Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 23STCV04747, Date: 2024-05-15 Tentative Ruling

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“Defendant”)

This is a lemon law action under the Song-Beverly Act (“Song-Beverly” or the “Act”) arising from an allegedly defective 2018 Land Rover Range Rover (the “Vehicle”) purchased by Plaintiff on September 21, 2018. Over the next four years, Plaintiff made frequent visits to Defendant’s authorized dealership for issues with the Vehicle’s tires, leaks, overheating, an abnormally loud engine, an abnormal clinking noise, the infotainment system and the coolant system.

Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint against Defendant, alleging causes of action for: (1) breach of express warranty, (2) breach of implied warranty and (3) violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b) of the Song-Beverly Act.

According to the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel, Priscilla Le (“Le”): (1) on May 1, 2023, Plaintiff served Defendant with her first set of Requests for Production (“RFPs”) and Special Interrogatories (“SIs”)(Morse Decl. at ¶ 17; Exhs. M and N); (2) on June 2, 2023, Defendant mailed its responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs and SIs, which were deficient and contained numerous objections (Id. at ¶ 18 and Exhs. O and P); (3) on July 26, 2023, Plaintiff initiated the meet and confer process by sending a letter to Defendant that specified the deficiencies in Defendant’s responses (Id. at ¶ 19 and Exh. Q); (4) the parties continued to correspond via email and telephonically and agreed that Defendant’s further responses were due September 8, 2023 (Id. at ¶¶ 20-26); and (5) Defendant did not provide any supplemental responses or produce any additional documents. (Id. at ¶27.)

Under California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 2017.010, “any person may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “The Court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611.) “For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.” (Id.) Discovery statutes are “construed liberally in favor of disclosure.” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 434.) Where a party objects to a motion to compel, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) To support an objection to a request for production of documents, the objecting party has to establish the validity of its objections with supporting facts in order to meet its burden. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 195, 198.)

Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One, nos. 10, 15, 20, 23-26, 28, 29, 35-36, 7-49, and 51-64 (the “RFP Motion”). Plaintiff groups these requests into three categories:

(2) Those relating to Defendant’s knowledge, internal investigations, analysis and publications of defects plaguing the Vehicle (nos. 15, 28-29, 37-39, 40-49, 51-64); and

(3) Those relating to Defendant’s warranty and vehicle repurchase policies, procedures, and practices (nos. 10, 20, 23-26).

Plaintiff asserts that: (1) the scope of allowed discovery is broad; (2) Defendant’s boilerplate objections demonstrate a lack of good faith; and (3) the requests, including those for materials relating to similar defects in other vehicles, are relevant and necessary to establish Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Claims.

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s RFP Motion on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing good cause because the requests are overbroad, burdensome and seek irrelevant information; (2) Plaintiff has not established the requested information’s relevance; (3) Plaintiff’s cited authorities do not pertain to relevancy or the scope of discovery; (4) the requests seek production involving third party privacy rights and proprietary information; and (5) Requests nos. 36 and 36 demand the production of parts and components not within Defendant’s possession, custody or control.

These requests seek the production of “Any parts or components of the SUBJECT VEHICLE that were returned to YOU by any of YOUR authorized repair facilities” or “retained by YOUR authorized repair facilities.” (Le Decl., Exh. M.) Plaintiff contends that this request “is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of materials regarding the Plaintiff’s subject vehicle such as its brochures and advertisements etc., Sales Documents, Repair Orders, and any document related to any service adjustments to the Vehicle prior to delivery.” (Motion, 10:7-10.) This is, as Defendant noted, a misrepresentation of the requests, which in fact seek the physical parts and components that were removed from the Vehicle. A motion to compel further responses to the production of documents must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(b)(1); see Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223-224 [“Code Civ. Proc., § 2031 . . . requires a party seeking to compel such production to set forth the specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand”].) Plaintiff has not shown good cause for discovery of replaced car parts. Even in her reply brief, Plaintiff failed to offer any justification for requesting the production of parts and components, and instead confusingly refers to the materials sought in Requests nos. 35 and 36 as “documents”. (See Reply, 6:1.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for further responses to RFP nos. 35 and 36 is DENIED.

Initially, the Court notes that this grouping of requests is different from Plaintiff’s categories. The difference is that Requests nos. 28 and 29 are not in this category because they pertain to Defendant’s internal policies regarding refunds and replacements, which are more fitting for the third category of requests analyzed below.

These requests seek documents related to the Vehicle, including diagnostic trouble codes in the Vehicle (no. 15) and communications between Defendant and its authorized repair facilities regarding diagnosis and/or repairs involving the Vehicle (no. 40).

These requests also seek information about other vehicles of the same year, make and model as the Vehicle, including: complaints by other customers about defects similar to the ones complained about by Plaintiff (nos. 37 and 38); all documents related to vehicles of the same year, make and model that Defendant has repurchased or replaced (no. 39); communications between Defendant and its authorized repair facilities regarding diagnosis and/or repairs involving the coolant manifold pipe, a Powertrain Control Module (PCM) reprogram, codes P0457-76, P008B-07, and P0496-00, an EVAP system or coolant leak, the EVAP purge valve causing abnormal noise, and pressure testing the cooling system (nos. 41-49); failure rates of the radiator coolant hose, the coolant outlet pipe, the outlet pipe base, and the EVAP purge valve (nos. 51-54); complaints about illuminated warning lights for low coolant or check engine, vehicle alignment feeling off, steering wheel feeling heavy, overheating, and loud engine (nos. 55-60); and the number of warranty claims for the front coolant manifold pipe, the radiator coolant hose, the evaporative emission canister purge valve and the EVAP purge valve. (Nos. 61-64.)

Plaintiff contends that this second category of documents “is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of materials regarding [the] nature and duration of the defects, Defendant’s awareness of the defects and Defendant’s inability to repair the defects.” (Motion, 10:11-13.) Plaintiff contends that these documents evince a necessary element of Plaintiff’s case (that defects exist), and that Plaintiff’s expert requires the technical information requested to give reliable opinion testimony as to the nature of the defects. (Motion, 10:13-20.)

In opposition, Defendant likens Plaintiff’s requests to the ones made in Calcor, which were stricken down for overbreadth. There, the plaintiff requested “all purchase orders” for the allegedly defective part, as well as documents relating to the “design, modification, engineering manufacture, testing, rejection, revision, modification, or acceptance” of the part. (Calcor, supra, at 219-220.) The Calcor court characterized the subcontractor’s requests as “very simple” in that “[i]t orders Calcor to produce everything in its possession which has anything to do with” that part. (Id.) This is not the case here. Plaintiff’s requests are limited to customer repurchases and replacements, complaints and warranty claims about a limited number of issues, and communications between Defendant and its dealerships about those issues in question. Plaintiff’s requests, to the extent they concern vehicles other than the Subject Vehicle, are further limited by year, make and model. Therefore, Defendant cannot rely on Calcor to avoid production of documents.

Defendant also attacks the authorities cited by Plaintiff. In her RFP Motion, Plaintiff relies heavily on Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138 and Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967 for the position that the scope of discovery is not limited to Plaintiff’s vehicle; rather, similar defects experienced by other customers are also discoverable. Defendant contends that “there is no indication in these cases that the manufacturer ever raised an objection based on relevance during discovery” and “courts do not adjudicate matters that are not timely raised” because they are considered waived. (Opp’n, 8:18-9:10.) It is true that neither the Donlen court nor the Doppes court address the permissible scope of discovery. The procedural history of the cases, however, establishes that trial courts routinely permit discovery of evidence pertaining to defects in vehicles other than the plaintiff’s vehicle.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has shown good cause for the RFPs in this category. The requests are limited to the specific kinds of defects Plaintiff experienced with the Vehicle. The requests are further limited to cars of the same year, make and model as the Vehicle (i.e., 2018 Land Rover Range Rovers) that presented those defects. This information is relevant to prove whether Defendant had knowledge of those defects, and whether Defendant had the ability to repair those defects, as any willfulness in violating Song-Beverly would entitle Plaintiff to a civil penalty. Defendant has not shown how compliance with these requests would be overly burdensome or expensive. In fact, Defendant does not address this issue beyond a passing characterization of the requests as “burdensome” (Opp’n, 4:22.)

To the extent these requests seek production of documents that involve third party privacy rights and Defendant’s proprietary information, Plaintiff has stated that she is willing to stipulate to a protective order. Defendant may redact personal information, such as personal addresses and cell phone number of others. (Reply, 3:7-17.) The parties are ordered to submit to the Court within ten (20) days of the date of this Order a stipulated [Proposed] Protective Order in the form for “Confidential Documents” and not for “Highly Confidential Documents” as set forth on the Court’s website.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for further responses to RFP nos. 15, 37-39, 40-49, and 51-64 is GRANTED.

These requests seek all versions of the Warranty Policies and Procedures Manual published by Defendant and provided to its authorized repair facilities in California, effective from Plaintiff’s date of purchase of the Vehicle to the present date (no. 10); documents concerning the handling of repeat complaints by customers regarding their vehicles (no. 20); documents that Defendant uses and had used to evaluate consumer requests for repurchase pursuant to the Act (no. 23); and Defendant’s policies, procedures and/or instructions for the handling of customer complaints (no. 24), the issuance of refunds or replacement vehicles (nos. 25 and 26); and the issuance of recalls and technical service bulletins (nos. 28 and 29).

Plaintiff contends that this category of requests is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of documents regarding Defendant’s good faith compliance with those duties, which is relevant to the Act’s civil penalty provision. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. The requests are, however, overbroad and redundant. The timeframe for the documents should be limited to the period beginning on the date of purchase of the Vehicle on September 21, 2018 and ending on the date of Plaintiff’s last visit to Defendant’s dealership on December 23, 2022. The requests should be geographically limited to policies and procedures that were in effect in California during that period. Further, Request no. 20 is denied in its entirety. As phrased, it would have Defendant produce details of all repeat complaints that any purchaser or lessee of any vehicle has made, which is an overbroad request.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for further responses to RFP no. 20 is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for further responses to RFPs nos. 10, 23-26, and 28-29 is GRANTED with the above time and place restrictions.

Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s SROGs, Set One, nos. 14, 20, 25, 39, 41, and 43 (the “SI Motion”). These interrogatories seek the identification of witnesses: those who inspected and tested the Vehicle (no. 20) and those who performed warranty repairs on the Vehicle (no. 14); those who participated in the investigation relating to Plaintiff’s complaints of the Vehicle (no. 41); the person in charge of the customer relations department in the district or region having jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint (no. 25); those who made the decision not to repurchase and/or replace the Vehicle (no. 43); and the supervisor in charge of ensuring Defendant properly determines whether a vehicle should be repurchased or replaced under Song Beverly (no. 39). Plaintiff does not request monetary sanctions.

Plaintiff asserts that: (1) the scope of allowed discovery is broad; (2) Defendant’s boilerplate objections demonstrate a lack of good faith; and (3) the identification of witnesses is a proper subject of discovery.

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s Motion on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff violated Dept. 56 rules by failing to schedule an Informal Discovery Conference (“IDC”) prior to filing her motions, (2) Plaintiff has not and cannot meet her burden of showing good cause because the interrogatories are overbroad, burdensome and seek irrelevant information; (3) Plaintiff has not established the requested information’s relevance; and (4) Defendant’s objections are reasonably particularized.

Defendant is hereby informed that with the sunsetting of the requirements for an IDC in CCP § 2016.080, there is no longer a statutory basis for Courts to impose the requirement of an IDC before a motion to compel, and the Court no longer orders an IDC in the absence of a stipulation of the parties.

Defendant contends that it has already identified all known persons who have worked on the Vehicle by providing their name and technician number in its response to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatory no. 12.1. (Opp’n, 7:5-10; Le Decl., Exhibit P, Defendant’s Responses to SIs nos. 14 & 20.) In response to Form Interrogatory no. 12.1’s request for the contact information of witnesses, Defendant answered:

the current and/or former service managers at the JLRNA-authorized service facility(s) that serviced/repaired the vehicle (including, but not limited to, Service Manager Scott Paul Schluttenhofer at Jaguar Land Rover Anaheim Hills and Service Manager Nathan Krafczyk at Jaguar Land Rover South Bay), and the service advisors and technicians identified in the repair orders (including, but not limited to, Service Advisor Susana Nava and Technician 1020-Richard Lloyd at Jaguar Land Rover Anaheim Hills and Service Advisors Sergio Jimenez, Evan Sheehan, Rodrigo Chavez, Juan Reyes III, Magdoline Soliman, Jolie Speckmeyer, Kelly Lokken and Lizeth Loza and Technicians 6503-Kevin Ruiz, 1613-Gabriel Gutierrez, 6380-Rafael Romos, 5706-Luis J. Ramos, 6998-Leonardo Avalos, 6597-Christian Cancino, 5645, 8928 and 9020 at Jaguar Land Rover South Bay (further identifying information presently unknown). JLRNA continues to collect repair orders from the third party service facility(s) and will identify the service advisors and technicians indicated therein once such documents are obtained. Discovery is continuing, and JLRNA reserves the right to supplement this response based upon further investigation.

This information is responsive to SIs nos. 14 and 20. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to these SIs is MOOT as to SI nos. 14 and 20.

Defendant contends that SROG no. 25 (seeking identification of the person in charge of the customer relations department in the district or region having jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint) is irrelevant and overbroad because Defendant has no record of Plaintiff contacting its customer relations department prior to the instant lawsuit. The Court agrees with Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion must be DENIED as to SROG no. 25 for irrelevance.

Similarly, as to the remaining interrogatories, Defendant contends that Plaintiff never complained to Defendant or asked Defendant to repurchase her car, or otherwise put Defendant on notice of her lemon law claims prior to this lawsuit. Thus, any repurchase evaluation or decision would have been made after Plaintiff filed suit and with the advice of counsel. The requested information is therefore covered by the attorney-client privilege and protected from disclosure by the attorney work product doctrine. (See Opp’n, 2:7-14; Defendant’s Response to SROG no. 39.) However, Plaintiff only requests the identity and contact information of the individuals who participated in the investigation of Plaintiff’s complaints of the Vehicle (no. 41); those who made the decision not to repurchase and/or replace the Vehicle (no. 43); and the supervisor in charge of ensuring Defendant properly determines whether a vehicle should be repurchased or replaced under the Song Beverly Act (no. 39). Defendant does not provide any authority for the position that attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine protect the identity of individuals employed by a corporate client. Moreover, as discussed in the RFP section, the scope of discovery is broad and includes, for example, how Defendant has handled complaints by other owners of 2018 Range Rover. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is also GRANTED as to SROGs nos. 39, 41, and 43.

Pursuant to the discussion above, Plaintiff’s RFP Motion is DENIED in part, as to RFP no. 20, and GRANTED in part, as to RFPs nos. 15, 37-39, 40-49 and 51-64, and as to RFPs nos. 10, 23-26, and 28-29 with time and place restrictions. Plaintiff’s SI Motion is DENIED in part, as to SI nos. 14, 20 and 25, and GRANTED in part, as to SI nos. 39, 41, and 43.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court