Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV16192, Date: 2024-05-31 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.
Case Number: 22STCV16192 Hearing Date: May 31, 2024 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP; BRETT MCCOY;
and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,
Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Date: May 31, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 |
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Deloitte Consulting LLP
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Ramez Wissa
The Court has considered the moving,
opposition, and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This is a wrongful termination action. On
March 8, 2023, Plaintiff Ramez Wissa (“Plaintiff”) filed the operative Third
Amended Complaint (“TAC”) against Defendants Deloitte Consulting LLP
(“Deloitte”); Brett McCoy (“McCoy”) (collectively, “Defendants”); and Does 1
through 20, inclusive for: (1) Employment Discrimination in Violation of FEHA
(Gov. Code §12940(a)); (2) Failure to Accommodate in Violation of FEHA (Gov.
Code §12940(m)); (3) Failure to Engage in a Timely & Good Faith Interactive
Process in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code §12940(n)); (4) Harassment in Violation
of FEHA (Gov. Code §12940(j)); (5) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code
§§12940(h)(m)); (6) Failure to Prevent/Remedy Discrimination, Harassment and/or
Retaliation in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code §12940(k)); (7) Wrongful Discharge
in Violation of Public Policy; and (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress.
On November 17, 2023, Defendant
Deloitte filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). On May
17, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion and on May 24, 2024,
Defendant Deloitte filed a reply.
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
In support of the moving papers, Defendant
Deloitte submits an Appendix of Evidence. Plaintiff objects to portions of the
Declaration of Alicia Carberry attached as Exhibit C and Exhibit 28. The Court
rules on the objections as follows:
OVERRULED: Paragraphs 11-12 of
Carberry Decl.; Exhibit 28
SUSTAINED: None
In support of the opposition, Plaintiff submits an Exhibit List.
Defendant Deloitte objects to exhibits attached to the Declaration of Jonathan
Ebrahimian, portions of the Declaration of Ramez Wissa, certain portions of the
Declaration of Karem Takla, and certain portions of the Deposition of Alicia
Carberry. The Court
rules on the objections as follows:
OVERRULED: 15, 17-18, 20,
24, 37-43, 45, 47-52, 63
SUSTAINED: 1-14, 16, 19,
21-23, 25-36, 44, 46, 53-62, 64-72
DISCUSSION
The function of a motion for summary
judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing
party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an
order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) The Code of Civil Procedure §
437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and
uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary
judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits
or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact
within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento
(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima
(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿¿
As
to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for
summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of
proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of
action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the
cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2); see also Scalf v. D. B.
Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally
construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and
resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v.
Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿¿
Once
the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of
action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the
party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿¿
Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant Deloitte moves for an order granting
summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication of the first, second,
third, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action[1]
of the TAC on the ground that they fail as a matter of law.
First
Cause of Action for Disability Discrimination
Government Code section 12940, subdivision
(a) states in relevant part, “[i]t is unlawful employment practice…[f]or
an employer,
because of the…physical disability, mental disability…of any person…to discharge
the person from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or
to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).)
“Generally, the plaintiff must provide
evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified
for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he
held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination,
demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance
suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 355.)
Defendant
Deloitte contends there is no evidence linking Plaintiff’s three-day
hospitalization in July 2019 or alleged disability to his termination.
Here,
the proffered declarations of Brian Siegel, Alicia Carberry, Jacob Gustafson,
Bard Woltman and Andrew Satenberg; Deloitte
Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct; Plaintiff’s Responses to Form
Interrogatories; Office of Security Incident Report; Security Badge Report; and
TAC are sufficient to satisfy Defendant Deloitte’s initial burden to show that
a triable issue of material fact does not exist as to whether Plaintiff was
discharged and discriminated against because of his July 2019 hospitalization
and disability. The proffered evidence suggests that Plaintiff’s supervisor did
not prohibit Plaintiff from being assigned on client engagements due to any
hospitalization or any disability. The evidence further mentioned a medical
issue but did not give details about his condition. The evidence proffered also
indicates that Plaintiff was discharged due to purported theft of Deloitte’s
property.
The
burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact
does exist as to whether Plaintiff was discharged and discriminated against
because of his July 2019 hospitalization and disability. Plaintiff has not,
however, shown that a triable issue of
material fact does exists as to whether he was discharged and discriminated
against because of his disability. The proffered evidence merely demonstrates that
Defendant Deloitte was informed about Plaintiff’s hospitalization in 2019 due
to medical issues, not the specifics of why he was hospitalized or his
disability. The proffered evidence further simply indicates that Plaintiff notified
HR he needed further accommodations for relocation to California. Also, the
proffered evidence merely suggests that Plaintiff was actively trying to get on
projects and providing updates to his supervisor on the status of those
projects. As such, Plaintiff has not
provided substantial responsive, admissible evidence beyond speculation to
support the first cause of action.
Therefore,
the motion for summary judgment as to the first cause of action is GRANTED.
Second
Cause of Action for Failure to Accommodate
Government
Code section 12940, subdivision (m) states in relevant part, “[i]t is unlawful
employment practice…[f]or an employer or other entity covered by this part to
fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental
disability of an applicant or employee.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m)(1).)
Defendant
Deloitte contends that it granted the exact accommodations Plaintiff requested,
which was time-off during his hospitalization and to relocate to California.
Here,
proffered declarations of Brian Siegel, Alicia Carberry, Jacob Gustafson, Bard
Woltman, and Andrew Satenberg; Deloitte
Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct; Plaintiff’s Responses to Form
Interrogatories; emails exchanges between staff and Plaintiff; and TAC are
sufficient to satisfy Defendant Deloitte’s initial burden to show that a
triable issue of material fact does not exist as to whether it failed to make
reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff’s known disability. The evidence
proffered indicates it is common for a consultant to be unassigned to client
engagements/projects for a period of time. The evidence also demonstrates the
consultant is paid full salary and benefits even when unassigned. The proffered
evidence also indicates that multiple staff members worked to get Plaintiff on
projects. Furthermore, the proffered evidence showcases that Plaintiff was
granted relocation to California. Similarly, the evidence indicates Plaintiff
was given time-off due to hospitalization. The proffered evidence further
suggests that Plaintiff did not disclose his medical condition, disability, or
reason for being hospitalized.
The
burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact
does exist as to whether Defendant Deloitte failed to make reasonable
accommodations for Plaintiff’s known disability. Plaintiff has not, however, shown
that a triable issue of material fact does exist as to whether Defendant
Deloitte failed to make reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff’s known
disability. The proffered evidence indicates that Defendant Deloitte was only
informed that Plaintiff was hospitalized with serious medical issues.
Furthermore, the evidence does not indicate that Plaintiff formally requested
time-off due to hospitalization and was denied. Moreover, the evidence suggests
that Plaintiff requested relocation to California and it was approved. As such,
Plaintiff has not provided substantial responsive, admissible evidence beyond
speculation to support the second cause of action.
Therefore,
the motion for summary judgment as to the second cause of action is GRANTED.
Third
Cause of Action for Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process
Government Code section 12940, subdivision
(n) states in relevant part, “[i]t is unlawful employment practice…[f]or an
employer or other entity covered by this part to fail to engage in a timely,
good faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine
effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for
reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known physical or
mental disability or known medical condition.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n).)
As
discussed above, Defendant Deloitte contends Plaintiff cannot show that it
failed to engage in the interactive process because it granted the exact
accommodations requested by Plaintiff.
Here,
proffered declarations of Brian Siegel, Alicia Carberry, Jacob Gustafson, Bard
Woltman, and Andrew Satenberg; Deloitte
Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct; Plaintiff’s Responses to Form
Interrogatories; emails exchanges between staff and Plaintiff; and TAC are
sufficient to satisfy Defendant Deloitte’s initial burden to show that a
triable issue of material fact does not exist as to whether it failed to engage
in a good faith interactive process with Plaintiff in response to his request
for reasonable accommodations. The proffered evidence showcases Plaintiff
expressed interest in working on a project in California. The evidence also
demonstrates that Plaintiff’s request for relocation to California was granted.
The evidence proffered further suggests that Plaintiff was given time off for
his hospitalization.
The
burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact
does exist as to whether Defendant Deloitte failed to engage in a good faith
interactive process with Plaintiff in response to his request for reasonable
accommodations. Plaintiff has not, however, shown that a triable issue of
material fact does exist as to whether Defendant Deloitte failed to engage in a
good faith interactive process with Plaintiff in response to his request for
reasonable accommodations. As explained
above, the proffered evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff requested relocation
in July 2019. The proffered evidence also indicates this request was approved.
Moreover, the proffered evidence showcases that Plaintiff only informed
Deloitte staff that he was hospitalized for serious medical issues. The
evidence does not suggest Defendant Deloitte denied any request for time-off.
As such, Plaintiff has not provided substantial responsive, admissible evidence
beyond speculation to support the third cause of action.
Therefore,
the motion for summary judgment as to the third cause of action is GRANTED.
Fifth
Cause of Action for Retaliation in Violation of FEHA
Government Code section 12940, subdivision
(h) states in relevant part, “[i]t is unlawful employment practice…[f]or any
employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person to discharge, expel,
or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any
practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a
complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.” (Gov.
Code, § 12940, subd. (h).) Also, it is unlawful employment practice “[f]or an
employer or other entity covered by this part to, in addition to the employee
protections provided pursuant to subdivision (h), retaliate or otherwise
discriminate against a person for requesting accommodation under this
subdivision, regardless of whether the request was granted.” (Gov. Code, §
12940, subd. (m)(2).)
“Past California cases hold that in order
to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must
show (1) he or she engaged in a “protected activity,” (2) the employer
subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link
existed between the protected activity and the employer's action. Once an employee
establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.” (Yanowitz v.
L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.)
Defendant
Deloitte contends the fifth cause of action fails for the reasons set forth
above because it is wholly derivative of the first, second and third causes of
action. Defendant Deloitte also contends that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that
its legitimate reasons for termination were a pretext for retaliating against
Plaintiff based on concerns that he raised about staffing eleven months before.
Here,
the proffered declarations of Brian Siegel, Alicia Carberry, Jacob Gustafson,
Bard Woltman, and Andrew Satenberg;
Deloitte Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct; Plaintiff’s Responses
to Form Interrogatories; Office of Security Incident Report; Security Badge
Report; and TAC are sufficient to satisfy Defendant Deloitte’s initial burden
to show that a triable issue of material fact does not exist as to whether it
retaliated against Plaintiff for requesting reasonable accommodations. The
evidence proffered indicates staff members tried to get Plaintiff on projects.
The proffered evidence further demonstrates that Plaintiff’s request for
time-off due to his hospitalization. The evidence also showcases that Plaintiff
did not tell anyone at Deloitte what disability is or his reason for being in
the hospital. Furthermore, the evidence proffered indicates Plaintiff’s request
for relocation to California was granted. Moreover, the evidence suggests that
Plaintiff was terminated for purported theft of Deloitte’s property, entering
into Deloitte office with approval during the pandemic, and lying to Deloitte’s
investigation staff about the alleged incident.
The
burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact
does exist as to whether Defendant Deloitte retaliated against Plaintiff for
requesting reasonable accommodations. Plaintiff has not shown, however, that a
triable issue of material fact does exist as to whether Defendant Deloitte retaliated
against Plaintiff for requesting reasonable accommodations. The evidence
proffered merely demonstrates Plaintiff was trying to get on projects while
waiting for approval of his request for relocation to California. The evidence
also indicates that Plaintiff was approved for a project in California. Furthermore,
the evidence proffered suggests that Plaintiff was removed from a project
because the client was limiting cross-country travel. As such, Plaintiff has
not provided substantial responsive, admissible evidence beyond speculation to
support the fifth cause of action.
Therefore,
the motion for summary judgment as to the fifth cause of action is GRANTED.
Sixth
Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent/Remedy Discrimination and/or Retaliation
Government
Code section 12940, subdivision (k) states in relevant part, “[i]t is unlawful
employment practice…[f]or an employer, labor organization, employment agency,
apprenticeship training program, or any training program leading to employment,
to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and
harassment from occurring.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k).)
Defendant
Deloitte contends the sixth cause of action fails for the reasons set forth
above because it is wholly derivative of the first, second and third causes of
action.
Here,
the proffered declarations of Brian Siegel, Alicia Carberry, Jacob Gustafson,
Bard Woltman, and Andrew Satenberg;
Deloitte Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct; Plaintiff’s Responses
to Form Interrogatories; Office of Security Incident Report; Security Badge
Report; and TAC are sufficient to satisfy Defendant Deloitte’s initial burden
to show that a triable issue of material fact does not exist as to whether it
failed to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent or remedy
discrimination and/or retaliation against Plaintiff. As explained above, the
proffered evidence indicates that Deloitte granted the exact accommodations
requested by Plaintiff. The evidence further suggests Deloitte staff were not
aware of Plaintiff’s disability and the reason he was hospitalized. The
evidence proffered also demonstrates Deloitte staff attempted to get Plaintiff
on projects and still paid him the full salary and benefits while unassigned to
any projects.
The
burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact
does exist as to whether Defendant Deloitte failed to take all reasonable steps
necessary to prevent or remedy discrimination and/or retaliation against
Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not, however, shown that a triable issue of material
fact does exist as to whether Defendant Deloitte failed to take all reasonable
steps necessary to prevent or remedy discrimination and/or retaliation against
Plaintiff. As previously mentioned, Plaintiff proffered no admissible evidence
indicating Plaintiff was removed from projects or not assigned projects due to
his hospitalization and/or disability. The proffered evidence demonstrate that
Defendant Deloitte and staff were not aware of Plaintiff’s disability. The proffered
evidence also suggest that Plaintiff was removed from a project because the
client was limiting cross-country travel. As such, Plaintiff has not provided
substantial responsive, admissible evidence beyond speculation to support the
sixth cause of action.
Therefore,
the motion for summary judgment as to the sixth cause of action is GRANTED.
Seventh
Cause of Action for Wrongful Discharge/Termination
“To
support a common law wrongful discharge claim, the public policy ‘must be: (1)
delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) “public” in
the sense that it “inures to the benefit of the public” rather than serving
merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of the
discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental.’” (Mendoza v. Western
Medical Center Santa Ana (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1338.)
Defendant
Deloitte contends the seventh cause of action fails for the reasons set forth
above because it is wholly derivative of the first, second, and third causes of
action.
Here,
the proffered declarations of Brian Siegel, Alicia Carberry, Jacob Gustafson,
Bard Woltman, and Andrew Satenberg;
Deloitte Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct; Plaintiff’s Responses
to Form Interrogatories; Office of Security Incident Report; Security Badge
Report; and TAC are sufficient to satisfy Defendant Deloitte’s initial burden
to show that a triable issue of material fact does not exist as to whether it
wrongfully terminated Plaintiff. As previously discussed, the proffered
evidence suggests Deloitte staff were unaware of Plaintiff’s disability and
reason for being hospitalized. Further, the evidence proffered indicates
Plaintiff was terminated due to purported theft of Deloitte’s property,
entering Deloitte’s office without approval during the pandemic, and allegedly
lying about this conduct.
The
burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact
does exist as to whether Defendant Deloitte wrongfully terminated him. Plaintiff
has not, however, shown that a triable issue of material fact does exist as to
whether Defendant Deloitte wrongfully terminated him. The proffered evidence simply
indicates Plaintiff informed Defendant Deloitte and staff about his
hospitalization and requested relocation to California. The proffered evidence
also merely suggests that Plaintiff was provided approval to enter the Deloitte
office in 2020. As such, Plaintiff has not provided substantial responsive,
admissible evidence beyond speculation to support the seventh cause of action.
Therefore, the motion for summary
judgment as to the seventh cause of action is GRANTED.
As the Court finds that summary
judgment is appropriate as to all remaining causes of action of the TAC, the
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety.
Moving
Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed
by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email
and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off
calendar.
Dated this 31st day of May 2024
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Hon. Holly J.
Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |
[1] On June 9, 2023, the Court granted Deloitte’s
Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action of the TAC without leave to amend.