Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 23STCV04747, Date: 2025-04-09 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“Defendant”)

This is a lemon-law action. Plaintiff’s complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty; and (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b).

On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees (the “Motion”). On March 26, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition to the Motion (the “Opposition”). On April 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply to the Opposition (the “Reply”).

Attorneys’ fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute or law. (Code Civil Procedure (“CCP”), § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).)

In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. Civil Code section 1794 states: If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)

The attorney claiming fees bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (CCP, § 1033.5 subd. (c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Id.)

In determining a reasonable attorneys’ fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the

number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Id.) These facts include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Id.)

Plaintiff moves for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $72,652.50, consisting of: (1) $48,435.00 in attorney’s fees; (2) a 1.5 multiplier enhancement in the amount of $24,217.50; and (3) $5,362.18 in costs and expenses.

Plaintiff contends that she is the prevailing party in this action because of a signed 998 offer in which Defendant ultimately agreed to settle this case. The Court agrees and Defendant does not dispute this. Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action entitled to a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees.

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [“The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [her] court.”].)

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees for 2 attorneys from JSGM Law LLP (“JSGM”) and 3 attorneys and 2 paralegals from Wirtz Law APC (“Wirtz”). Their hourly rates are as follows: (1) Guy Mizrahi: $550/hr; (2) Priscilla Le: $350/hr; (3) Amy R. Rotman: $550/hr; (4) Jessica R. Underwood: $550/hr; (5) Rebecca Evans: $300/hr; (6) Dalia Zaki: $250/hr; and (7) Laura Rose Schwartz: $450/hr.

For each of the JSGM attorneys, attorney Guy Mizrahi attests to their legal experience and the reasonableness of their rates. (Mizrahi Decl., ¶¶ 7-12.) For each of the Wirtz attorneys and paralegals, attorney Richard M. Wirtz attests to their legal experience and the reasonableness of their rates. (Wirtz Decl., ¶¶ 14-25.) The Court finds, based on the submitted evidence in the Mizrahi and Wirtz declarations and the Court’s own experience, that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ requested hourly rates are reasonable for attorneys with their experience and in this area of the law. The range of rates charged in this matter by JSGM and Wirtz are reasonable for attorneys of similar experience, in the same area, dealing with the same subject matter. (See Goglin v BMW of North America (2016) LLC 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473-74 [approving $575 per hour fee on lemon law action for attorneys in Los Angeles].)

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on 52.20 hours spent by attorneys at JSGM and 71.4 hours spent by attorneys and paralegals at Wirtz litigating this case through this Motion for which Plaintiff has submitted billing records. (Mizrahi Decl., Ex. 1; Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1.) At the rates identified above, Plaintiff represents that she is seeking a lodestar of $48,435.00.

Defendant objects to several of Plaintiff’s requested hours on the grounds that the hours and fees are excessive.

First, Defendant objects to 1.1 hour ($605.00) billed on February 14 and March 6, 2023 for drafting and preparing the Complaint and 0.5 hours ($275.00) billed on June 19, 2023 for preparing a case management statement on grounds that these tasks were straightforward and could have been handled by a paralegal as opposed to being billed at the highest partner rate. (Opp., p. 6:8-20.) Upon review, the Court does not find that the time spent on these tasks was unnecessary or billed at excessive rates.

Second, Defendant objects to 1.9 hours ($1,045.00) billed on May 1, 2023 to prepare written discovery on grounds that the discovery was standard and formulaic and required little customization for Plaintiff’s case. (Opp., pp. 6:21-7:6.) Upon review, the Court does not find that 1.9 hours was an unreasonable amount of time to spend preparing the discovery requests.

Third, Defendant objects to the time spent related to the meet and confer process regarding Defendant’s discovery responses on grounds that the time spent was excessive and inefficient. (Opp., p. 7:7-7:19.) Specifically, Defendant objects to 7.9 hours ($3,115.00) billed on July 19, 20 and 24, and August 3 and 4, 2023 for drafting and reviewing the meet and confer letter, as well as 1.0 hour ($350.00) billed on August 4 and 28, 2023 for the actual meet and confer calls. The Court finds that the amount of time spent preparing Plaintiff’s meet and confer is slightly overstated given that it pertains to standard discovery in Lemon Law actions. The Court will thus reduce the fees by 2.0 hours, in the amount of $700.00.

Fourth, Defendant objects to the time spent on the motions to compel discovery on grounds that the hours billed were excessive considering the extensive meet and confer process. (Opp., pp. 7:20-8:4.) Specifically, Defendant objects to 10.5 hours ($3,675.00) billed on September 21 and 22, 2023 to draft Plaintiff’s discovery motions, as well as 4.6 hours ($1,610.00) billed on May 2 and 8, to review and reply to Defendant’s opposition. Upon review, the Court does not find that Plaintiff spent an unreasonable amount of time on this discovery dispute, as the discovery was challenged and the Court ordered Defendant to produce additional responses and documents in response.

Fifth, Defendant objects to 1.0 hour ($350.00) billed on January 17, 18 and 26, 2024 for time spent regarding the informal discovery conference on grounds that the time was incurred due to Plaintiff’s oversight. (Opp., p. 8:5-13.) Upon review, the Court does not find that the time spent on this task was unreasonable.

Lastly, Defendant objects to 13.5 hours ($7,175.00) for actual and anticipated time spent on the instant Motion on grounds that the time spent was excessive. (Opp., p. 8:14-22.) While the billing and supporting evidence may have taken some time to gather, the Court finds that the time as requested is excessive and not reasonable. The Court therefore reduces the fee by $2,500.00.

Thus, having analyzed the motions and pleadings filed, and having reviewed the billing statements provided, the Court determines that a reasonable lodestar in this case, based on the foregoing discussion, is $45,235.00.

While the lodestar reflects the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community, it may be adjusted based on various factors, including “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee

award” and (4) the success achieved. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)

Nonetheless, the court must not consider extraordinary skill and the other Serrano factors to the extent these are already included with the lodestar. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1138-1139.) “[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been

provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the

lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be

Plaintiff requests a lodestar multiplier enhancement of 1.5 in the additional amount of $24,217.50 for risk and delay and because public interest justifies a multiplier. (Mot., pp. 13:22-15:12.)

The Court finds that under the circumstances of this case, a lodestar multiplier is not appropriate. While Plaintiff argues that counsel accepted the case only on a contingency basis and Plaintiff’s attorneys advanced all litigation costs, the Court finds that such consideration and risk is already included within the lodestar amount. That is because the substantial hourly rates allowed for by the court are hourly rates for lemon law cases done on a contingency basis. Based on the foregoing, the Court declines to award a lodestar multiplier.

Allowable costs “shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (CCP, § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) Any items not specifically mentioned by statute “may be allowed or denied in the court's discretion.” (CCP, § 1033.5 subd. (c)(4).)

Song-Beverly allows a successful plaintiff to recover both “costs” and “expenses.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Courts have held that “it is clear the Legislature intended the word

‘expenses' to cover items not included in the detailed statutory definition of ‘costs.”’ (Jensen v.

BMW of North America, Inc. (“Jensen”) (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137.) The court in Jensen

held that “[t]he legislative history indicates the Legislature exercised its power to permit the

recovery of expert witness fees by prevailing buyers under the Act … ,” noting that the

legislature included “expenses” in the lemon law act because '“[t]he addition of awards of “costs

and expenses” by the court to the consumer to cover such out-of-pocket expenses as filing fees,

expert witness fees, marshall’s fees, etc., should open the litigation process to everyone.’

Plaintiff requests a total of $5,362.18 in costs and expenses. (Mizrahi Decl., ¶ 43; Wirtz Decl., ¶ 52.) Defendant does not object to the costs or expenses sought.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED, in part. The court awards $45,235.00. in attorneys’ fees and $5,362.18 in costs. Payment of these funds is due to Wirtz Law APC within 45 days of this Order.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court