Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case 22STCV19770 2023-01-05 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Central Basin Municipal Water District and Alex Rojas (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)

Plaintiff’s complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. On August 19, 2022, the Court ruled on Moving Defendants’ special motion to strike portions of the SAC (the “anti-SLAPP Motion”). The Court granted the anti-SLAPP Motion to seven out of the 18 claims being challenged by Moving Defendants. On October 3, 2022, Moving Defendants filed a motion for attorney’s fees (the “Motion”) to recover fees incurred in connection to the anti-SLAPP Motion.

Plaintiff’s objections to the Supplemental Declaration of Derrick S. Lowe are SUSTAINED.

Under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), a prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs. (CCP § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) The reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees sought by a defendant prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659.) In the anti-SLAPP context, an award of fees may include not only the fees incurred with respect to the underlying claim, but also the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees under CCP section 425.16. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141.)

A party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion must generally be considered a prevailing party unless the results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion. (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 340 (“Mann”).) A prevailing defendant is only entitled to recover the attorney’s fees and costs related to the special motion to strike, not the entire action. (Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 92.) A defendant should not be entitled to obtain¿as a matter of right¿his or her entire attorney fees incurred on successful and unsuccessful claims¿merely because the attorney work on those claims was overlapping. (Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at 344-45.) Instead, the court should first determine the lodestar amount for the hours expended on the successful claims, and, if the work on the successful and unsuccessful causes of action was overlapping, the court should then consider the defendant's relative success on the motion in achieving his or her objective, and reduce the amount if appropriate. (Id. at 345.)

The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) A defendant can carry its burden of establishing its entitlement to attorney’s fees by submitting a declaration from counsel instead of billing records or invoices. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 487-88; City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 785.) In challenging attorney’s fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. (Id. at 488.)

Moving Defendants provide evidence that 55.1 hours of attorney time were expended in connection to the anti-SLAPP Motion. (Declaration of Derrick S. Lowe (“Lowe Decl.”) ¶ 3.) Moving Defendants seek recovery of 36.1 percent of the total fees incurred to reflect the partial success of the anti-SLAPP Motion. (Lowe Decl. ¶ 10.) Moving Defendants contend that $543.07 represents a reasonable hourly rate for the work performed on the anti-SLAPP Motion. (See Lowe Decl. ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff argues that the Motion fails to sufficiently demarcate time expended in connection to the meritorious portions of the anti-SLAPP Motion. Due to the lack of detail in the billing records submitted with the anti-SLAPP Motion and Moving Defendants’ success on the anti-SLAPP Motion, the Court exercises its discretion and reduces Moving Defendants’ total recovery to 30 percent of the total time expended on the anti-SLAPP Motion. The Court further observes that the billing records submitted provide that services were rendered at an hourly rate of $400 per hour. (See Lowe Decl., Exhibit A.) The Court finds that $400 represents a reasonable hourly rate. Based on these modifications, Moving Defendants may recover $6,612 in attorney’s fees related to the anti-SLAPP Motion and $45.48 in costs related to the anti-SLAPP Motion. (See Lowe Decl. ¶ 5.)

Moving Defendants also seek attorney’s fees for 5.8 hours of work performed in connection to this Motion. This amount represents: (1) 2.3 hours drafting the Motion; (2) an anticipated 2 hours reviewing opposition papers and preparing reply papers; and (3) an anticipated 1.5 hours preparing for and attending the hearing. (Lowe Decl. ¶ 4.) The Court exercises its discretion and grants attorney’s fees for work related to the Motion in the total amount of $1,720, which represents 4.3 hours drafting the Motion, reviewing the opposition papers and drafting the reply papers at an hourly rate of $400 per hour.

Based on the foregoing, the Court therefore GRANTS the Motion in part and awards Moving Defendants attorney’s fees in the total amount of $8,377.48.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court