegations elsewhere in the FAC, plaintiffs’ have carried their burden to demonstrate they can cure these defects by amendment.

The Court GRANTS defendant’s motion as to plaintiffs’ third cause of action WITH twenty days leave to further amend their complaint.

Defendant argues, based on U.S. Youth Soccer, that AYSO owed no duty to warn, educate, etc. its enrolled athletes or their families about the dangers of child sex abuse. Specifically, the U.S. Youth court held that “sports organizations… are not designed to educate children, their parents, and others regarding the risk of sexual abuse”, and “the burden … of implementing a sexual abuse education program for millions of players, their parents, adult employees, and team volunteers would be substantial.” (Id. at 1138-1139.) Plaintiff replies, in essence, that the question is more nuanced. Plaintiff cites to Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, disapproved on other grounds in Brown v. USA Taekwondo, supra, 11 Cal.5th 204, for the proposition that in certain circumstances, particularly where an organization already has mechanisms in place for educating its members about particular dangers, a duty to warn might arise.

The parties’ arguments over failure to warn are, ultimately, arguments over the scope of defendant’s alleged duty under a negligence theory, not about whether a separate duty exists. The plaintiff and the court in U.S. Youth Soccer both treated the duty to warn as one part of an underlying duty of care supporting the plaintiff’s larger negligence action. (U.S. Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123.) Juarez, similarly, treated respondeat superior, negligent hiring, and failure to warn as separate theories of relief under the same set of facts. (See Juarez, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A demurrer is properly sustained without leave to amend when a cause of action contains allegations of other causes and “add[s] nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory of recovery.” (Rodrigues v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 494, 501; see also Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290.) Here, if AYSO owed a duty to plaintiffs to properly warn and prepare them regarding risks of sexual abuse, that duty was a part of the larger duty of care it owed based on the parties’ special relationship. Such facts do not provide a separate basis for either liability or relief.

The Court SUSTAINS defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action WITHOUT leave to further amend that cause of action of the complaint.

The Court SUSTAINS defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ second and third causes of action WITH twenty days leave to amend their complaint.

The Court SUSTAINS defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action WITHOUT leave to amend this cause of action of their complaint.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court