Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV15838, Date: 2022-08-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV15838 Hearing Date: August 9, 2022 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. CINDA SUE SPINKS, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER AND
MOTION TO STRIKE Date: August 9, 2022 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 Judge: Holly J. Fujie |
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Cinda Sue Spinks (“Moving Defendant”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
The Court has considered the moving and opposition papers. No reply papers were filed. Any reply papers were required to have been
filed and served at least five court days before the hearing under California Code
of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1005, subdivision (b).
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of a
landlord/tenant relationship. Plaintiff’s complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges:
(1) negligence; (2) wrongful eviction in violation of the Los Angeles Rent
Ordinance; (3) constructive eviction; (4) breach of contract; (5) tenant
harassment in violation of the Los Angeles Anti-Harassment Ordinance; (6)
violation of Civil Code section 1942.5; (7) nuisance; (8) trespass; (9)
intentional infliction of emotional distress; (10) unfair business practices; and
(11) declaratory and injunctive relief.
The relevant
allegations of the Complaint are as follows: Beginning in 2018, Plaintiff
leased a residential unit in real property owned by Moving Defendant (the
“Property”). Moving Defendant lived next
door to Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶
33.) The Property had many habitability
issues throughout Plaintiff’s tenancy, which went unaddressed despite Plaintiff
notifying Moving Defendant, including: a rodent infestation, dilapidated
bathroom, ceiling leaks, and damaged windows.
(See Complaint ¶¶ 11-31.)
In addition to ignoring the habitability problems, Moving Defendant
harassed Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶
32.) For example, Moving Defendant would
regularly yell for Plaintiff to go outside and if Plaintiff did not respond,
Moving Defendant would walk upstairs to Plaintiff’s unit and knock for her
until Plaintiff responded. (Complaint ¶
33.) Moving Defendant would also make
unannounced visits while intoxicated; during these visits, Moving Defendant
would yell profanities about the tenant in the third unit of the Property and
demand that Plaintiff vacate her residence.
(Complaint ¶ 32.) Moving
Defendant also consistently encouraged Plaintiff to move out of the
Property. (See Complaint ¶
34.) Moving Defendant frequently called
out to or texted Plaintiff to complain about other tenants at the
Property. (Complaint ¶¶ 35-36.) In August 2021, Plaintiff emailed Moving
Defendant to tell her that she did not want to be involved with Moving
Defendant’s drama with the other tenants and did not want to continue to
receive text messages on the subject.
(Complaint ¶ 37.) Plaintiff also
wrote that if conditions did not improve at the Property by November 1, 2021,
she would have to move out by December 1, 2021.
(Id.) Moving Defendant
responded and told Plaintiff to let her know if she decided to move out. (Complaint ¶ 38.) On August 31, 2021, after Plaintiff
complained of rodents, Moving Defendant escalated her attempts to encourage
Plaintiff to move out, including by representing that she “accepted”
Plaintiff’s notice to vacate which was communicated in the August 2020
email. (See Complaint ¶¶
39-44.) Moving Defendant did not
acknowledge Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to explain that the August 2020 email
was not an official notice to vacate, and as a result of Moving Defendant’s
persistence, Plaintiff moved out of the Property on November 18, 2021. (Complaint ¶¶ 40-45.) As a result of the conditions at the Property
and Moving Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff has suffered conditions including
impaired cognition, chronic inflammation, insomnia, anxiety, and panic
attacks. (Complaint ¶¶ 46-47.)
Moving Defendant filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the fifth and ninth
causes of action on the grounds that the Complaint fails to state facts to constitute
a cause of action and is uncertain with respect to both claims. Moving Defendant also filed a motion to
strike (the “Motion”), which seeks to strike allegations concerning punitive
damages and attorney’s fees.
DEMURRER
Meet and Confer
The meet and
confer requirement has been met with respect to both the Demurrer and Motion.
Legal Standard
A demurrer tests
the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law. (Durell
v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) The court accepts as true all material
factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not
consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations
contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.
(Shea Homes Limited Partnership v.
County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) With respect to a demurrer, the complaint
must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts
pleaded. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) Demurrers for uncertainty are
disfavored. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) A demurrer for
uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects
uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures. (Id.) A
demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend if there exists no reasonable
possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Fifth Cause of Action: Tenant
Anti-Harassment Ordinance
The
Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance provides, in part:
Tenant Harassment shall be
defined as a landlord's knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific tenant or tenants that causes detriment and harm, and that serves no
lawful purpose, including, but not limited to, the following actions:
…
2.¿¿¿Failing to perform and
timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by Federal, State,
County, or local housing, health, or safety laws; or failure to follow
applicable industry standards to minimize exposure to noise, dust, lead paint,
asbestos, or other building materials with potentially harmful health impacts.
…
¿
¿ 4.¿¿¿Threatening a tenant, by
word or gesture, with physical harm.
5. Attempting to coerce the tenant
to vacate with offer(s) of payments.
…
¿
8.¿¿¿Threatening to or engaging
in any act or omission which interferes with the tenant's right to use and
enjoy the rental unit or whereby the premises are rendered unfit for human
habitation and occupancy.
…
¿
16.¿¿¿Other repeated acts or
omissions of such significance as to substantially interfere with or disturb
the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of a tenant(s) and that cause, are likely
to cause, or are committed with the objective to cause a tenant(s) to surrender
or waive any rights in relation to such tenancy.
(LAMC
§§ 45.33, subds. (2), (4), (8), (16).)
The
Complaint adequately alleges a claim for violations of the Tenant
Anti-Harassment Ordinance. The Complaint
alleges that Moving Defendant failed to make repairs, yelled at tenants,
offered Plaintiff a free month of rent if she agreed to vacate, frequently
disrupted Plaintiff, and repeatedly attempted to persuade Plaintiff to vacate
the Property. The allegations supporting
this claim are not uncertain and Moving Defendant may seek clarification
through the discovery process. The Court
therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the fifth cause of action.
Ninth
Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a
plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous behavior with
the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,
emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and
(3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate
cause of the severe emotional distress. (Hughes
v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)
Conduct is considered extreme and outrageous when it is so extreme as to
exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Id.)
Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant: (1) abuses a
position that gives him power over a plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the
plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through emotional distress; or (3) acts
intentionally or unreasonably when the conduct is likely to result in mental
distress and illness. (Agarwal v.
Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946.)
Whether conduct is extreme or outrageous is generally a question of
fact. (See Barker v. Fox &
Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 356.)
The Complaint adequately alleges a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The Complaint
alleges that Moving Defendant habitually ignored Plaintiff’s repeated
complaints about the conditions at the Property while simultaneously creating a
disruptive environment by yelling at other residents of the Property and
seeking Plaintiff’s attention in person and through text message to complain
about the other tenants. The Complaint
also alleges that Plaintiff experienced numerous conditions, both physical and
psychological, as a result of Moving Defendant’s conduct. Moving Defendant’s arguments regarding
whether her alleged conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous and whether
Plaintiff’s emotional distress is sufficiently severe require a factual
analysis inappropriate at the demurrer stage.
Furthermore, the allegations supporting this cause of action are not
uncertain. The Court therefore OVERRULES
the Demurrer to the ninth cause of action.
MOTION
TO STRIKE
Legal
Standard
A motion to strike either: (1) strikes any
irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strikes
any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of
this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.)
Punitive
Damages
A plaintiff may
recover punitive damages in an action for breach of an obligation not arising
from contract when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is conduct which is intended by the
defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code §
3294, subd. (c)(1).) Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile,
base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked
down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. (Mock v. Michigan
Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.)
Oppression is defined as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)
The Court finds
that the Complaint sufficiently alleges conduct to warrant an award of punitive
damages, including the pervasive substandard conditions at the Property of
which Moving Defendant was aware and failed to address and Moving Defendant’s
overall disregard for Plaintiff’s personal space throughout her tenancy. (See Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101
Cal.App.3d 903, 920.
Attorney’s Fees
Attorney’s fees
are generally not recoverable unless authorized by a contract, statute or
law. (CCP § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) A prevailing tenant may recover attorney’s
fees under the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance. (LAMC § 45.35, subd. (B).)
As Plaintiff has
adequately alleged a cause of action under the Tenant Anti-Harassment
Ordinance, the Complaint alleges a proper basis for an award of attorney’s
fees.
The Court
therefore DENIES the Motion in its entirety.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this
ruling.
In consideration of
the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages
that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made
by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If
you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you
must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of
the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in
person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of
the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any
time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the
hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal
appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate
precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to
the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on
the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive
an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed
off calendar.
Dated
this 9th day of August 2022
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Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court |