Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 22STCV19770, Date: 2024-11-27 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Defendant CENTRAL BASIN MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT (“Defendant”)

Plaintiff’s complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (the “Bane Act”).

On October 7, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Protective Order (the “Motion”), seeking a protective order that as to Requests for Production of Documents, Set No. 5 (“Fifth RFPs”), propounded by Plaintiff on Defendant, all of the documents requested need not be produced and all of the requests need not be answered. In the alternative, Defendant seeks an order of the Court limiting or setting conditions for the subject discovery. Plaintiff filed an opposition on November 13, 2024, and Defendant filed a reply on November 20, 2024.

“The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(a).) Moreover, “[t]he court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060, subd. (b).)

The decision as to whether to enter a protective order lies within the sound discretion of the court. (Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588, 591; Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 237, 242.) The moving party has the burden of showing good cause for protective order. (Emerson Elec. Co. v Sup. Ct. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1110; Fairmont Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)¿

“In accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, California courts have been broad-minded in determining whether discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.” (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 172; Pettie v. Superior Court (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 680, 687.) As a practical matter, it is difficult to define at the discovery stage what evidence will be relevant at trial. Therefore, the party seeking discovery is often entitled to substantial leeway. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 172.) Furthermore, California’s liberal approach to permissible discovery generally has led the courts to resolve any doubt in favor of permitting discovery. (Id. at p. 173.) In doing so, the courts have taken the view if an error is made in ruling on a discovery motion, it is better that it be made in favor of granting discovery of the nondiscoverable rather than denying discovery of information vital to preparation or presentation of the party’s case or to efficacious settlement of the dispute.” (Norton v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1761.)¿¿

Here, Defendant seeks the issuance of a protective order mainly on the ground that the discovery propounded by Plaintiff is irrelevant and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff asserts a Bane Act claim, and that as such, Plaintiff need only prove: (1) violence or intimidation by threat of violence against Plaintiff; and (2) resulting interference with Plaintiff’s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the state or federal constitutions, here the First Amendment. (Opposition, p. 6, citing Civ. Code § 52.1 and Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Calif., Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 111.) Defendant points out that motive and intent are not elements of a Bane Act claim. Defendant thus argues that the records sought are not relevant to a Bane Act claim.

As a note, although Defendant suggests in the alternative that the Fifth RFPs be limited or that conditions be imposed on production, Defendant does not propose how such limitations or conditions should be imposed.

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the Bane Act entitles Plaintiff to recover exemplary or punitive damages. Plaintiff argues that the emails requested in the Fifth RFPs will likely demonstrate and reveal Defendant Alex Rojas’ motivation and state of mind regarding his alleged threats, intimidation and coercion against Plaintiff and provide relevant evidence on the issues of actual malice, oppression, fraud, hatred and ill will towards Plaintiff. Plaintiff further argues that the emails identified in the Fifth RFPs will also provide evidence to disprove, refute and contradict the affirmative defenses asserted by Defendant, specifically the allegations that the only reason Plaintiff continually requested certain information and documents was to harass and mistreat Defendant’s employees.

In reply, Defendant re-asserts that the records sought are not relevant to proving a Bane Act claim.

With respect to the relevance of the information sought, the scope of discovery is¿broad and encompasses any matter that is relevant to the subject matter of the action¿if the matter appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010;¿Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court of Merced County¿(1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355, 376.)¿ Any doubts are resolved in favor of permitting discovery.¿(Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court¿(1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.)

The burden of proof is generally on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for whatever order is sought. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) The concept of good cause requires a showing of specific facts demonstrating undue burden, etc., and justifying the relief sought. (See Goodman v. Citizens Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (1967) 253 Cal.App.3d 807, 819.) The facts are normally established in declarations by counsel for the party seeking the protective order. The declaration must contain competent evidence - i.e., first-hand knowledge of the facts. Hearsay allegations on information and belief and conclusory statements that a particular relief is necessary are not enough. (Ibid.)¿

As to relevance-related objections to discovery, judges have taken a liberal approach in favor of granting discovery, including when “‘possible objections to discovery should be resolved by protective orders addressing the specific harm shown by the respondent as opposed to a more general attack on the ‘relevancy’ of information the proponent seeks to discover.’” (Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1497.)

The court finds that Defendant has not met the burden of showing “good cause” for a protective order. The specific requests are targeted to documents referenced in a single report prepared by Carr, Riggs & Ingram. Defendant has offered no evidence suggesting that responding to the requests themselves will require a significant and unreasonable amount of work, and simply focuses on the purported lack of relevance of the documents sought. While the documents sought in the Fifth RFPs are only tangentially reasonably calculated to the discovery of admissible evidence, they are sufficiently related as to avoid a protective order. Neither has Defendant presented any specific harm posed by the production of the records sought in the Fifth RFPs that a protective order could resolve. Any issues with the relevance of the requested documents for use at the time of trial may be addressed by motions in limine.

In light of the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order is DENIED.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court