Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV10862, Date: 2022-11-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV10862 Hearing Date: November 21, 2022 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER Date: November 21, 2022 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 Judge: Holly J. Fujie |
MOVING PARTY: PHH Mortgage Corporation, Deutsch Bank National Trust
Company (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply
papers.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of foreclosure
proceedings taken against real property (the “Property”). Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a
complaint (the “Complaint”) on March 30, 2022.
The currently operative first amended complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1)
violations of the Homeowners Bill of Rights (“HOBR”); (2) violation of Civil
Code section 2923.5; (3) declaratory relief for void deed of trust; (4)
declaratory relief for void claim of lien; (5) injunctive relief; (6)
intentional misrepresentation; and (7) accounting.
In relevant part, the FAC alleges: On or about August 11, 2004,
Plaintiff executed a first deed of trust (the “DOT”) in favor of Agent Mortgage
Company in the principle sum of $734,500.
(FAC ¶ 10, Exhibit A.) Moving
Defendants violated the HBOR: (1) by recording or causing to be recorded a
notice of default (the “NOD”) and election to sell without fully informing
Plaintiff of the statutory opportunity to seek a loan modification; recording
the NOD when Plaintiff had submitted an application for a loan modification;
(3) failing to appoint to Plaintiff a single point of contact to provide
information about foreclosure alternatives; and (5) providing Plaintiff with
written materials about foreclosure prevention and alternatives. (See FAC ¶ 14.)
Moving Defendants filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the first
through fifth and seventh causes of action on the grounds that the FAC fails to
allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action against them.
REQUEST
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Moving Defendants’ Request for
Judicial Notice is GRANTED.
DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
The meet and
confer requirement has been met.
Legal Standard
A demurrer tests
the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law. (Durell
v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) The court accepts as true all material
factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not
consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations
contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.
(Shea Homes Limited Partnership v.
County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) With respect to a demurrer, the complaint
must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts
pleaded. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) A demurrer will be sustained without leave to
amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
First and Second Causes of Action
The
first cause of action alleges that Moving Defendants violated several sections
of the HBOR, including Civil Code section 2923.5, while the second cause of
action alleges Civil Code section 2923.5.
As the second cause of action is duplicative of the first cause of
action, the Court will analyze the sufficiency of the allegations in both
causes of action concurrently.
Moving
Defendants argue that these causes of action are barred by res judicata and the
statute of limitations.
The
FAC does not state when the NOD or Notice of Trustee’s Sale was executed or
recorded. The original Complaint,
however, alleges that the NOD was recorded on March 22, 2016, and the Notice of
Trustee’s Sale was recorded on June 27, 2018.
(See Complaint ¶¶ 22-23, Exhibits B-C.)
The admission of fact in a
pleading is a judicial admission. (Bucur
v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 187.)
A judicial admission in a pleading is not merely evidence of a fact; it
is a conclusive concession of the truth of the matter. (Id.) When a complaint contains allegations that are
fatal to a cause of action, a plaintiff facing demurrer cannot avoid those
defects simply by filing an amended complaint that omits the problematic facts
or pleads facts inconsistent with those alleged earlier. (Banis
Restaurant Design, Inc. v. Serrano (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1035,
1044.) Absent an explanation for the inconsistency, a court will read the
original defect into the amended complaint, rendering it vulnerable to demurrer
again. (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 743.)
Moving Defendants argue
that although omitted from the FAC, Plaintiff is bound by the NOD and Notice of
Trustee’s Sale alleged in and attached to the original Complaint which form the
basis for Plaintiff’s HBOR claims.
Plaintiff’s opposition (the “Opposition”) contends that Moving
Defendants’ argument on this point is without legal basis. The Opposition, unlike the Demurrer, however,
does not cite to any legal authority to support this argument. Nor does the Opposition set forth facts to
explain the omission of these documents from the FAC. The Court thus agrees with Moving Defendants
and finds that Plaintiff is bound by the NOD and Notice of Trustee’s Sale
alleged in the Complaint. The FAC is therefore susceptible to demurrer on any
grounds that would appear on the face of the pleading had Plaintiff included
the allegations of the NOD and Notice of Trustee’s Sale.
Res Judicata
A demurrer may be brought on the ground
that the doctrine of res judicata bars an action. (See generally
Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 797-805.) Res judicata, or claim preclusion,
prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the
same parties. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888,
896.) Res judicata precludes piecemeal
litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same
cause of action on a different theory or for different relief. (Weikel
v. TCW Realty Fund II Holding Co. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1245.)
For res judicata purposes, the central inquiry is not whether identical causes
of action were litigated, but whether a party had the opportunity to litigate
the causes of action. (See id.) Two proceedings are on the
same cause of action if they are based on the same “primary right.” (Federation
of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126
Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202.) For the doctrine of res judicata to apply to a subsequent
action, the decision in the prior proceeding must have been final and on the
merits. (Id.) It is the
nature of the action and character of the judgment that determines whether it
is res judicata. (Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of
Conservation (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1220.) Where a complaint is
dismissed on procedural or technical grounds and the substance of the
underlying claim was never tried or determined the doctrine of res judicata
does not apply because there was no judgment on the merits. (Id.)
The doctrine of
res judicata generally precludes parties, or parties in privity with them, from
relitigating a cause of action determined with finality in a prior
proceeding. (See, e.g., Smith v.
ExxonMobil Oil Corp. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413-14; Wright v. Ripley (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th
1189, 1193.) The doctrine has two
aspects: it applies to both a previously litigated cause of action, referred to
as claim preclusion, and to an issue
necessarily decided in a prior action, referred to as issue preclusion. (Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21
Cal.4th 815, 828; Teitelbaum Furs, Inc.
v. Dominion Ins. Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604.) This distinction is essential, as courts have
oft-noted the “seemingly ineradicable confusion over the distinctions between
‘res judicata’ (claim preclusion) and ‘collateral estoppel’ (issue
preclusion).” (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 541 n. 21.)
Issue preclusion
applies only to issues that were actually litigated in the earlier matter;
whereas claim preclusion extends to all legal theories, proofs, and demands for
relief that might have been presented in the first matter, provided both suits
assert the same cause of action. (Id.) Res judicata (claim preclusion) bars the relitigation not only
of claims that were conclusively determined in the first action, but also
matter that was within the scope of the action, related to the subject matter,
and relevant to the issues so that it could have been raised and includes
matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or
litigable. (Burdette v. Carrier Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1668,
1674-75; accord Mark v. Spencer (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 219, 229 (noting that res
judicata bars claims that parties had fair opportunities to litigate).) Claim preclusion therefore applies as a bar
to splitting a cause of action for partial, later litigation, or relitigation
of the same cause of action based upon on another legal theory or associated
with different relief, that could have been sought in the prior action. (Noble
v. Draper (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.) The prerequisite elements for determining
whether a claim or issue is precluded are the same: (1) a claim or issue raised
in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior
proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the
merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a
party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Vandenberg
v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 829.)
Plaintiff
has filed several lawsuits relating to the foreclosure proceedings described in
the FAC. (See generally RJN,
Exhibits 4-18.) In 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the
action styled as Gass v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, LASC Case No.
19STCV20341 (the “2019 Action”). (See
RJN, Exhibit 13.) The 2019 Action
alleged: (1) quiet title/wrongful foreclosure; (2) damages for severe mental
and emotional distress; and (3) declaratory relief. (See id.) In the 2019 Action, Plaintiff alleged that
Moving Defendants wrongfully foreclosed on the Property in part by violating
the HBOR. (See id. at ¶ 14.) Moving Defendants filed a demurrer in the
2019 Action that was sustained without leave to amend, and the action was
dismissed with prejudice. (See RJN,
Exhibit 14.)
The
Court finds that the first two causes of action are barred based on the
dismissal in the 2019 Action. These
claims arise out of the same primary right asserted in the 2019 Action and
Plaintiff is not entitled to relitigate them.
(See Gillies v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
907, 914-15.) The Court therefore
SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the first to causes of action without leave to amend.
Third and Fourth Causes of Action
Plaintiff
alleges that the DOT is void because it was not signed in the presence of a
notary public. (FAC ¶ 23.) Plaintiff further alleges that the DOT is
also void because the underlying loan was improperly inflated be because of an
unsupported claim of lien. (See FAC
¶ 26.)
The
Court finds that these two claims are time-barred. Plaintiff is essentially seeking redress on a
breach of contract theory, which has a statute of limitations of four
years. (CCP § 337, subd. (a).)
Both claims are based on
facts that were available to Plaintiff when the DOT was executed, and Plaintiff
has alleged no facts to support a tolling of the statute of limitations. The Opposition does not provide facts
indicating that this claim can be remedied by further amendment. The Court therefore SUSTAINS the Demurrer to
the third and fourth causes of action without leave to amend.
Sixth Cause of Action
Injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause
of action.
(Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th
1177, 1187.) As this is not an
independent cause of action, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the sixth cause
of action without leave to amend.
Seventh
Cause of Action
An action for an accounting may be brought to compel the defendant
to account to the plaintiff for money or property: (1) where a fiduciary
relationship exists between the parties; or (2) where, even though no fiduciary
relationship exists, the accounts are so complicated that an ordinary legal
action demanding a fixed sum is impracticable.
(Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872,
910.) A cause of action for an
accounting requires a showing that a relationship exists between the plaintiff
and defendant that requires an accounting, and that some balance is due to the
plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting. (Id.)
Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a duty that justifies
an accounting. The Court therefore
SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the seventh cause of action without leave to amend.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this
ruling.
In consideration of
the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages
that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if
the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make
an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2
p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The
Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your
hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during
that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for
another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set
on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can
be taken for proper social distancing.
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to
the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on
the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive
an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed
off calendar.
Dated
this 21st day of November 2022
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Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court |