Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV27147, Date: 2023-11-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV27147    Hearing Date: January 12, 2024    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Century Towers Association (“Moving Defendant”)

The Court has considered the moving papers.  No opposition papers were filed.  Any opposition papers were required to have been filed and served at least 14 days before the hearing under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 437c, subdivision (b)(2).

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a landlord/tenant relationship.  The currently operative second amended complaint (the “SAC”) alleges: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (4) violation of Civil Code section 789.3; (5) breach of quiet enjoyment; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) negligence; and (8) malicious prosecution—wrongful use of civil proceeding.

In relevant part, the SAC alleges: On or about May 18, 2021, Plaintiff began leasing a unit in a building that is part of Moving Defendant’s common interest development.  (See SAC ¶¶ 9, 12.)  In or around July 2021, Moving Defendant issued an emergency rule mandating that residents wear masks in common areas of the building.  (SAC ¶ 13.)  Plaintiff sought a medical exemption from the mask mandate that was denied by Moving Defendant.  (See SAC ¶¶ 20-22.)  In addition to fining Plaintiff for not complying with the mask mandate, Moving Defendant limited Plaintiff’s access to internet and cable services, valet parking, and the gym.  (SAC ¶¶ 25-26.) 

On October 25, 2023, Moving Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (the “Motion”) to the fourth and sixth causes of action on the grounds that there are no triable issues of material fact regarding the claims alleged against Moving Defendant and Moving Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            Moving Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as to the existence of the documents and their legal effect, but not to the truth of the matters stated therein.  (See Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400.)

DISCUSSION

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  CCP section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense.  (CCP § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)  Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) 

Undisputed Material Facts

In support of the Motion, Moving Defendant provides evidence that it implemented a mask requirement as a preventative measure to limit the spread of the COVID-19 virus in its community.  (See Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) 3-10.)  On multiple occasions in July and August of 2021, Plaintiff was seen maskless in common areas.  (UMF 12.)  Moving Defendant’s board of directors subsequently voted to deny Plaintiff’s request for an exemption from the mask mandate.  (See UMF 19.)  Moving Defendant notified Plaintiff of this decision on August 17, 2021.  (UMF 20.)  Plaintiff was thereafter observed not wearing a mask in common areas.  (See UMF 21.)  Moving Defendant held a disciplinary hearing on October 19, 2021 to consider Plaintiff’s ongoing violations of the mask mandate, and decided to fine Plaintiff for violating the rule.  (UMF 25, 27-28.)  On November 15, 2021, Moving Defendant held another disciplinary hearing to address Plaintiff’s continued violations of the mask mandate and implemented an escalated fine due to the ongoing nature of Plaintiff’s violations.  (See UMF 29-32.)  On January 12, 2022, after conducting another disciplinary hearing to address Plaintiff’s mask mandate violations, Moving Defendant imposed an additional fine and suspended Plaintiff’s common area privileges for 30 days.  (UMF 33-34.)  The common area privileges that were suspended as a result of the vote at the January 12, 2022 hearing were: switchboard calls, door attendants, valet parking, non-emergency engineering, loading dock, Spectrum cable television, and gym, sauna, swimming pool, and tennis courts.  (UMF 35.)  The temporary suspension of these common area privileges was consistent with Moving Defendant’s policy and procedures, and these privileges were reinstated on February 12, 2022.  (UMF 36-37.)  After Plaintiff was again observed not wearing a mask in common areas, another disciplinary hearing was held on February 16, 2022 that resulted in a second temporary suspension of common area privileges.  (UMF 38-42.)  Moving Defendant’s enforcement of the mask mandate was not unique to Plaintiff.  (UMF 44.) 

Fourth Cause of Action: Civil Code Section 789.3

Under Civil Code section 789.3, subd. (a), a landlord shall not with intent to terminate the occupancy under any lease or other tenancy or estate at will, however created, of property used by a tenant as his residence willfully cause, directly or indirectly, the interruption or termination of any utility service furnished the tenant, including, but not limited to, water, heat, light, electricity, gas, telephone, elevator, or refrigeration, whether or not the utility service is under the control of the landlord.  (Civ. Code § 789.3, subd. (a).)

            The Court finds that Moving Defendant has met its burden to show that there are no triable issues of material fact regarding the fourth cause of action.  Moving Defendant’s evidence establishes that its suspensions of Plaintiff’s common area privileges were not intended to terminate Plaintiff’s tenancy; rather, the suspensions were disciplinary responses to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the mask mandate.  Furthermore, Moving Defendant’s evidence indicates that the privileges that were suspended do not constitute utility services within the meaning of Civil Code section 789.3, subdivision (a).  For this reason and because Plaintiff has not introduced evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact, the Court GRANTS the Motion with respect to the fourth cause of action.  (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

Sixth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous behavior with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress.  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)  Conduct is considered extreme and outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.  (Id.)  Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant: (1) abuses a position that gives him power over a plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through emotional distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably when the conduct is likely to result in mental distress and illness.  (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946.)  Whether conduct is extreme or outrageous is generally a question of fact.  (See Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 356.)

            Moving Defendant’s evidence satisfies Moving Defendant’s burden to demonstrate that its decisions to suspend Plaintiff’s common area privileges were not extreme or outrageous behavior; rather, Moving Defendant’s evidence demonstrates that its conduct was within its discretion to enforce rules imposed on the community it governs.  For this reason and because Plaintiff has not introduced evidence that raises a triable issue of material fact, the Court GRANTS the Motion with respect to the sixth cause of action.  (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

         Dated this 12th day of January 2024