Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 23STCV13045, Date: 2024-02-22 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.
Case Number: 23STCV13045 Hearing Date: February 22, 2024 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff
Alden Javier Dominguez (“Plaintiff Dominguez”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant
General Motors LLC (“Defendant GM”)
The Court has considered the moving,
opposition, and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This is lemon law action arising from
Plaintiff Dominguez’s purchase of a 2017 Chevrolet Silverado
manufactured/distributed by Defendant GM. Plaintiff Dominguez filed a Complaint
against Defendant GM and DOES 1 through 10, alleging causes of action for: (1)
Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) Violation of Civil
Code Section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) Violation of Civil Code Section
1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) Breach of Express Written Warranty – Civil Code
Sections 1791.2, subdivision (a) and 1794; and (5) Breach of Implied Warranty
of Merchantability – Civil Code Sections 1791.1 and 1794.
Plaintiff Dominguez filed this
instant motion to compel further responses to request for production of
documents, set one. Defendant GM filed an opposition. Plaintiff Dominguez filed
a reply.
MEET AND CONFER
The motion to compel further responses must be
accompanied with a meet and confer declaration.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) The Court finds that Plaintiff Dominguez
sufficiently met and conferred with Defendant GM on this matter prior to
bringing forth this instant motion.
DISCUSSION
A party may file a motion to compel further production if it concludes
that the “statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete,” a
“representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive,”
and “[a]n objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) The
motion must be accompanied by a separate statement, unless no response has been
provided to the request for discovery or where the court has allowed the moving
party to submit in place a concise outline of the discovery request and each
response in dispute. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 3.1345(a)(2) and (3), 3.1345(b).)
The separate statement must provide “all the information necessary to
understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at
issue.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rules
3.1345(c).)
To prevail, the moving party must first offer
specific facts demonstrating “good cause justifying the discovery sought by the
demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) This burden “is met simply by a fact-specific
showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002)
96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) If “good
cause” is shown by the moving party, the burden shifts to the responding party
to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95
Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)¿¿
The court must impose sanctions on a party who
unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further unless the party
acted with substantial justification or other circumstances make imposing a
sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.310, subd. (h).) “[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, the court shall not
impose sanctions on a party or any attorney of a party for failure to provide
electronically stored information that has been lost, damaged, altered, or
overwritten as the result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic
information system.” (Id., §
2031.310, subd. (j)(1).)
Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for
Production of Documents, Set One
Plaintiff
Dominguez moves to strike Defendant GM’s objections and compel further
responses to request for production of documents, set one Nos. 16-21 (the
“Requests”). Plaintiff Dominguez contends Defendant GM has failed to provide
adequate responses to the Requests, which seek documents directly relevant to
his claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Specifically,
Plaintiff Dominguez contends the Requests seek documents relating to Defendant
GM’s internal investigation and analysis of the defects plaguing his vehicle
and establishing that Defendant GM previously knew of such defects but
nevertheless failed to repurchase the vehicle.
Furthermore,
Plaintiff Dominguez argues Defendant GM’s responses lodged boilerplate
objections and utterly non-responsive statements necessitating further
responses. Moreover, Plaintiff Dominguez asserts that to date, Defendant GM has
failed to provide any emails or search protocol, in contravention of its
obligations under the Discovery Act. Plaintiff Dominguez also argues courts
routinely compel production of documents similar to those requested here. To
support this argument Plaintiff Dominguez cites to Doppes v. Bentley Motors,
Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 973, 978-979, 986, and Donlen v. Ford
Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 143-144, 153.
In
Opposition, Defendant GM argues it has already supplemented its document
production with some of the information sought in this motion, pursuant to the
parties’ stipulated protective order. Specifically, Defendant GM contends it
has produced: (1) GM’s Global Warranty History Reports for Plaintiff’s
Silverado, including that vehicle’s Transaction History documenting all the
warranty repairs for which GM paid; (2) the Vehicle Summary and Repair Order
Details for Plaintiff’s Silverado reflecting the amounts paid for warranty
repairs; (3) the
2017 Chevrolet Limited Warranty and Owner Assistance Information (i.e., the
document containing the warranty at issue); (4) BARS Invoice reflecting the
components included in Plaintiff’s Silverado at the time of delivery and the
corresponding MSRP value; (5) copies of any bulletins for all field actions,
including recalls, applicable to the 2017 Chevrolet Silverado; (6) the Owner’s
Manual for the 2017 Chevrolet Silverado; (7) product brochures for the 2017
Chevrolet Silverado; (8) information service bulletins (“ISBs”) and technical
service bulletins (“TSBs”) for the 2017 Chevrolet Silverado, as well as
specific bulletins; (9) Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual and its policies
and procedures used to evaluate lemon law claims and repurchase requests made
under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act during the relevant time period; and (10) information
regarding other customer complaints within GM’s ESI database that are
substantially similar to Plaintiff’s complaint(s) concerning the alleged
“ENGINE DEFECT” – referenced in Plaintiff’s Requests – for vehicles purchased
in California of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle.
Defendant
GM further argues Plaintiff Dominguez does not need documents about other
vehicles because they are irrelevant to the pending claims concerning breach of
warranty. Moreover, Defendant GM contends the Requests impermissibly put the
onus on Defendant GM to determine the scope of the so-called non-conformities
that Plaintiff Dominguez has alleged and this issue is not ripe. Defendant GM
also argues the Requests are facially overbroad and Plaintiff Dominguez does
not need whatever materials may be responsive to the Requests to sustain his
burden of proof in this breach of warranty case. Defendant GM then contends the
cases cited in the moving papers are inapposite because neither Doppes
nor Donlen address discovery. (Opp’n at p. 6:11-16.) Additionally,
Defendant GM argues request No. 18 is overbroad and beyond the claims and
defenses of this instant matter because Plaintiff Dominguez does not need all
recalls, technical service bulletins, or special service messages. Defendant GM
contends Plaintiff Dominguez has refused to narrow the scope of the Requests to
information relevant to this instant matter and none of the information sought
could possibly shed light on whether Plaintiff Dominguez’s vehicle was made to
conform to Defendant GM’s warranty within a reasonable number of repair
attempts.
Finally,
Defendant GM argues Plaintiff Dominguez’s requests impermissibly seek trade
secret material and other protected information. Defendant GM asserts documents
with details about engineering, warranty, and root cause analyses, engineering
and manufacturing specifications and testing, component or product improvement,
and costs and financial forecasts are often discussed in internal
communications, meeting notices and minutes, and presentation materials. (Lu
Decl., ¶¶ 14, 38). Defendant GM further asserts documents Plaintiff Dominguez
seeks may relate to and contain confidential communications between GM
employees and GM’s suppliers and/or sub-suppliers concerning technical,
mechanical, and commercial issues and analyses. (Id., ¶ 38.) Defendant GM then asserts some of the
documents Plaintiff requests may include personally identifiable information. (Id.,
¶ 33.)
In
reply, Plaintiff Dominguez argues he has demonstrated good cause for the
requested discovery because Defendant GM failed to repurchase the defective
vehicle, denied liability in its Answer, and in its Responses to Plaintiff
Dominguez’s request for admission. Plaintiff Dominguez reiterates these
Requests are highly relevant to this present case. Furthermore, Plaintiff
Dominguez argues Defendant GM’s claims that the Requests are overbroad are
misleading and unsupported by the facts. Plaintiff Dominguez contends he has
narrowly tailored the Requests to documents concerning only Engine defects in
vehicles of the same year, make, and model as his vehicle. Moreover, Plaintiff
Dominguez argues there is no burden involved in producing the documents. Last,
Plaintiff Dominguez asserts Defendant GM’s claims of trade secret and
confidentiality are unsubstantiated and moot due to the executed protective
order.
Here,
the Court finds that Defendant GM’s objections to Plaintiff Dominguez’s request
for production off documents, set one Nos. 16-21 require further response.
First, Plaintiff Dominguez’s requests are narrowly tailored as they request
documents concerning the Engine Defects in vehicle of the same year, make, and
model as Plaintiff Dominguez’s vehicle. Secondly, these are not documents
easily accessible to Plaintiff Dominguez and are relevant to him proving his
claims against Defendant GM under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act. Lastly, to the
extent that Defendant GM claims certain documents may contain trade secret,
confidential, and/or personally identifiable information, these requests are
subject to the protective order.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Alden
Javier Dominguez’s motion to further responses to request for production of
documents, set one Nos. 16-21.
Moving
Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed
by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email
and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off
calendar.
Dated this 22nd day of February 2024
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Hon. Holly J.
Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |