Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV36965, Date: 2023-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV36965    Hearing Date: March 14, 2023    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: 5613 Lexington Avenue, LLC (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Jose Sanchez (“Mr. Sanchez”) and Maria Genoveva Sanchez (“Ms. Sanchez”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a landlord/tenant relationship.  Plaintiffs’ complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges: (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (2) negligence; (3) breach of implied covenant of quiet use and enjoyment; (4) nuisance; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; (7) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 45.30, et seq.; and (8) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4.

In relevant part, the Complaint alleges: Plaintiffs are tenants at a property (the “Property”) that Moving Defendant has owned since 2020.  (Complaint ¶¶ 5, 11.)  Plaintiffs began their tenancy in 1979, and since at least 2014, their landlords’ poor maintenance of the Property has subjected Plaintiffs to numerous habitability concerns, including bug and rodent infestations, lack of hot water, sewage, mold, and ventilation issues.  (See Complaint ¶¶ 11, 23.)  Plaintiffs’ previous landlords had notice of deteriorating conditions at the Property since the issues arose but failed to make necessary repairs despite being notified by Plaintiffs as well as the Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department (“HCIDLA”) and Los Angeles County Department of Health (“DPH”).  (Complaint ¶ 14.) 

In October 2020, after it took ownership of the Property, one of Moving Defendant’s agents entered Plaintiffs’ unit at the Property.  (Complaint ¶ 17.)  Moving Defendant’s agent expressed his shock about the conditions of the Property and told Mr. Sanchez that he would see what repairs could be made.  (Id.)  Moving Defendant did not thereafter attempt to improve the conditions of the Property, despite receiving continued notice of problems from HCIDLA and DPH.  (See id.)  As Plaintiffs’ health worsened from the Property’s conditions, in December 2021, they notified Moving Defendant in writing about the need for immediate repairs.  (Complaint ¶¶ 18-19.)  Plaintiffs did not hear from Moving Defendant until May 2022.  (Complaint ¶ 20.)  Although Moving Defendant attempted to make repairs in June 2022, many of Plaintiffs’ habitability concerns remained unresolved.  (Complaint ¶ 21-22.)  Plaintiffs’ negative experiences at the Property over the years—which include receiving bites from rats and bed bugs—caused them to suffer emotional distress.  (See Complaint ¶¶ 24-33.)

Moving Defendant filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the fifth cause of action on the ground that the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Moving Defendant also filed a motion to strike (the “Motion”) portions of the Complaint that concern punitive damages.

DEMURRER

Meet and Confer

The meet and confer requirement has been met for the Demurrer and Motion.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.  (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)  The court accepts as true all material factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.  (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.)  With respect to a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.  (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)  A demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

Fifth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous behavior with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress.  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)  Conduct is considered extreme and outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.  (Id.)  Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant: (1) abuses a position that gives him power over a plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through emotional distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably when the conduct is likely to result in mental distress and illness.  (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946.)  Whether conduct is extreme or outrageous is generally a question of fact.  (See Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 356.)

Accepting all facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court finds that the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903 (“Stoiber”).  In Stoiber, the plaintiff-tenant alleged that her landlords knew of and failed to repair multiple defective conditions in the plaintiff’s apartment, including a cockroach infestation, poor plumbing, leaks and deteriorated flooring.  (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 912.)  The trial court sustained the various defendants’ demurrers and granted motions for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability was the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy.  (Id. at 911.)  The court of appeal overruled the trial court, holding that a tenant may seek legal redress for breach of implied warranty of habitability and intentional infliction of emotional distress if the landlord’s acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress.  (Id. at 922.)  The court of appeal further found that, based on the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint, the issue of whether the landlords’ conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous was a factual issue that could not be determined on a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings.  (Id.)

Plaintiffs’ allegations are analogous to those alleged by the Plaintiff in Stoiber.  Furthermore, Moving Defendant’s arguments regarding the severity of Plaintiffs’ emotional distress require a factual analysis that is beyond the scope of the Court’s consideration at the pleading stage.  The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer to the fifth cause of action.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Legal Standard

A motion to strike either: (1) strikes any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strikes any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court.  (CCP § 436.)

Punitive Damages        

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages in an action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)  Malice is conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)  Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.  (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.)  Oppression is defined as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.  (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)  Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)  Absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, malice requires more than a “willful and conscious” disregard of the plaintiff’s interests; the additional component of “despicable conduct” must be found.  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

The Complaint sufficiently alleges conduct that may entitle Plaintiffs to recover an award of punitive damages, such as Moving Defendant’s repeated failure to address the pervasive substandard conditions at the Property despite its awareness and overt acknowledgement of the habitability problems.  (See See Stoiber v. Honeychuck, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 920.)  The Court therefore DENIES the Motion.  Moving Defendant is ordered to file an answer to the Complaint within 20 days of this order.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court¿strongly¿encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by LACourtConnect if the parties do not submit on the tentative.¿¿If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to¿SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org¿stating your intention to appear in person.¿ The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date.¿ This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. 

  Dated this 14th day of March 2023