Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 23STCV01919, Date: 2023-05-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV01919 Hearing Date: September 1, 2023 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. HOMEBOUND TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER Date: September 1, 2023 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 Judge: Holly J. Fujie |
MOVING PARTY:
Defendant Homebound Technologies, Inc. (“Moving Defendant”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of an employment relationship. The currently operative first amended
complaint (the “FAC”) alleges: (1) common law and statutory fraud and deceit;
(2) promissory estoppel; and (3) negligent misrepresentation
In relevant part, the FAC alleges: Moving Defendant’s vice president
of construction, Sam Sapp (“Sapp”) began recruiting Plaintiff for a project
manager position on or around May 14, 2021.
(FAC ¶ 7.) When Plaintiff
informed Sapp that he was happy at his current job, Sapp spent the next two
weeks making representations to Plaintiff about specific projects he would be
assigned to, as well as Moving Defendant’s finances and growth. (See FAC ¶¶ 9-10.) Based on Sapp’s statements, on June 3, 2021,
Plaintiff attended a recruitment meeting with Moving Defendant’s head of
construction, Spencer Padgett (“Padgett”).
During the meeting, Plaintiff restated that he liked his current job and
would only consider switching positions for a secure, long-term position that
had potential for growth. (FAC ¶
12.) Padgett reiterated Moving
Defendant’s growth and plans for future expansion and informed Plaintiff of the
specific role he would play in the company’s growth. (FAC ¶ 13.)
Padgett also told Plaintiff that it was a good time to join the company
because he would receive stock options before Moving Defendant went public
within the next two to three years. (Id.) After the meeting, Sapp again emphasized to
Plaintiff that the position would be long-term.
(FAC ¶ 14.)
Moving Defendant formally offered Plaintiff the position on or around
July 13, 2021. (FAC ¶ 15.) Plaintiff accepted the offer and resigned
from his current position based on the representations that his employment with
Moving Defendant would be long-term.
(FAC ¶ 16.)
When
Plaintiff began working on ot around August 2, 2021, he learned that Moving
Defendant was undergoing corporate reorganization, a fact which had not been
shared with him during the recruitment process.
(FAC ¶¶ 17-18.) Sapp and
Padgett withheld the information about Moving Defendant’s restructuring as part
of the effort to convince Plaintiff that he was accepting “long-term”
employment. (See FAC ¶¶ 46,
49.) Despite receiving positive
performance reviews, Moving Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment on
February 23, 2022. (See FAC ¶¶
19-21.)
Moving Defendant filed a demurrer (the “Demurrer”) to the third cause
of action on the ground that the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute
a negligent misrepresentation claim.
DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
The meet and
confer requirement has been met.
Legal Standard
A demurrer tests
the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law. (Durell
v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) The court accepts as true all material
factual allegations and affords them a liberal construction, but it does not
consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations
contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.
(Shea Homes Limited Partnership v.
County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) With respect to a demurrer, the complaint
must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts
pleaded. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) A demurrer will be sustained without leave to
amend if there exists no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Third Cause of Action: Negligent
Misrepresentation
The elements of
negligent misrepresentation are: (1) the misrepresentation of a past or
existing material fact; (2) without reasonable ground for believing it to be
true; (3) with intent to induce another's reliance on the fact misrepresented;
(4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (5) resulting damage. (Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 243.) A positive assertion is required; an omission or an implied
assertion or representation is not sufficient.
(Id.) Generally, parties
cannot read something into a neutral statement in order to justify a claim for
negligent misrepresentation. (OCM
Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 835, 854.) Although an
“implied” assertion or representation is not enough, when the defendant
purports to convey the “whole truth” about a subject, “misleading half-truths”
about the subject may constitute positive assertions for the purpose of
negligent misrepresentation. (Id.)
An actionable
misrepresentation must be made about past or existing facts; statements
regarding future events are merely deemed opinions. (Neu-Visions Sports, Inc. v.
Soren/McAdam/Bartells (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 303, 309-10.) Under certain circumstances, expressions of
professional opinion are treated as representations of fact. (Public Employees' Retirement System v.
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 643, 662.) When a statement, although in the form of an
opinion, is not a casual expression of belief but a deliberate affirmation of
the matters stated, it may be regarded as a positive assertion of fact. (Id.)
Moreover, when a party possesses or holds itself out as possessing
superior knowledge or special information or expertise regarding the subject
matter and a plaintiff is so situated that it may reasonably rely on such
supposed knowledge, information, or expertise, the defendant's representation
may be treated as one of material fact.
(Id.)
The third cause of action is rooted in: 1) the assurances
that Plaintiff would have a long-term position with Moving Defendant; 2) the
representations about Moving Defendant’s growth and financial backing; and 3) the
simultaneous omission of information regarding Moving Defendant’s ongoing
reorganization. (See, e.g., FAC
¶¶ 9, 14, 22-23.) Moving Defendant
argues that the claim is based on nonactionable opinions regarding the terms of
Plaintiff’s future employment and the non-actionable omission of the
reorganization. While the Court agrees
with Moving Defendant’s recitation of the law, the Court takes a less
compartmentalized approach to its consideration of the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s allegations. Reading the
allegations as a whole and drawing inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court
finds that the FAC sufficiently alleges that Moving Defendant misrepresented
itself as a potential employer by emphasizing its growth and incoming projects
while failing to inform Plaintiff of the ongoing reorganization, and the
possibility of related personnel changes.
In context, these allegations may be reasonably construed as an
actionable “half-truth” about the current state of Moving Defendant’s work
environment. (See OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets
Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 854.)[1] Furthermore, the affirmative statements about
growth combined with the omission of the reorganization may be construed as a
misrepresentation of a present fact. The
Court therefore OVERRULES the Demurrer.
Moving Defendant is ordered to file and serve a responsive pleading
within 20 days of the date of this order.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this
ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to
the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on
the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive
an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed
off calendar.
Dated
this 1st day of September 2023
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Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court |
[1] The
Court notes that the argument in Plaintiff’s opposition (the “Opposition”)
regarding actionable omissions of fact misstate the law, and Plaintiff’s legal
authorities only apply to intentional concealment claims. (See Opposition 3:1-4:15.)