Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 23STCV09571, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

MOVING PARTIES: Defendant Mark Crawford, Mary Crawford aka Joanna Crawford, Apts Managements LLC, Gelber Apts, LLC, and Expo Apts, LLC

This is an action which arises from allegedly uninhabitable conditions in four adjacent apartment complexes located at 4018 Gelber Place, Los Angeles, CA 90008, 4024 Gelber Place, Los Angeles, CA 90008, 4029 Gelber Place, Los Angeles, CA 90008, and 4036 Gelber Place, Los Angeles, CA 90008 (the “Subject Properties”). On August 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) against, inter alia, Defendants Mark Crawford, Mary Crawford a/k/a Joanna Crawford, Apts Mgmt, LLC, Gelber Apts, LLC, and Expo Apts, LLC (collectively, the “Crawford Defendants”) alleging causes of action for: (1) negligence; (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (4) nuisance; (5) premises liability; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (8) violation of Civil Code §1942.4; (9) constructive eviction and willful interruption of services; (10) retaliation; (11) harassment; (12) violation of unfair competition laws; (13) violation of tenant anti-harassment ordinance; (14) violation of Civil Code §1940.3(b); (15) violation of Fair Employment and Housing Act; (16) violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act; (17) violation of disabled persons act; (18) intentional misrepresentation; (19) negligent misrepresentation; and (20) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As in the previous versions of the complaint, only the first through twelfth and the twentieth causes of action are directed at the Crawford Defendants.

The Crawford Defendants filed a demurrer to the TAC pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.010 on the ground that they have been improperly joined in this action.

“A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) “[T]he court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.” (Id.) “The court accepts as true all material factual allegations, giving them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts.” (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) In the demurrer context a court “may also take notice of exhibits attached to the complain[t].” (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.) “If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence.” (Id.)

A party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may file a special demurrer on the ground that there is a defect or misjoinder of parties. (Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court (1977) 36 Cal. 3d 15, 21-22.) This defect must appear on the fact of the complaint or in matters judicially noticed. (Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 100 Cal. App. 4th 193, 198.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 389, “defect” means a necessary or indispensable party is absent from the action. Whereas, “misjoinder” states that a party has been improperly joined to an action.

(a) All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them:

(1) any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all persons will arise in the action; or

(2) a claim, right, or interest adverse to them in the property or controversy which is the subject of the action.

Special Demurrer for Misjoinder Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(d)

The Crawford Defendants specially demur to the TAC on the ground that they have been improperly joined in this action as there are no common questions of law or fact arising out of the same transaction or events for all of the named defendants. (Demurrer at pp. 10-13.)

“Although modern joinder statutes are to be liberally construed and applied, neither the statutes nor the case law in California permit unlimited joinder.” (Hoag v. Sup. Ct. (1962) 207 Cal. App. 2d 611, 618.) Where there has been no showing that different defendants operated cooperatively to cause the injury, a plaintiff has not established that defendants are jointly and severally liable. (Id.) In Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Adams (1985) 170 Cal. App. 3d 712 (disapproved on other grounds by Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 395), an insurance company sued numerous homeowner policy holders for declaratory relief seeking a judicial declaration that the policy did not provide coverage for damages arising from a single storm. The court held there was a misjoinder of parties even though the same storm played a role in each claim. The court stated that while it may be possible to join certain of the defendants together under a more specific factual allegations, it was improper to label damages herein to innumerable types of structures occurring at widely separate locations across the state, resulting from a myriad of causes and under various conditions as the same transaction or occurrence. (Id. at 723.)

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that, during the relevant time period, several different individuals and entities as defendants have had ownership and/or management interests in the Subject Properties. (TAC ¶¶ 5, 74-105.) They allege these defendants have failed to maintain the Subject Properties in a habitable condition and were aware of the unsafe and unsanitary conditions present at the Subject Properties. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3, 5-7.) As to the Crawford Defendants, they are alleged to have had an interest in the Subject Properties to varying degrees between February 2012 to November 2017. (Id. at ¶¶ 84-93.) The only allegation linking the Crawford Defendants with the remaining defendants is an allegation that each defendant was an agent of the other defendants during the relevant periods of time (Id. at ¶ 105.) However, there are no allegations to suggest that the Crawford Defendants’ ownership or management of the Subject Properties overlapped with those of the remaining defendants or that they acted cooperatively with them.

Plaintiffs argue that the Crawford Defendants have a common interest in all four of the properties based on the overlap of ownership and management of the Subject Properties. (Opposition at pg. 4.) Plaintiffs make the conclusory argument that, “Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants, including the Crawford Defendants, have a strong factual relationship because they all arose from Plaintiffs’ respective tenancies at one of the subject properties. (TAC ¶¶ 1-3, 9-72.) Plaintiffs argue that since all of their claims arise from their tenancies at the subject properties that Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, were owned and/or managed by each named Defendant, joinder between all Defendants is proper under California’s broad and liberal joinder statute.” (Opposition, p. 4, emphasis added.)

While the allegations within the TAC suggest that there may be a common issue regarding the purported mismanagement and uninhabitable conditions of the Subject Properties, the TAC fails to show how the Crawford Defendants “operated cooperatively” with the remaining defendants to cause Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Hoag, supra, 207 Cal. App. 2d at 618.) Plaintiffs fail to allege specific facts by which these Defendants are connected that are anything more than coincidence in owning or managing nearby properties. Moreover, while the TAC alleges that all defendants were agents of the other, this conclusory allegation is undermined by the fact that the Crawford Defendants’ ownership or management of the Subject Properties did not overlap with the remaining defendants. Thus, as alleged, any conduct of the Crawford Defendants relating to Subject Properties cannot be imputed on the remaining defendants and vice versa. As a result, any harm that the Plaintiffs may have suffered as a result of the Crawford Defendants’ mismanagement is unrelated to the harm purportedly caused by the remaining defendants. Therefore, the Crawford Defendants have been improperly joined in this action and any viable claim should be made in a separate lawsuit against them.

Accordingly, the Court sustains the instant demurrer because the Crawford Defendants have been improperly joined in this action.

“Where the defect raised by … demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question.” (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)

Plaintiffs again request the Court to grant leave to amend in order to cure the defect found in the TAC. (Opposition at pp. 9.) Plaintiffs were advised in the July 30, 2024 ruling that they were being given their last chance to amend the complaint in this case. Plaintiffs failed to substantively amend the complaint. Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to show how the issue of misjoinder can be cured because Plaintiffs do not suggest in their opposition that the Crawford Defendants acted cooperatively with the remaining defendants to cause harm to the Plaintiffs.

Thus, because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden, the Court denies their request for leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, because the Crawford Defendants have been improperly joined in this action, the Court SUSTAINS their demurrer without leave to amend.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court