Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 23STCV01091, Date: 2024-02-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV01091    Hearing Date: February 6, 2024    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Lompoc Unified School District (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff

The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.

BACKGROUND

            This action, which was initiated on June 13, 2023, arises out of alleged sexual abuse of a minor while Plaintiff attended a school in Moving Defendant’s school district.  The currently operative first amended complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1) sexual assault; and (2) negligence.

On October 26, 2023, Moving Defendant filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) on the grounds that the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.  The Demurrer argues that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred and violate the California Constitution’s prohibition against gifts of public funds. 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            The Requests for Judicial Notice filed by Moving Defendant and Plaintiff are GRANTED as to the existence of the documents and their legal effect, but not to the truth of the matters stated therein.  (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400.)

DISCUSSION

Meet and Confer

The meet and confer requirement has been met.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.  (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)  The court accepts as true all material factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.  (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.)  With respect to a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.  (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)  While the allegations of a complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of demurrer, the facts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint will also be accepted as true, and, if contrary to the allegations in the pleading, will be given precedence.  (Moran v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1145-46.)  A demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

Childhood Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations

Under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 340.1, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 218 (“AB 218”), in an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions: (1) an action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault; or (2) an action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.  (CCP § 340.1, subd. (a)(1)-(a)(2).)[1]

The version of the statute that applied when Plaintiff initiated this action contains a provision that states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020.  A plaintiff shall have the later of the three-year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision.”  (CCP § 340.1, subd. (q) [effective from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2022].)

Under California Rules of Court (“CRC”), Emergency Rule 9, the statutes of limitations and repose of civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.  (CRC, appen. I, emer. r. 9.) 

Moving Defendant argues that the FAC’s claims are expired because Plaintiff did not file this action until June 13, 2023 and that Emergency Rule 9 does not supersede the statutory filing deadline imposed by former CCP section 340.1, subdivision (q).  The Court is not persuaded by Moving Defendant’s argument on this point and declines to hold that Emergency Rule 9 does not apply to CCP section 340.1.  The Court adopts the reasoning set forth in a recent appellate court decision finding that the tolling provision of Emergency Rule 9 is applicable to CCP section 340.1, subdivision (q.)  (See Roe v. Doe (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 20, 2023, No. F086315) 2023 WL 9184651, at *4.)

Gifts of Public Funds

Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution (the “Anti-Gift Provision”) provides, in relevant part: “The Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize the giving or lending, of the credit of the State, or of any county, city and county, city, township or other political corporation or subdivision of the State now existing, or that may be hereafter established, in aid of or to any person, association, or corporation, whether municipal or otherwise, or to pledge the credit thereof, in any manner whatever, for the payment of the liabilities of any individual, association, municipal or other corporation whatever; nor shall it have power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever… .”  (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6.)

It is generally held that in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a “public” or “private” purpose; the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom.  (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745-46.)  The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.  (Id.)  An appropriation of money by the legislature for the relief of one who has no legal claim therefor must be regarded as a gift, within the meaning of that term as used in the section, and is none the less a gift that a sufficient motive appears for its appropriation, if the motive does not rest upon a valid consideration.  (Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, 274-75.)  The California Supreme Court has held that creating liability against the state for any past acts of negligence on the part of its officers, agents or employees would, in effect, be the making of a gift.  (Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517.) 

AB 218 amended the provision that lists exceptions to the Government Claims Act, Government Code section 905, by removing language in subdivision (m) that limited the exception to claims arising out of conduct that occurred on or after January 2009 and adding subdivision (p), which made this change retroactive.  (See Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 424; Gov. Code § 905, subds. (m), (p).) 

Moving Defendant argues that the portion of AB 218 that retroactively exempts childhood sexual abuse claims from the Government Claims Act is unconstitutional with respect to public entities and constitutes an impermissible gift of public funds.  Moving Defendant’s argument turns on the distinction between the nature of the statutes of limitation for childhood sexual abuse cases and the substantive requirements of the Government Claims Act for stating a claim against a government entity.  (See State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240-41.) 

The Court does not agree with Moving Defendant’s argument that AB 218’s amendment of the Government Claims Act to add an exemption for claims of the type alleged herein constitutes a “gift of public money or thing of value” within the meaning of the Anti-Gift Provision of the Constitution.  As the California Supreme Court held in Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 509, 517:

“We are not strongly impressed with the contention of the respondent that the application of funds to pay judgments obtained against the state constitutes a gift of public money, within the prohibition of the Constitution.  The state cannot be subjected to suits against itself express by its express consent; but it may surrender its sovereignty in that particular.  The judgments which are to be paid bear no semblance to gifts.  They must first be obtained in courts of competent jurisdiction, to which the parties have submitted their claims in the manner directed by law.  In other words, they are judgments obtained after the requirements of due process of law have been complied with.”

The Court finds that AB 218 did not create an obligation on the part of a governmental agency to pay a claim made by Plaintiff.  In order for Plaintiff to recover money from Moving Defendant, Plaintiff must first obtain a judgment in this case.  Plaintiff’s potential recovery of monetary damages from Moving Defendant after obtaining a judgment would not constitute a gift under the circumstances.  (See Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 509, 517.)  The Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer in its entirety.  Moving Defendant is ordered to file a responsive pleading within 20 days of the date of this order.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. 

 Dated this 6th day of February 2024