Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV11799, Date: 2023-09-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV11799 Hearing Date: February 1, 2024 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. ESTATE OF LUIGI ANTONIO VERNOLA, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES Date:
February 1, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 Judge: Holly J. Fujie |
MOVING PARTY:
Defendant Lisa Marie Vernola Salas, as authorized Co-Special Administrator on
behalf of the Estate of Luigi Antonio Vernola (“Moving Defendant”)
The
Court has considered the moving papers.
No opposition papers were filed.
Any opposition papers were required to have been filed and served at
least nine court days before the hearing under California Code of Civil
Procedure (“CCP”) section 1005, subdivision (b).
BACKGROUND
This
action arises out of a dispute over the assets of Decedent Luigi Antonio
Varnola (“Decedent”). Plaintiff’s
complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges: (1) breach of contract.
On September 29,
2023, the Court granted Moving Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
found that Plaintiff could not show the existence of an enforceable contract,
in part because she failed to overcome the presumption of undue influence
established by Probate Code section 21380.
Judgment was entered for Moving Defendant on October 19, 2023.
On October 24,
2023, Moving Defendant filed a motion for attorney’s fees (the “Motion”)
seeking to recover $167,078.
DISCUSSION
Unless authorized
by either statute or agreement, attorney’s fees ordinarily are not recoverable
as costs. (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 128.) The party moving for attorney’s fees has the
burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate
hours expended and hourly rates. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.)
Probate Code
section 21380 enumerates circumstances that create a presumption of fraud or
indue influence for provisions of an instrument making a donative
transfer. (See Prob. Code §
21380, subd. (a).) If a beneficiary is
unsuccessful in rebutting the presumption, the beneficiary shall bear all costs
of the proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees. (Pron. Code § 21380, subd. (d).)
When it ruled on
the MSJ, the Court found that the contract at the heart of the Complaint was a
donative transfer subject to the presumption of fraud that Plaintiff failed to
rebut. The Court thus finds that Moving Defendant
has provided a statutory basis for seeking attorney’s fees.
Reasonableness of Requested Attorney’s Fees
The party moving
for attorney’s fees has the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and
documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (Christian
Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) To that end, the
court may require a defendant to produce records sufficient to provide a proper
basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims. (Id.)
The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any
failure to maintain appropriate time records.
(Id.) The evidence should
allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the
attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably
expended. (Id.)
A court awards
attorney’s fees based on the “lodestar” method which is “the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM
Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The trial court has broad authority to
determine the amount of a reasonable fee.
(Id.) The loadstar figure may be adjusted, based on
a consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the
fair market value for the legal services provided. (Id.) Generally, the reasonable hourly rate used
for the lodestar calculation is that prevailing in the community for similar
work. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616.)
The Motion
provides evidence of the fees Moving Defendant incurred in defending this
action. (See Declaration of
Charles A. Mollis (“Mollis Decl.”) ¶ 9, Exhibit 1.) The Court finds that Moving Defendant has
demonstrated that counsel’s hourly rate and the hours of work performed are
reasonable. For this reason and because
it is unopposed, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
(Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) Given the lack of opposition, the Court finds
it appropriate to reduce Moving Defendant’s recovery to $164,970, which
accounts for the removal of entries for the anticipated time spent drafting
reply papers and attending the hearing.
(See Mollins Decl. ¶ 10.)
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to
the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on
the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive
an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed
off calendar.
Dated this 1st day of February
2024
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Hon.
Holly J. Fujie Judge
of the Superior Court |