Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 22STCV09671, Date: 2024-05-24 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Farm Credit Leasing Services Corporation (“Plaintiff”)

The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition papers were filed. Any opposition papers were required to have been filed and served at least nine court days prior to the hearing pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1005(b).

This action arises from the alleged breach of a lease for farm equipment. On March 18, 2022, Plaintiff Farm Credit Leasing Services Corporation (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Goodland Global Farm, Inc. (“Goodland”), Utomo Tani (“Tani”), Yongsook Kim (“Kim”) (collectively “Defendants”), and DOES 1-10, inclusive, alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Leases; (2) Breach of the Tani Guaranty; (3) Breach of the Kim Guaranty; (4) Claim and Delivery; and (5) Conversion. On May 23, 2022, Defendants filed a joint Answer to the Complaint.

On June 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a demurrer to the Answer, to which Defendants filed an opposition and Plaintiff replied.

On July 18, 2022, after hearing, the Court sustained Plaintiff’s demurrer to Defendants’ Answer with leave to amend. (07/18/22 Minute Order.) The Court ordered an Amended Answer to be filed by August 19, 2022. (07/18/22 Minute Order.) Defendants, however, did not file an Amended Answer.

On August 9, 2022, after hearing, the Court granted the motion to be relieved as counsel filed by Paul A. Hoffman as to Defendant Goodland. (08/09/22 Minute Order.)

On February 17, 2023, after hearing, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Answer of Defendant Goodland. (02/17/23 Minute Order.) There were no appearances by Defendants at the hearing. (02/17/23 Minute Order.)

On March 6, 2023, after hearing oral argument, the Court granted the motions to compel filed by Plaintiff. (03/06/23 Minute Order.) There were no appearances by Defendants at the hearing. (03/06/23 Minute Order.)

On January 23, 2024, non-jury trial commenced in this action. (01/23/24 Minute Order.) There were no appearances by Defendants. (01/23/24 Minute Order.)

On February 27, 2024, after non-jury trial, Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff on each cause of action in the Complaint. The Court entered a money judgment in the amount of $4,785,847.07 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in favor of Plaintiff. The Judgment provides that Plaintiff “is deemed the prevailing party and shall also recover contractual attorneys’ fees in an amount to be determined pursuant to a post-judgment motion, plus statutory costs to be determined pursuant to a memorandum of costs.” (Judgment at p. 4: 25-28.) Defendants did not appear at trial.

On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed and served the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (the “Motion”). Plaintiff seeks an order setting the attorneys’ fees award in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the sum of $201,021.57 or in such other amount as the Court deems just and proper. The Motion is made on the grounds that: (1) on February 27, 2024, the Court entered judgment against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees pursuant to the parties’ contracts. The Motion was initially set for hearing on May 22, 2024.

On April 29, 2024, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the Motion from May 22, 2024 to May 24, 2024. The Court ordered Plaintiff to give notice of the continued hearing date to all parties and to file proof of service of such notice in this department. (04/29/24 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order.) Plaintiff did not file a proof of service showing effectuation of notice of the continued hearing date on all Defendants; however, the Court’s April 29, 2024 Notice of Continuance of Hearing and Order was mailed by the Clerk’s Office to Defendants Tani and Kim. (04/29/24 Certificate of Mailing.) There is no indication that Defendant Goodland was given notice of the continued hearing date.

In general, a prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees only when a statute or agreement of the parties provides for fee shifting. (Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1248.) It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) “The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.)

A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award. (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com., supra, 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at p. 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.) The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 98.) An award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1365.)

Unless authorized by either statute or agreement, attorney’s fees ordinarily are not recoverable as costs. (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 127.) California Civil Code, Section 1717(a) provides the following: in any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs. (Civ. Code § 1717(a).) Civ. Code § 1717 was enacted to establish mutuality of remedy where a contractual provision makes recovery of attorney’s fees available for only one party. (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 124, 128.)

Here, the Court’s Statement of Decision states that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to its contractual attorneys’ fees. (Alper Decl., ¶ 4; Exh. 2.) Given that the Motion is unopposed, Defendants have conceded to all of Plaintiff’s arguments raised in the Motion. (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.) The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees. The Court will now assess the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s claimed attorneys’ fees.

In support of the Motion, Andrew K. Alper (“Alper”) presents a declaration which states the following: he is the Vice President and Shareholder of Frandzel Robins Bloom & Csato, LLC (“FRBC”). (Alper Decl., ¶ 1.) Alper presents billing records showing work done by FRBC’s attorneys and paralegals on this matter in the amount of $59,354.50 from January 4, 2022, through January 30, 2024. (Alper Decl., ¶ 5; Exh. 3.) Alper sets forth the hourly rates of attorneys and staff at FRBC who performed work on this matter and sets forth the experience and qualifications of the individuals who worked on this matter. (Alper Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.) Alper indicates that the rates charged are reasonable and that all time spent, work performed, and hourly fees charged were reasonable and necessary. (Alper Decl., ¶ 11.) FRBC has billed attorneys’ fees totaling $59,354.50 in this matter. (Alper Decl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff requests an award of attorneys’ fees in its favor and against Defendants in the amount of $201,021.57. (Alper Decl., ¶ 13.)

In support of the Motion, Benjamin J. Court (“Court”) provides a declaration. Mr. Court is a partner at Stinson LLP (“Stinson”) and indicates that he has been admitted pro hac vice to practice before this Court in the State of California. (Court Decl., ¶ 1.) Mr. Court presents copies of Stinson’s invoices covering work performed by attorneys and paralegals in this matter from August 2021 through February 2024, totaling $141,667.07, discounted by 13.5 percent from $163,777.00. (Court Decl., ¶ 6; Exh. 4.) Counsel sets forth the hourly rates of attorneys and paralegals at Stinson who performed work on this matter and sets forth the experience and qualifications of some of the individuals who worked on this matter. (Court Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) Mr. Court declares that the rates charged are reasonable and that all time spent, work performed, and hourly fees charged were reasonable and necessary. (Court Decl., ¶ 11.) Stinson has billed attorneys’ fees totaling $141,667.07 in this matter. (Court Decl., ¶ 12.) Mr. Court sets forth some of the tasks done in this case such as researching potential claims and planning and preparing for depositions. (Court Decl., ¶ 12.) The legal tasks for this matter were allocated between Stinson and FRBC. (Court Decl., ¶ 14.) Stinson undertook the primary laboring on discovery, motions, and trial. (Court Decl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff requests an award of attorneys’ fees in its favor and against Defendants in the amount of $201,021.57. (Court Decl., ¶ 15.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has substantiated the reasonableness of its requested attorneys’ fees. Given that the Motion is unopposed, Defendants have conceded to the argument that the claimed attorneys’ fees are reasonable. (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.)

As stated above, however, Defendant Goodland was not given notice of the continued hearing date on the Motion. The Court GRANTS the Motion and awards Plaintiff attorneys’ fees in the amount of $201,021.57 CONDITIONED ON Plaintiff providing the Court with a proof of service—either at or before the hearing—showing that Defendant Goodland was given timely notice of the continued hearing date.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court