Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 22STCV39875, Date: 2024-10-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV39875    Hearing Date: October 8, 2024    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”)

The Court has considered the moving, opposition papers and reply papers.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle (the “Vehicle”) manufactured by Defendant.  Plaintiff’s complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges: (1) breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act; and (2) breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act. 

On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs (the “Motion”).  Defendant opposed the Motion and Plaintiff filed a reply.

DISCUSSION

Attorney’s fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute or law. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).)

In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) Section 1794 provides:

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

(Civ. Code, § 1794 [emphasis added].) Thus, the statute includes a “reasonable attorney’s fees” standard. 

The attorney seeking fees bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Id.) 

In determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.  (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.)  The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided.  (Ibid.)  These facts include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.  (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of a lodestar of $63,017.50 plus a multiplier of 25% plus $6,623.39 in costs and expenses.    

            A. Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff contends that he is the prevailing party in this action because of a second 998 offer in which Defendant ultimately agreed to settle this case on the eve of trial.  The Court agrees and Defendant does not dispute this.  Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees.

B. Reasonableness of Fees

i.               Reasonable Hourly Rate

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [her] court.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees primarily for three different attorneys who worked on the case over one and a half years. Their hourly rates are as follows:

(1) Otis R. Hayes, III,  whose billing rate is $500 an hour; (2) Elizabeth Quinn, whose billing rate is $500 an hour; and (3) David Barry (“Barry”), whose billing rate is $675

For each of the attorneys, attorney Barry attests to their legal experience and the reasonableness of their rates. (Barry Decl. ¶ ¶ 41-72.)

The Court finds, based on the submitted evidence of the declaration of Shahian and the Court’s own experience, that Plaintiff’s requested hourly rates are reasonable for attorneys with their experience.  The range of rates charged in this matter by SLP is reasonable for attorneys of similar experience, in the same area, dealing with the same subject matter. (See Goglin v BMW of North America (2016) LLC 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473-74 [approving $575 per hour fee on lemon law action for attorneys in Los Angeles].

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claimed lodestar fees are excessive and should be reduced, and do not deserve a multiplier.

Reasonable Hours Incurred

 “A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.”  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

Plaintiff’ lodestar fee request is based on 113.8 hours spent by his attorneys litigating this case through this motion. Plaintiff has submitted billing records. (Barry Decl., Ex. 4.) At the rates identified above, Plaintiffs represent that they are seeking a lodestar of $63,017.50.

Next, Defendant objects to tasks that Defendant argues are billed at excessive amounts of time. Defendant provides examples of what it considers to be excessive billing and discusses why it believes that the rates charged by counsel are excessive.

The Court disagrees. The Court finds that the rates sought and the amounts noted are not excessive under the circumstances.

Having analyzed the motions and pleadings filed, and having reviewed the billing statements provided, the Court determines that a reasonable lodestar in this case is $63,017.50.

C. Multiplier

While the lodestar reflects the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community, it may be adjusted based on various factors, including “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award” and (4) the success achieved. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)

Nonetheless, the court must not consider extraordinary skill and the other Serrano factors to the extent these are already included with the lodestar. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1138-1139.) “[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be unreasonable.” (Id. at 1139.)

Plaintiff requests a lodestar multiplier enhancement of .25 on the ground that the settlement results were excellent, and because counsel undertook representation of Plaintiff on a contingency basis—if the action failed and Plaintiff did not recover, neither would his counsel. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion, Section IV E.) Plaintiff claims that its counsel faced a genuine risk of not being paid for its services for years (if at all) while advancing thousands in costs and expenses to prosecute Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant, a large corporate defendant with the proven track record to engage in prolonged litigation (while its attorneys get paid regardless of outcome).

The Court finds that under the circumstances of this case, a lodestar multiplier is not appropriate. This is a straightforward lemon law case.  Nothing before the Court indicates that the case presented novel issues or that the quality of representation far exceeded the quality of representation that would have been provided by attorneys of comparable skill and experience billing at the same rates. While Plaintiff argues that counsel accepted the case only on a contingency basis and there was a delay in payment, the Court finds that such consideration and risk is already included within the lodestar amount. That is because the substantial hourly rates allowed for by the court are hourly rates for lemon law cases done on a contingency basis.

Based on the foregoing, the Court declines to award a lodestar multiplier.

D. Entitlement and Reasonableness of Costs

Allowable costs “shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) Any items not specifically mentioned by statute “may be allowed or denied in the court's discretion.” (Id., subd. (c)(4).)

The Beverly-Song Act allows a successful plaintiff to recover both “costs” and “expenses.” (See Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Courts have held that “it is clear the Legislature intended the word ‘expenses' to cover items not included in the detailed statutory definition of ‘costs.”’ (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (“Jensen”) (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137.) The court in Jensen held that “[t]he legislative history indicates the Legislature exercised its power to permit the recovery of expert witness fees by prevailing buyers under the Act … ,” noting that the legislature included “expenses” in the lemon law act because '“[t]he addition of awards of “costs and expenses” by the court to the consumer to cover such out-of-pocket expenses as filing fees, expert witness fees, marshall’s fees, etc., should open the litigation process to everyone.’ [Citation.]”

Plaintiffs request a total of $6,623.39 in costs and expenses.  Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ costs should be taxed and that only $738.13 should be allowed.

The Court has reviewed Defendant’s claims as to the alleged excessiveness of Plaintiff’s claimed costs.  Having considered the work performed and the conduct of the litigation, the Court finds that the costs claimed are reasonable and compensable under the law. 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED in part.  The Court awards $63,017.50 in attorney fees and $6,623.39 in costs to Plaintiff.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

         Dated this 8th day of October 2023