Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV10953, Date: 2023-11-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV10953    Hearing Date: November 1, 2023    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff E.J.

The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.

BACKGROUND

            The currently operative First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1) negligence; and (2) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. 

In relevant part, the FAC alleges that Plaintiff was sexually abused by Norbert Stuart Volk (“Volk”), a teacher employed by Moving Defendant from approximately 1978 to 1981.  (FAC ¶¶ 18-19.)  The FAC alleges that Moving Defendant had reason to know of Volk’s misconduct that created a risk of childhood sexual abuse.  (FAC ¶ 15.)

On August 1, 2023, Moving Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (the “Motion”).  The Motion argues that the FAC does not state a valid claim against Moving Defendant because the statutory basis for exempting Plaintiff’s claims from the Government Claims Act violates the California Constitution’s prohibition against the gift of public funds. 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            Moving Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.  Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.  While the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of court documents, it does not take notice of the truth of the matters stated therein.  (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.) 

DISCUSSION

Meet and Confer

            The meet and confer requirement has been met.

Legal Standard

Under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 438, subdivision (c)(1)(B), a defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings if the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.  (CCP § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).)  The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer.  (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064.)  The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations in the complaint, along with matters subject to judicial notice.  (Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th. 725, 738.)  The court must view the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  (Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 28.) 

Childhood Sexual Abuse Claims

Under CCP section 340.1, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 218 (“AB 218”), the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions: (1) an action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault; or (2) an action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.  (CCP § 340.1, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)[1]

            AB 218 also amended the provision that lists exceptions to the Government Claims Act, Government Code section 905, by removing language in subdivision (m) that limited the exception to claims arising out of conduct that occurred on or after January 2009 and adding subdivision (p), which made this change retroactive.  (See Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 424 (“Coats”); Gov. Code § 905, subds. (m), (p).) 

Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution (“the Anti-Gift Provision”) provides, in relevant part: “The Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize the giving or lending, of the credit of the State, or of any county, city and county, city, township or other political corporation or subdivision of the State now existing, or that may be hereafter established, in aid of or to any person, association, or corporation, whether municipal or otherwise, or to pledge the credit thereof, in any manner whatever, for the payment of the liabilities of any individual, association, municipal or other corporation whatever; nor shall it have power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever… .”  (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6.)

Moving Defendant argues that the portion of AB 218 that retroactively exempts childhood sexual abuse claims from the Government Claims Act is unconstitutional with respect to public entities and constitutes an impermissible gift of public funds.  Compliance with the Government Claims Act is a substantive prerequisite to stating a claim for money damages against a public entity.  (See State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240-41.) 

Moving Defendant’s argument turns on the distinction between the nature of the statutes of limitation for childhood sexual abuse cases and the substantive requirements of the Government Claims Act for stating a claim against a government entity. 

The Court finds that the effect of AB 218 in amending the Government Claims Act to add an exemption for claims of the type alleged herein does not constitute a “gift of public money or thing of value” within the meaning of the Anti-Gift Provision of the Constitution.  As the California Supreme Court held in Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 509, 517:

We are not strongly impressed with the contention of the respondent that the application of funds to pay judgments obtained against the state constitutes a gift of public money, within the prohibition of the Constitution.  The state cannot be subjected to suits against itself except by its express consent; but it may surrender its sovereignty in that particular.  The judgments which are to be paid bear no semblance to gifts.  They must first be obtained in courts of competent jurisdiction, to which the parties have submitted their claims in the manner directed by law.  In other words, they are judgments obtained after the requirements of due process of law have been complied with.”

Here, AB 218 did not create an obligation on the part of a governmental agency to pay a claim made by Plaintiff.  In order for Plaintiff to recover money from Defendant, Plaintiff must first obtain a judgment in this case.  This would not be a gift of public funds. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court is not persuaded by Moving Defendant’s argument that the retroactive elimination of the claim presentation requirement for childhood sexual abuse claims that arose before 2009 in AB 218 is unconstitutional under the Anti-Gift Provision.  The Court therefore DENIES the Motion.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

         Dated this 1st day of November 2023