Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 22STCV32620, Date: 2025-04-10 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

This is a harassment and discrimination action arising out of an employment relationship. Plaintiff Eme Iturralde (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants California Highway Patrol (“CHP”), Ruben Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) and Kimberly Ramirez (“Ramirez”) (collectively “Defendants”) on October 5, 20222. The operative Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”) filed on April 6, 2023 alleges causes of action for: (1) Age Harassment in Violation of Government Code §12940 (j); (2) Age Discrimination in Violation of Government Code §12940 (a); (3) Retaliation in Violation of Government Code §12940 (h); and (4) Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination, or Retaliation in Violation of Government Code §§12940 (j) (1) and (k).

On February 28, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to compel further (“MTCF”). On March 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition (“Opp. to MTCF”). On April 3, 2025, Defendants filed a reply (the “Reply to Opp. to MTCF”).

On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for protective order (the “Motion”). On March 27, 2025, Defendants filed an opposition (“Opp. to Mot.”). On April 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply (the “Reply to Opp. to Mot.”).

“Any party may obtain discovery . . . by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action.” (Code Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 2025.010.) “If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (CCP § 2025.480 subd. (a).) Such motion “shall be made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition, and shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”¿(CCP § 2025.480 subd. (b).)

“If the court determines that the answer or production sought is subject to discovery, it shall order that the answer be given or the production be made on the resumption of the deposition.” (CCP, § 2025.480 subd. (i).)

Defendants move for an order compelling Plaintiff to provide further deposition testimony on the Equal Employment Opportunity investigation, Plaintiff’s claimed emotional distress and related damages, Plaintiff’s allegations related to her termination, Plaintiff’s subsequent employment and statements Plaintiff made in her daily observation reports. (MTCF, pp. 10:26-12:1.)

Plaintiff opposes the MTCF, arguing that Defendants should not be permitted to ask questions regarding her termination, subsequent employment or whether she considered Defendants’ behavior to be ‘extreme’ or ‘outrageous’ because she is not alleging causes of action for wrongful termination or intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Opp. to MTCF, pp. 3:1-5:15.) Plaintiff also argues that a sixth deposition is an attempt to intimidate and argues that Defendants’ questions are harassing. (Opp. to MTCF, pp. 5:16-9:5.)

Defendants have shown good cause for compelling additional deposition testimony. Questions regarding Plaintiff’s discharge or rejection during probation are relevant to the adverse employment action element of Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims. Further, questions regarding whether Defendants’ conduct was extreme or outrageous are relevant as Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Defendants. (FAC, ¶ 51, prayer ¶ 2.) Thus, the Motion to Compel Further is GRANTED.

“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2025.420, subd. (a).)¿

“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions: (1) That the deposition not be taken at all.” (CCP § 2025.420, subd. (b).)¿ “[T]he burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for whatever order is sought.” (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

“In accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, California courts have been broad-minded in determining whether discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court¿(1970) 2 Cal.3d 161,¿172;¿Pettie v. Superior Court¿(1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 680,¿687.) As a practical matter, it is difficult to define at the discovery stage what evidence will be relevant at trial. Therefore, the party seeking discovery is entitled to substantial leeway. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,¿supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 172.) Furthermore, California’s liberal approach to permissible discovery generally has led the courts to resolve any doubt in favor of permitting discovery. (Id.¿at p. 173.)

Plaintiff moves for an order prohibiting Defendants from taking any further volumes of Plaintiff’s deposition. Plaintiff argues that Defendants have already taken five sessions of her deposition, and Defendants’ questions are not related to Plaintiff’s causes of action and are intended to harass, bully and intimidate Plaintiff. (Mot., pp. 5: 25-9:5.) Plaintiff has not met her burden to shown that a protective order is required to protect her from “unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (CCP § 2025.420 subd. (b).) As discussed above, the further deposition testimony is relevant to Plaintiff’s causes of action. Further, upon review of the deposition transcripts submitted with the instant Motion and the MTCF, the Court does not find that the questioning by Defendants’ counsel was objectionably harassing or intended to bully or intimidate Plaintiff. (Droege Decl., Exs. 5, 8, 9, 13-14.) Thus, the Motion is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Compel Further is GRANTED as to the following topics: (1) Damages Plaintiff seeks; (2) alleged ‘extreme’ and ‘outrageous’ conduct; (3) Plaintiff’s allegations related to her ‘termination’ or ‘dismissal’; and (4) substance of the remaining Daily Observation Reports.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court