Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV15838, Date: 2022-08-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV15838    Hearing Date: August 9, 2022    Dept: 56

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

EMILY BAKER,

 

                        Plaintiff,

            vs.

 

CINDA SUE SPINKS, et al.,

 

                        Defendants.

 

      CASE NO.:  22STCV15838

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE

 

Date: August 9, 2022

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept. 56

Judge: Holly J. Fujie

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Cinda Sue Spinks (“Moving Defendant”)

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff

 

The Court has considered the moving and opposition papers.  No reply papers were filed.  Any reply papers were required to have been filed and served at least five court days before the hearing under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1005, subdivision (b).

 

BACKGROUND

            This action arises out of a landlord/tenant relationship. Plaintiff’s complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges: (1) negligence; (2) wrongful eviction in violation of the Los Angeles Rent Ordinance; (3) constructive eviction; (4) breach of contract; (5) tenant harassment in violation of the Los Angeles Anti-Harassment Ordinance; (6) violation of Civil Code section 1942.5; (7) nuisance; (8) trespass; (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (10) unfair business practices; and (11) declaratory and injunctive relief.

 

The relevant allegations of the Complaint are as follows: Beginning in 2018, Plaintiff leased a residential unit in real property owned by Moving Defendant (the “Property”).  Moving Defendant lived next door to Plaintiff.  (Complaint ¶ 33.)  The Property had many habitability issues throughout Plaintiff’s tenancy, which went unaddressed despite Plaintiff notifying Moving Defendant, including: a rodent infestation, dilapidated bathroom, ceiling leaks, and damaged windows.  (See Complaint ¶¶ 11-31.)  In addition to ignoring the habitability problems, Moving Defendant harassed Plaintiff.  (Complaint ¶ 32.)  For example, Moving Defendant would regularly yell for Plaintiff to go outside and if Plaintiff did not respond, Moving Defendant would walk upstairs to Plaintiff’s unit and knock for her until Plaintiff responded.  (Complaint ¶ 33.)  Moving Defendant would also make unannounced visits while intoxicated; during these visits, Moving Defendant would yell profanities about the tenant in the third unit of the Property and demand that Plaintiff vacate her residence.  (Complaint ¶ 32.)  Moving Defendant also consistently encouraged Plaintiff to move out of the Property.  (See Complaint ¶ 34.)  Moving Defendant frequently called out to or texted Plaintiff to complain about other tenants at the Property.  (Complaint ¶¶ 35-36.)  In August 2021, Plaintiff emailed Moving Defendant to tell her that she did not want to be involved with Moving Defendant’s drama with the other tenants and did not want to continue to receive text messages on the subject.  (Complaint ¶ 37.)  Plaintiff also wrote that if conditions did not improve at the Property by November 1, 2021, she would have to move out by December 1, 2021.  (Id.)  Moving Defendant responded and told Plaintiff to let her know if she decided to move out.  (Complaint ¶ 38.)  On August 31, 2021, after Plaintiff complained of rodents, Moving Defendant escalated her attempts to encourage Plaintiff to move out, including by representing that she “accepted” Plaintiff’s notice to vacate which was communicated in the August 2020 email.  (See Complaint ¶¶ 39-44.)  Moving Defendant did not acknowledge Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to explain that the August 2020 email was not an official notice to vacate, and as a result of Moving Defendant’s persistence, Plaintiff moved out of the Property on November 18, 2021.  (Complaint ¶¶ 40-45.)  As a result of the conditions at the Property and Moving Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff has suffered conditions including impaired cognition, chronic inflammation, insomnia, anxiety, and panic attacks.  (Complaint ¶¶ 46-47.)

 

Moving Defendant filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the fifth and ninth causes of action on the grounds that the Complaint fails to state facts to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain with respect to both claims.  Moving Defendant also filed a motion to strike (the “Motion”), which seeks to strike allegations concerning punitive damages and attorney’s fees.

 

DEMURRER

Meet and Confer

The meet and confer requirement has been met with respect to both the Demurrer and Motion.

 

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.  (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)  The court accepts as true all material factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.  (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.)  With respect to a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.  (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)  Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored.  (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.)  A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.  (Id.)    A demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

 

Fifth Cause of Action: Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance

            The Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance provides, in part:

Tenant Harassment shall be defined as a landlord's knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific tenant or tenants that causes detriment and harm, and that serves no lawful purpose, including, but not limited to, the following actions: 

 

 

2.¿¿¿Failing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by Federal, State, County, or local housing, health, or safety laws; or failure to follow applicable industry standards to minimize exposure to noise, dust, lead paint, asbestos, or other building materials with potentially harmful health impacts. 

 

¿ 

¿           4.¿¿¿Threatening a tenant, by word or gesture, with physical harm. 

 

            5. Attempting to coerce the tenant to vacate with offer(s) of payments.

 

¿ 

8.¿¿¿Threatening to or engaging in any act or omission which interferes with the tenant's right to use and enjoy the rental unit or whereby the premises are rendered unfit for human habitation and occupancy. 

 

¿ 

16.¿¿¿Other repeated acts or omissions of such significance as to substantially interfere with or disturb the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of a tenant(s) and that cause, are likely to cause, or are committed with the objective to cause a tenant(s) to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such tenancy. 

 

(LAMC §§ 45.33, subds. (2), (4), (8), (16).) 

 

            The Complaint adequately alleges a claim for violations of the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance.  The Complaint alleges that Moving Defendant failed to make repairs, yelled at tenants, offered Plaintiff a free month of rent if she agreed to vacate, frequently disrupted Plaintiff, and repeatedly attempted to persuade Plaintiff to vacate the Property.  The allegations supporting this claim are not uncertain and Moving Defendant may seek clarification through the discovery process.  The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the fifth cause of action.

 

Ninth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous behavior with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress.  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)  Conduct is considered extreme and outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.  (Id.)  Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant: (1) abuses a position that gives him power over a plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through emotional distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably when the conduct is likely to result in mental distress and illness.  (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946.)  Whether conduct is extreme or outrageous is generally a question of fact.  (See Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 356.)

 

The Complaint adequately alleges a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Complaint alleges that Moving Defendant habitually ignored Plaintiff’s repeated complaints about the conditions at the Property while simultaneously creating a disruptive environment by yelling at other residents of the Property and seeking Plaintiff’s attention in person and through text message to complain about the other tenants.  The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff experienced numerous conditions, both physical and psychological, as a result of Moving Defendant’s conduct.  Moving Defendant’s arguments regarding whether her alleged conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous and whether Plaintiff’s emotional distress is sufficiently severe require a factual analysis inappropriate at the demurrer stage.  Furthermore, the allegations supporting this cause of action are not uncertain.  The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the ninth cause of action.

 

MOTION TO STRIKE

Legal Standard

A motion to strike either: (1) strikes any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strikes any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court.  (CCP § 436.)

 

 

 

 

Punitive Damages        

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages in an action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)  Malice is conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)  Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.  (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.)  Oppression is defined as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.  (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) 

 

The Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges conduct to warrant an award of punitive damages, including the pervasive substandard conditions at the Property of which Moving Defendant was aware and failed to address and Moving Defendant’s overall disregard for Plaintiff’s personal space throughout her tenancy.  (See Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920. 

 

 

 

 

 

Attorney’s Fees

Attorney’s fees are generally not recoverable unless authorized by a contract, statute or law.  (CCP § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)  A prevailing tenant may recover attorney’s fees under the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance.  (LAMC § 45.35, subd. (B).)

 

As Plaintiff has adequately alleged a cause of action under the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance, the Complaint alleges a proper basis for an award of attorney’s fees.

 

The Court therefore DENIES the Motion in its entirety.

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

 

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. 

 

  Dated this 9th day of August 2022

 

 

  

Hon. Holly J. Fujie 

Judge of the Superior Court