Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV35055, Date: 2023-04-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV35055 Hearing Date: June 20, 2023 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
AND
RELATED CROSS-ACTION
MOVING
PARTY: Defendants Edith Uribe (“Uribe”), Melanie Bernaola (“Bernaola”), Jessica
Pineda (“Pineda”), and Diana Moreno (“Moreno”) (collectively, “Moving
Defendants”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff
The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply
papers.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of employment
relationships. On November 3, 2022,
Plaintiff filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging: (1) breach of duty of
loyalty; (2) aiding and abetting breach of duty of loyalty; (3) breach of
contract/covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) interference with
prospective economic advantage; (5) misappropriation of trade secrets; and (6)
unfair competition. On March 9, 2023, Bernaola,
Pineda, and Moreno filed a cross-complaint (the “XC”) alleging: (1) declaratory
relief; and (2) unfair competition.
On March 29,
2023, Moving Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay
proceedings (the “Motion”) on the grounds that Moving Defendants and Plaintiff
are parties to binding arbitration agreements (collectively, the “Agreements”)
that require that the claims alleged in the Complaint and XC be resolved in individual
binding arbitrations.
DISCUSSION
The
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is to move the parties in an
arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as
possible. (Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460
U.S. 1, 23.) The FAA is consistent with
the federal policy to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of
private agreements to arbitrate. (Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 57.) Under California Code of Civil Procedure
(“CCP”) section 1281.2, upon petition of a party to an arbitration agreement
alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and
that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court
shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy
unless grounds exist not to compel arbitration.
(CCP § 1281.2.) The moving party bears the burden of
proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of
the evidence. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951,
972.) The party opposing arbitration has
the burden of demonstrating that an arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to
require arbitration of the dispute. (Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th
175, 185.)
Existence
of Agreements to Arbitrate
Moving Defendants provide evidence
of the Agreements they signed while employed with Plaintiff. (See, e.g., Declaration of Edith Uribe
(“Uribe Decl.”) ¶ 4, Exhibit A.)[1] In relevant part, the Agreements provide:
“You and the Company voluntarily agree to resolve by binding arbitration
any and all claims, disputes, causes of action, lawsuits, proceedings, and/or
controversies (‘Claims’), past, present, or future, relating to or arising out
of Your employment with the Company. This includes Claims that the Company may
have against You or that You may have against the Company and its parent companies,
holding companies, agents, subsidiaries and affiliated companies, officers,
directors, successors, assigns, clients, customers, or alleged joint employers
(collectively, the ‘Parties’ to this Agreement).” (Uribe Decl., Exhibit A at 1.)
The Agreements further provide that they are
governed by the FAA and “shall be construed, interpreted, governed, and
enforced in accordance with the FAA.” (Id.)
Moving Defendants have met their
burden to demonstrate the existence of agreements to arbitrate. Plaintiff does not dispute the existence or
validity of the Agreements; rather, Plaintiff argues that Moving Defendants’
conduct and participation in this litigation before they filed the Motion
constitute a waiver their right to assert their contractual right to
arbitration.
Waiver
A judge may deny a petition for
arbitration when the petitioner has waived the right to compel
arbitration. (CCP § 1281.2, subd. (a).)
Where the FAA applies, whether a party has waived a right to arbitrate
is a matter of federal, not state, law.
(Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.) Section 2 of the FAA provides that
arbitration agreements shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. (Id. at 964.) However, like any contract right, the right
to arbitrate may be waived—either expressly or by implication. (Id.)
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the “strong federal policy in
favor of enforcing arbitration agreements” is based upon the enforcement of
contract, rather than a preference for arbitration as an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism. (Davis v. Shiekh
Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 964.)
Thus, the question of whether there has been waiver in the arbitration
agreement context should be analyzed in much the same way as in any other
contractual context. (Id.) The essential question is whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, the defaulting party has acted inconsistently
with the arbitration right. (Id.) Relevant factors to consider include: (1)
whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2)
whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the parties
were well into preparation of a lawsuit before the party notified the opposing
party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested
arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period
before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a
counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) whether
important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery
procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place; and (6) whether the
delay affected, misled, or prejudiced the opposing party. (Id.)
In 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prejudice is
not a condition of finding that a party, by litigating too long, waived its
right to stay litigation or compel arbitration under the FAA. (Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 142
S.Ct. 1708, 1713 (“Morgan”).) As
a result of the decision in Morgan, a party opposing the enforcement of
an arbitration agreement governed by the FAA no longer bears a “heavy burden”
to show waiver of the right to arbitration.
(Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 59 F.4th
1011, 1016.) In view of Morgan,
the party asserting waiver must demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right
to compel arbitration; and (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing
right. (Id. at 1015.)
Plaintiff argues that Moving
Defendants’ conduct and use of judicial resources prior to their invocation of
the Arbitration Agreements is inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and that
their belated attempt to compel arbitration is a strategic maneuver that would
prejudice Plaintiff.
Moving Defendants first communicated
their intention to resolve this matter in arbitration on March 14, 2023. (Declaration of Philip K. Lem (“Lem Decl.”) ¶
3, Exhibit 1.) On March 15, 2023,
Plaintiff represented that it would not voluntarily submit its claims to
arbitration. (Lem Decl. ¶ 4, Exhibit 2.)[2]
In its opposition (the “Opposition”), Plaintiff
provides evidence that on November 3, 2022, Moving Defendants’ then-counsel
requested copies of arbitration agreements from Plaintiff. (Declaration of Russell F. Wolpert (“Wolpert
Decl.”) ¶ 2, Exhibit 1.) Plaintiff’s
counsel’s November 6, 2022, response expressed Plaintiff’s willingness to
submit the dispute to arbitration and inquired if Moving Defendants wished to
proceed to arbitration and enter into a stipulation to that effect. (See Wolpert Decl. ¶ 3, Exhibit
2.) Plaintiff sent copies of the
Agreements on November 9, 2022. (See Wolpert
Decl., Exhibit 5.) On November 21,
2022, Plaintiff confirmed that Moving Defendants’ deadline to file their
response to the Complaint was January 6, 2023 and reiterated its willingness to
submit to arbitration. (See Wolpert
Decl., Exhibit 6.)
On January 5, 2023, Uribe, Pineda, and Moreno
submitted responses to Plaintiff’s document requests setting forth numerous
objections to them that did not include arbitrability. (See Wolpert Decl. ¶ 7.) On January 6, 2023, Moving Defendants filed a
demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the Complaint which the Court overruled on
February 6, 2023. Although Plaintiff
does not present direct evidence of the communications, the Opposition
indicates that Plaintiff raised the issue of arbitration with Moving
Defendants’ former counsel twice in January 2023 and Moving Defendants’ counsel
represented that they wished to proceed with the Demurrer. (See Opp. 7:12-18.)[3]
Moving Defendants’ Case Management
Statement filed on February 21, 2023 requested a jury trial and did not mention
arbitration as an issue in the case.
Following their retention of new counsel, on March
13, 2023, Moving Defendants filed an answer (the “Answer”) to the Complaint. The Answer raises arbitration as Moving
Defendants’ 23rd affirmative defense.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s arguments to
support its contention that Moving Defendants waived their right to arbitrate
do not compel a finding that Moving Defendants waived their right to arbitrate. The record before the Court shows only an
approximate 4.5 month delay in asserting the right to arbitrate, after which
time Moving Defendants retained new counsel when the Court overruled their
Demurrer. The Court finds that the
inclusion of the right to arbitrate in their Answer and the filing of the
Motion within this time period supports a finding that there was no waiver of
that right.[4] The
Court therefore GRANTS the Motion and orders the stay of this action pending
arbitration. The Court sets a non-appearance
case review for December 28, 2023 at 8:30 a.m. to review the status of the
arbitration. The parties are ordered to
submit a joint status report seven Court days before that date.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org
as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at
www.lacourt.org. If the department does
not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion
will be placed off calendar.
Dated this 20th day of June 2023
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Hon. Holly J.
Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |
[1] The four Agreements contain the
same language.
[2] On March 9, 2023, Moving
Defendants filed Substitution of Attorney forms reflecting that they retained
new counsel.
[3] In law and motion practice,
factual evidence is supplied to the court by way of declarations. (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.)
[4] In contrast, in Davis v. Shiekh
Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 968, the moving party had delayed
nearly one and a half years and had participated in the litigation to an extent
that justified the Court’s finding of waiver.