Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 23STCV11680, Date: 2024-02-07 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

Case Number: 23STCV11680    Hearing Date: February 7, 2024    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Hyundai Motor America and Riverside Hyundai (collectively, “Defendants”)  

            The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.

BACKGROUND

            Plaintiff’s complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges: (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty; (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of Song-Beverly Act – Section 1793.2, subdivision (b); and (4) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1796.5.

On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement.  On November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees (the “Motion”) to recover $13,684.50 in attorney’s fees and $1,129.43 in costs expended in the prosecution of this action.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

            Defendants’ objections to the Declaration of Michael Saeedian (“Saeedian Decl.”) are OVERRULED in their entirety.  

DISCUSSION

            A prevailing party in an action under the Song-Beverly Act may be entitled to attorney’s fees.  (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d); see also CCP § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)  Attorney’s fees ordinarily include compensation for all hours reasonably spent, including those necessary to establish and defend the claims.  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.)  The party moving for attorney’s fees has the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.)  Where a case is premised on a contingent fee agreement it is appropriate to award reasonable attorney’s fees for time reasonably expended by the attorney.  (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 755.)  If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.  (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

            As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party who is entitled to attorney’s fees as provided in the Song-Beverly Act.  Plaintiff presents evidence that that on September 12, 2023, Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) that specifically provides for Plaintiff’s recovery of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.  (See Saeedian Decl. ¶ 18.)

Reasonableness of Counsels’ Hourly Rates

In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, his learning, his age and his experience in the particular type of work demanded.  (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659.)  An award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.  (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.)  The verified time statements of attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) 

             A court awards attorney’s fees based on the “lodestar” method which is “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)  The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.  (Id.)  The loadstar figure may be adjusted, based on a consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Id.)  Generally, the reasonable hourly rate used for the lodestar calculation is that prevailing in the community for similar work.  (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616.)  Nevertheless, where an attorney has been awarded attorney’s fees for comparable work at comparable hourly rates in other actions, the hourly rate will be deemed reasonable.  (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473-74.)  Where a defendant does not produce evidence contradicting the reasonableness of plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates, the Court will deem an attorney’s hourly rate reasonable.  (Id. at 473.) 

In cases involving the Song-Beverly Act, the lodestar figure may be augmented or diminished.  (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 819.)  In determining whether or not a lodestar figure will be multiplied for purposes of attorney’s fees, the court takes various relevant factors into account, including: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.  (Id.)

In support of the Motion, Plaintiff provides evidence of counsel’s billing records.  (See Saeedian Decl. ¶10, Exhibit A.)  Three timekeepers billed for work performed during the litigation: two attorneys whose hourly rates are $695 per hour and $525 per hour, and a law clerk whose hourly rate is $250 per hour.  (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 11.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their attorneys’ hourly rates are reasonable based on their qualifications, skills and experience.  (See 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-37.) 

Reasonableness of Requested Fees

Where a party is challenging the reasonableness of attorney’s fees as excessive that party must attack itemized billing with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate or obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable.  (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-64.)  A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.  (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101.)  Attorney billing records are given a presumption of credibility.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s billing records are inflated by time logged for prelitigation client communications and time logged for clerical work.

Defendants provide no authority for their argument that time billed for prelitigation work is not recoverable, and the Court therefore finds that Defendants have not satisfied their burden to show that these billing entries are unreasonable.  The Court finds, however, that some of the time entries logged by Plaintiff’s counsel’s law clerk correspond with work that is primarily clerical in nature.[1]   As a result, the Court finds it appropriate to reduce Plaintiff’s recovery of fees by $300, which represents 1.2 hours of work at a rate of $200 per hour. 

With respect to the costs requested in the Motion, Defendants indicate that they intend to file a motion to tax costs in order to challenge items claimed in the Memorandum of Costs (the “MOC”) filed with the Motion.  Accordingly, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff the costs requested in the Motion to allow Defendants to file their motion to tax costs.

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Motion in accordance with the terms set forth above.  Plaintiff is ordered to refile the MOC included as an exhibit to the Motion within five days of the date of this order.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. 

        Dated this 7th day of February 2024