Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV32620, Date: 2023-03-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV32620 Hearing Date: March 17, 2023 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER Date: March 17, 2023 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 Judge: Holly J. Fujie |
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Ruben Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) and Kim
Ramirez (“Ramirez”) (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply
papers.
BACKGROUND
This
action arises out of an employment relationship. The currently operative first amended
complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1) age harassment in violation of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) age discrimination in violation of
FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (4) failure to prevent harassment,
discrimination, or retaliation in violation of FEHA; and (5) intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
In relevant part,
the FAC alleges: Plaintiff began working for Defendant California Highway
Patrol (“CHP”) in around May 2020 and in January 2021, Plaintiff applied for a
public safety dispatcher position within CHP.
(FAC ¶¶ 13-14.) Rodriguez
began training Plaintiff for the position on around February 17, 2021. (FAC ¶ 16.)
Rodriguez made disparaging comments about Plaintiff’s age throughout Plaintiff’s
training until Plaintiff complained to a supervisor and became paired with
Ramirez to continue training. (See FAC
¶¶ 16-20.) Upon assuming
responsibility for continuing Plaintiff’s training, Ramirez also made remarks
about Plaintiff’s age that upset Plaintiff.
(See FAC ¶¶ 20-23.)
Moving Defendants’ conduct caused Plaintiff to suffer ongoing humiliation
and emotional distress. (FAC
¶ 82.)
Moving Defendants
filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the fifth cause of action on the grounds
that the FAC fails to state sufficient fats to constitute a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Specifically, Moving Defendants argue that the FAC fails to allege that
Plaintiff complied with the claim presentation requirements imposed by the
Government Claims Act.
DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
The meet and
confer requirement has been met.
Legal Standard
A demurrer tests
the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law. (Durell
v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) The court accepts as true all material
factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not
consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations
contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.
(Shea Homes Limited Partnership v.
County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) With respect to a demurrer, the complaint
must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts
pleaded. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) Demurrers for uncertainty are
disfavored. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) A demurrer for
uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects
uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures. (Id.) A demurrer will be sustained without leave to
amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Tort Claims Against Public
Employees
The Government Claims Act immunizes
public entities from tort liability unless liability is authorized by
statute. (See Gov. Code § 815, subds. (a)-(b); K.M.
Grossmont Union High School District (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 717, 756.) Under Government Code section 950.2, except
as provided in Section 950.4, a plaintiff alleging a cause of action against a
public employee or former public employee for injury resulting from an act or
omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee must comply with
the Government Claims Act as a prerequisite for maintaining the action against
the employee. (Gov. Code § 950.2.) This section is applicable even though the
public entity is immune from liability for the injury. (Id.)
An employee acts within “the scope of his employment” when he is engaged
in work he was employed to perform or when an act is incident to his duty and
was performed for the benefit of his employer and not to serve his own purpose.
(Fowler v. Howell (1996) 42
Cal.App.4th 1746, 1750-51.) The proper
inquiry is not whether the wrongful act itself was authorized but whether it
was committed in the course of a series of acts of the employee which were
authorized by the employer. (Id. at
1751.) Courts view “scope of employment” broadly to
include willful and malicious torts as well as negligence. (Id.)
That an employee is not engaged in the ultimate object of his employment
at the time of his wrongful act does not necessarily mean the employee acted
outside the scope of his employment. (Id.) Whether an employee has acted within the
scope of his employment is ordinarily a factual issue to be resolved by the
trier of fact. (Id.) When the facts are undisputed and no
conflicting inferences are possible, the issue becomes one of law. (Id.)
Moving
Defendants argue that the FAC fails to allege intentional infliction of
emotional distress because there are no allegations providing that Plaintiff
complied with the Government Claims Act before initiating this action. The Court agrees. Although Plaintiff argues that she was not
required to allege that she complied with claim presentation requirements as a
prerequisite to prosecuting her intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim against Moving Defendants because the FAC names Moving Defendants as
parties to that cause of action in their individual capacities and does not
identify CHP as a Defendant, Government Code section 950.2 applies regardless
of whether the public entity employer is named as a defendant. Furthermore, while the determination of
whether an employee’s wrongful acts were conducted in the scope of employment
is generally a question of fact, the alleged conduct underlying the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim consists of harassing comments Moving
Defendants made while they were training her.
The FAC does not allege that Moving Defendants’ acts occurred outside
the scope of employment. The Court finds
that the FAC fails to allege facts showing that Moving Defendants did not act
within the scope of their employment; as a result, Plaintiff was required to
comply with the Government Claims Act before pursuing her tort claim. The Court therefore SUSTAINS the Demurrer
with 20 days leave to amend.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this
ruling.
In consideration of
the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages
that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made
by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If
you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you
must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of
the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in
person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of
the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any
time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the
hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal
appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate
precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to
the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on
the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive
an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed
off calendar.
Dated
this 17th day of March 2023
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Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court |