Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 23STCV09571, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTIES: Defendant Mark Crawford, Mary Crawford aka Joanna Crawford, Apts Managements LLC, Gelber Apts, LLC, and Expo Apts, LLC

This is an action arises from alleged uninhabitable conditions in four adjacent apartment complexes located at 4018 Gelber Place, Los Angeles, CA 90008, 4024 Gelber Place, Los Angeles, CA 90008, 4029 Gelber Place, Los Angeles, CA 90008, and 4036 Gelber Place, Los Angeles, CA 90008 (the “Subject Properties”). On August 30, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against, inter alia, Defendants Mark Crawford, Mary Crawford a/k/a Joanna Crawford, Apts Mgmt, LLC, Gelber Apts, LLC, and Expo Apts, LLC (collectively, the “Crawford Defendants”) alleging causes of action for: (1) negligence; (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (4) nuisance; (5) premises liability; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (8) violation of Civil Code §1942.4; (9) constructive eviction and willful interruption of services; (10) retaliation; (11) harassment; (12) violation of unfair competition laws; (13) violation of tenant anti-harassment ordinance; (14) violation of Civil Code §1940.3(b); (15) violation of Fair Employment and Housing Act; (16) violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act; (17) violation of disabled persons act; (18) intentional misrepresentation; (19) negligent misrepresentation; and (20) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It is noted that only the first through twelfth and twentieth causes of action are directed at the Crawford Defendants.

The Crawford Defendants filed a demurrer to FAC pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.010 on the ground that they have been improperly joined in this action. Also, the Crawford Defendants move the Court for an order that they are tried separately pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 379.5.

“A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) “[T]he court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.” (Id.) “The court accepts as true all material factual allegations, giving them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.” (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) In the demurrer context a court “may also take notice of exhibits attached to the complain[t].” (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.) “If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence.” (Id.)

A party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may file a special demurrer on the ground that there is a defect or misjoinder of parties. (Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court (1977) 36 Cal. 3d 15, 21-22.) This defect must appear on the fact of the complaint or in matters judicially noticed. (Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 100 Cal. App. 4th 193, 198.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 389, “defect” means a necessary or indispensable party is absent from the action. Whereas, “misjoinder” states that a party has been improperly joined to an action.

(a) All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them:

(1) any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all persons will arise in the action; or

(2) a claim, right, or interest adverse to them in the property or controversy which is the subject of the action.

Special Demurrer for Misjoinder Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(d)

The Crawford Defendants specially demur to the FAC on the ground that they have been improperly joined in this action as there are no common questions of law or fact arising out of the same transaction or events for all of the named defendants. (Demurrer at pp. 9-12.)

“Although modern joinder statutes are to be liberally construed and applied, neither the statutes nor the case law in California permit unlimited joinder.” (Hoag v. Sup. Ct. (1962) 207 Cal. App. 2d 611, 618.) Where there has been no showing that different defendants operated cooperatively to cause the injury, a plaintiff has not established that defendants are jointly and severally liable. (Id.) In Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Adams (1985) 170 Cal. App. 3d 712 (disapproved on other grounds by Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 395), an insurance company sued numerous homeowner policy holders for declaratory relief seeking a judicial declaration that the policy did not provide coverage for damages arising from a single storm. The court held there was a misjoinder of parties even though the same storm played a role in each claim. The court stated that while it may be possible to join certain of the defendants together under a more specific factual allegations, it was improper to label damages herein to innumerable types of structures occurring at widely separate locations across the state, resulting from a myriad of causes and under various conditions as the same transaction or occurrence. (Id. at 723.)

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that, during the relevant time period, several different individuals and entities as defendants have had ownership and/or management interests in the Subject Properties. (FAC ¶¶ 5, 74-104.) Effectively, these defendants are alleged to have failed to maintain the Subject Properties in a habitable condition and were aware of the unsafe and unsanitary conditions present at the Subject Properties. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3, 5-6.) As to the Crawford Defendants, they are only alleged to have had an interest in the Subject Properties to varying degrees between February 2012 to November 2017. (Id. at ¶¶ 79-86.) The only allegation linking the Crawford Defendants with the remaining defendants is an allegation that each defendant was an agent of the other defendants during the relevant periods of time (Id. at ¶ 104.) However, there are no allegations to suggest that the Crawford Defendants’ ownership or management of the Subject Properties overlapped with those of the remaining defendants.

Plaintiffs argue that the Crawford Defendants have a common interest in all four of the properties based on the overlap of ownership and management of the Subject Properties. (Opposition at pg. 4.) While the allegations within the FAC suggest that there is a common issue regarding the purported mismanagement and uninhabitable conditions of the Subject Properties, the FAC fails to show how the Crawford Defendants “operated cooperatively” with the remaining defendants to cause Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Hoag, supra, 207 Cal. App. 2d at 618.) Moreover, while the FAC alleges that all defendants were agents of the other, this conclusory allegation is undermined by the fact that the Crawford Defendants’ ownership or management of the Subject Properties did not overlap with that of the remaining defendants. Thus, as alleged, any conduct of the Crawford Defendants relating to Subject Properties cannot be imputed to the remaining defendants and visa verse. As a result, any harm that the Plaintiffs suffered by the Crawford Defendants’ mismanagement is unrelated to the harm purportedly caused by the remaining defendants. Therefore, the Crawford Defendants have been improperly joined in this action and any viable claim should be made in a separate lawsuit against them.

Plaintiffs also argue that the Crawford Defendants have failed to show that they suffered any prejudice for being improperly joined in this action. (Opposition at pg. 5, relying on Anaya v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 228, 231 and Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 193, 198) The Court disagrees with this assertion because Plaintiffs’ reliance on Anaya and Royal Surplus Lines Ins. is misplaced. The issue in Anaya was a misjoinder of plaintiff under section 378 and not a misjoinder of defendants under section 379. The court there held that the joinder of numerous plaintiffs suing defendants for their exposure of a hazardous chemical at the same location was proper. The court found a common question of law or fact because the injuries were for the same chemical at the same location. The issue here is misjoinder of defendants and whether defendants who have no relationship amongst each other (or at least the FAC does not allege any relationship) can be sued in the same lawsuit.

Moreover, the rule established in Royal Surplus Lines Ins. is that a properly joined defendant cannot object to misjoinder of an improperly joined defendant on his behalf. (Id., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at 198.) As stated above, the Crawford Defendants have been improperly joined in this action, and consequently, they are prejudiced in defending against a lawsuit where there are no common issues of law or fact amongst the defendants.

Accordingly, the Court sustains the instant demurrer because the Crawford Defendants have been improperly joined in this action.

“Where the defect raised by … demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question.” (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)

Plaintiffs request that the Court grant leave to amend in order to cure the defect found in the FAC. (Opposition at pp. 6-7.) Notably, Plaintiffs fail to show how the issue of misjoinder can be cured because Plaintiffs do not suggest in their opposition that the Crawford Defendants acted cooperatively with the remaining defendants to cause harm to the Plaintiffs. Thus, because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden, the Court denies their request for leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, because the Crawford Defendants have been improperly joined in this action, the Court SUSTAINS their demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(d) without leave to amend. Consequently, the Crawford Defendants’ request pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 379.5 is DENIED as moot.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court