Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case 22STCV23316 2023-02-27 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

The currently operative first amended complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1) demand for excess rent in violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) section 151.04; (2) collection of rent in violation of LAMC section 151.05; (3) violation of LAMC section 151.09; (4) violation of the Tenant Habitability Program; (5) violation of LAMC section 45.33; (6) violation of Section 8 of Los Angeles County Eviction Moratorium; (7) violation of Los Angeles County Code section 8.52.130; (8) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (9) breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; (10) negligence; (11) nuisance; (12) housing discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEMA”) section 12955; (13) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (14) wrongful eviction; (15) negligent misrepresentation; and (16) fraud.

In relevant part, the FAC alleges: On or about November 13, 2016, Plaintiff and Moving Defendant (the “Parties”) entered into a lease agreement (the “Lease Agreement”) for Plaintiff to rent a unit (the “Unit”) located on real property (the “Property”) owned by Moving Defendant. (FAC ¶ 11.) The Unit was subject to the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“LARSO”).

During Plaintiff’s tenancy, the Unit was impacted by habitability issues, including insect and rodent infestations and a lack of running hot water. (FAC ¶ 14.) On or about May 21, 2019, the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (“LADBS”), responded to an application to repair or replace the Unit’s water heater with a correction notice stating that the Unit required a permit before it could issue approvals. (FAC ¶ 13.) On July 26, 2019, LADBS inspected the Property determined that the Unit was an illegal dwelling unit. (See FAC ¶ 14.)

After LADBS’s inspection of the Property and Unit, Plaintiff was forced to vacate the Unit in around August 2019. (FAC ¶ 15.) Plaintiff moved into a bedroom at Moving Defendant’s residence at the Property based on Moving Defendant’s representation that Plaintiff would be able to return to the Unit when renovation ended. (See id.) While living at the Property, Plaintiff paid the same amount of rent that he paid when he resided in the Unit. (See id.) When Plaintiff moved into the Property, he continued to experience uninhabitability conditions, including water leaks, infestations, and mold. (FAC ¶ 16.) These conditions impacted his health. (See id.)[1]

On March 25, 2021, Plaintiff inquired about when the renovation of the Unit would be complete and when he could continue to resume occupying the Unit. (FAC ¶ 17.) On April 5, 2021, Moving Defendant informed Plaintiff that because of renovation costs, he could not resume residing at the Unit and needed to vacate the Property by July 1, 2021. (FAC ¶ 18.)

Moving Defendant filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the third through seventh; ninth; and 11th through 16th causes of action in the FAC on the grounds that the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the allegations underpinning these claims are uncertain. Moving Defendant also filed a motion to strike (the “Motion”) on the grounds that the FAC does not allege a proper basis Plaintiff to recover punitive damages.

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law. (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) The court accepts as true all material factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts. (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) With respect to a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) A demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond. (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.)

As a preliminary matter, the Court does not find that the FAC is fatally uncertain. While not replete with detail, the FAC’s allegations sufficiently place Moving Defendant on notice of Plaintiff’s claims. Ambiguities may be clarified in the discovery process.

Under LARSO, there are only 14 enumerated permissible grounds for a landlord to bring an action to recover possession of a rental unit. (See LAMC § 151.09(A).)

The FAC alleges that Moving Defendant violated LAMC section 101.09(G) by failing to provide a relocation fee. (FAC ¶ 40.) The Court finds that this cause of action is sufficiently alleged—the FAC alleges that when Moving Defendant evicted Plaintiff due to the renovation costs of the Unit and did not provide a relocation fee. The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the third cause of action.

LAMC Section 152 concerns landlords’ responsibilities to their tenants when they perform primary renovation work (“Primary Renovation Work”) on their properties. Primary Renovation Work is: work performed either on a rental unit or on the building containing the rental unit that improves the property by prolonging its useful life or adding value, and involves either or both of the following: (1) replacement or substantial modification of any structural, electrical, plumbing or mechanical system that requires a permit under the Los Angeles Municipal Code; or (2) abatement of hazardous materials, such as lead-based paint and asbestos, in accordance with applicable federal, state and local laws. (LAMC § 151.02.) Under Section 152, landlords are required to create a tenant habitability plan (“THP”), provide temporary relocation assistance for tenants, and provide tenants with written notice of the THP. (See LAMC § 152.00 et seq.)

Moving Defendant argues that the fourth cause of action is insufficiently alleged because the FAC concedes that Plaintiff paid the same rent when he relocated from the Unit and began living at the Property and because the scope of the construction being performed at the Unit does not constitute Primary Renovation Work. The Court is not persuaded by these arguments. The issue of the nature of the construction is a question of fact beyond the scope of consideration of a demurrer. In addition, while Plaintiff was provided with alternative housing, the FAC alleges that no THP was created advising Plaintiff of his rights or of a timeline for construction of the Unit to be completed. Further, the FAC alleges that Moving Defendant did not permit Plaintiff to move back into the Unit after construction. (See LAMC § 152.07(E).) The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the fourth cause of action.

LAMC section, 45.33, Section 9 of the Los Angeles County Eviction Moratorium, and Los Angeles County Code section 8.52.130 prohibit tenant harassment and retaliation, which includes conduct that interferes with a tenant’s right to live in habitable conditions and fraudulently causing a tenant to vacate their tenancy.[2] Here, the FAC alleges that Moving Defendant did not apprise Plaintiff of his rights while the Unit was being renovated, and made false representations about his ability to return to the Unit, which ultimately deprived him of his lawful tenancy. The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action.

Unless expressly provided otherwise, every lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, whereby the landlord impliedly covenants that the tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises. (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 587.) The covenant protects tenants from acts or omissions on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with tenants’ right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy. (Id.)

The FAC alleges that the Unit and Property were both uninhabitable and that Moving Defendant prevented Plaintiff from lawfully resuming his residence at the Unit. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the ninth cause of action.

Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance. (Civ. Code § 3479.) To state a claim for private nuisance, the plaintiff must allege: (1) interference with his land or property; (2) substantial actual damage which is (3) unreasonable as to its nature, duration or amount. (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 937-38.)

Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim. (El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) A demurrer is properly sustained where a cause of action contains allegations of other causes of action and thus adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory of recovery. (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290.)

Moving Defendant argues that the nuisance claim is duplicative of the negligence claim. The Court agrees that the nuisance claim is premised on the same facts as the negligence cause of action and does not include an additional basis for liability. The Court therefore SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the 11th cause of action with 20 days leave to amend.

In order to establish discrimination based on a refusal to provide reasonable accommodations, a party must establish that he or she: (1) suffers from a disability as defined in FEHA; (2) the discriminating party knew of, or should have known of, the disability; (3) accommodation is necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) the discriminating party refused to make this accommodation. (Auburn Woods I Homeowners Assn. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1592.)

The FAC alleges that Plaintiff has respiratory conditions and requested that Moving Defendant accommodate the disability by addressing the habitability issues such as infestation and mold, and that Moving Defendant did not address these issues. The Court finds that these allegations are sufficient to allege FEHA housing discrimination and OVERRULES the Demurrer to the 12th cause of action.

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous behavior with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) Conduct is considered extreme and outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Id.) Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant: (1) abuses a position that gives him power over a plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through emotional distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably when the conduct is likely to result in mental distress and illness. (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946.) Whether conduct is extreme or outrageous is generally a question of fact. (See Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 356.)

Accepting all facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that the FAC alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903 (“Stoiber”). In Stoiber, the plaintiff-tenant alleged that her landlords knew of and failed to repair multiple defective conditions in the plaintiff’s apartment, including a cockroach infestation, poor plumbing, leaks and deteriorated flooring. (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 912.) The trial court sustained the various defendants’ demurrers and granted motions for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability was the exclusive remedy available to the plaintiff. (Id. at 911.) The court of appeal overruled the trial court, holding that a tenant may seek legal redress for breach of implied warranty of habitability and intentional infliction of emotional distress if the landlord’s acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress. (Id. at 922.) The court of appeal further found that, based on the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint, the issue of whether the landlords’ conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous was a factual issue that could not be determined on a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Id.)

Moving Defendant’s argument regarding whether her alleged conduct is sufficiently severe and outrageous requires a factual analysis inappropriate at the demurrer stage. The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the 13th cause of action.

The 14th cause of action appears to be duplicative of the third cause of action. The Court therefore SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the 14th cause of action with 20 days leave to amend.

The elements of intentional misrepresentation are: (1) misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. (Golden Eagle Land Investment, L.P. v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 399, 428.) Each element must be alleged with particularity. (Id.) The facts required to be pled are facts that show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) Less specificity is required to allege fraud when it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy. (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 838.)

The elements of negligent misrepresentation are similar to those of intentional misrepresentation, except the plaintiff does not need to allege that the defendant made an intentionally false statement, but simply one as to which he or she lacked any reasonable ground for believing the statement to be true. (Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 454.)

Moving Defendant argues that the FAC does not include the requisite specificity to allege fraud-based claims. The Court finds that the FAC’s allegations are sufficient given the nature of Plaintiff’s claims. The FAC alleges that Moving Defendant falsely informed Plaintiff in August 2019 when he relocated to the Property that he would be able to return to the Unit after construction was complete. The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the 15th and 16th causes of action.

A motion to strike either: (1) strikes any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strikes any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.)

Moving Defendants seek to strike the allegations concerning punitive damages from the FAC.

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages in an action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.) Oppression is defined as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)

The Court finds that the FAC sufficiently alleges conduct to support the prayer for punitive damages, including the substandard conditions at the Unit and Property and Moving Defendant’s misrepresentation that Plaintiff would be able to resume occupying the Unit after its renovation. The Court therefore DENIES the Motion.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

[1] In addition, Plaintiff is partially blind and has respiratory illnesses. (FAC ¶ 101.)

[2] Although the FAC cites to Section 8 of the Los Angeles County Eviction Moratorium, the anti-harassment provisions are found in Section 9.